Cognitive Akrasia in Moral Psychology and Normative Motivation by Gillette, Brandon
 
 
Cognitive Akrasia in Moral Psychology and Normative Motivation 
By 
©2013 
Brandon Scott Gillette 
 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in Philosophy and the Graduate Faculty of the 
University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy. 
 
________________________________        
    Chairperson Dr. Dale Dorsey       
________________________________        
Dr. John Bricke 
________________________________        
Dr. Ben Eggleston 
________________________________        
Dr. Mabel Rice 
________________________________  
Dr. Sarah Robins 
 ________________________________  
Dr. Tom Tuozzo 
 
Date Defended: 20 November 2013 
 
 
  
ii 
 
 
The Dissertation Committee for Brandon Scott Gillette 
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
 
Cognitive Akrasia in Moral Psychology and Normative Motivation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      ________________________________ 
 Chairperson Dr. Dale Dorsey 
 
 
       
Date approved: 20 November 2013 
 
 
  
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
A number of persistent questions surround akrasia. Is akrasia (acting intentionally 
against one’s own better judgment) possible? If it is, how best to explain akrasia in a way 
consistent with acceptable theories of normative motivation? I argue that akrasia is possible—in 
fact, akrasia is actual. Research in psychology and information science, suitably interpreted, 
contains an empirically informed account of akrasia that is consistent with the traditional 
philosophical concept of akrasia as notably explored by Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Hume, 
Hare, and Davidson. 
My account of akrasia appeals to our best current research in order to develop an account 
of how someone could have knowledge of the good without attending to that knowledge, or 
could make normative judgments that motivate, but that do not include all of the factors at play 
in a more complete normative judgment (i.e. better judgment) that would motivate the agent 
differently. 
Adopting this empirically informed account of akrasia requires abandoning positions that 
are incompatible with its existence. One such view is the view that normative judgments are 
necessarily connected to motivation (often called normative judgment internalism, or NJI). 
Drawing on works by Sarah Stroud and Ralph Wedgwood, I demonstrate that NJI can be 
amended to allow akrasia, long thought to be a straightforward counterexample to NJI, while 
preserving what is plausible about NJI. 
My account of akrasia is termed ‘cognitive akrasia’ because I appeal to cognitive states 
as playing a central role in identifying and understanding akrasia. Preserving an amended NJI by 
means of a strongly cognitive understanding of akrasia means arguing against an opponent of 
NJI, which is normative judgment externalism (NJE).  The most common form of NJE is 
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Humean in character, and explains akrasia in terms of desiderative or other affective states.  That 
is, one is akratic when one judges that A is better than B but has less desire to do A than B. 
My response to NJE as a view that explains akrasia is also empirically informed.  I make 
use of clinical research into addiction and addiction treatment, because addiction has long been a 
fruitful source of examples of akrasia. Many addicts judge it better not to be addicts and yet 
occasionally or repeatedly fail to reform their addictive behavior. In this analysis, I provide a 
plausible family of everyday accounts of persons changing their behavior without changing their 
desires.  I also point out that recent research indicates that specifically cognitive bias 
modification provides better clinical outcomes among addicts than approaches that attempt to 
change the addicts’ desires. One important consequence of cognitive akrasia, then, is that it 
represents support for theories that hold that motivation can be a product of cognitive and not 
only affective states. 
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“At dawn of day, when you dislike being called, have this thought ready: “I am 
called to man’s labour; why then do I make a difficulty if I am going out to do 
what I was born to do and what I was brought into the world for? Is it for this that 
I am fashioned, to lie in bedclothes and keep myself warm?” 
“But this is more pleasant.” 
“Were you born then to please yourself; in fact for feeling, not for action? Can’t 
you see the plants, the birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees each doing his own 
work, helping for their part to adjust a world? And then you refuse to do a man’s 
office and don’t make haste to do what is according to your own nature.” 
“But a man needs rest as well.” 
“I agree, he does, yet Nature assigns limits to rest, as well as to eating and 
drinking, and you nevertheless go beyond her limits, beyond what is sufficient; in 
your actions only this is no longer so, there you keep inside what is in your power. 
The explanation is that you do not love your own self, else surely you would love 
both your nature and her purpose.””
1
 
 
                                                        
1
 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book V 
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INTRODUCTION 
Akrasia, a Greek term often translated ‘weakness of will’ or less often ‘incontinence’, 
means, in a nutshell, acting intentionally against your own better judgment.  Akrasia represents a 
philosophical puzzle because it pits two very plausible statements against one another.  It seems 
obviously true that when we view one option as the better or best option, we are motivated to 
pursue that option instead of the inferior one.  We do not often choose lesser value over greater, 
nor do we choose the worse to the better if we can help it.  This would seem to make it 
impossible to act intentionally against our own better judgment.  It seems just as obviously true 
that we often fail to live up to our own standards for ourselves.  We do not always find the 
courage to be honest despite its seeming to us the right thing, we do not always stick to our diets 
or exercise regimens despite forming such regimens for the best of reasons, and we sometimes 
put off important projects in favor of things that we ourselves know to be less important.  What 
is the difference between cases in which we act in accord with our better judgment and cases in 
which we do not? What can explain this common part of human experience?  
Akrasia posesses a long and distinguished history in Western philosophy. Indeed 
discussion of akrasia as a philosophical puzzle goes all the way back to its Socratic origins.  
Socrates denies the possibility of akrasia while Aristotle devotes a substantial part of the 
Nicomachean Ethics (the first book in the Western tradition treating ethics as its own subject) to 
defending the possibility of akrasia.  Akrasia is mentioned as a difficulty in the writings of the 
Apostle Paul, and it is puzzled over by Augustine and Aquinas.  Disputes concerning the 
possibility and/or intelligibility of akrasia continue through the 20
th 
century in exchanges 
between Hare and Davidson, and contemporary writers like Sarah Stroud, Michael Smith, and 
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Ralph Wedgwood continue to examine whether akrasia is possible, and if it is, how to explain 
akrasia in a way consistent with acceptable theories of normative motivation.  
In the first chapter of this work I supply a conceptual account of akrasia that has 
appeared reasonably consistently through the history of philosophical discussion of akrasia.  I 
also supply a set of common examples of akrasia that have had historical currency, and 
demonstrate that they share a common set of criteria.   The main purpose of this effort is to show 
that the concept of akrasia in which I am interested is the same concept as written and thought 
about by the aforementioned luminaries of Western philosophy from Socrates all the way 
through to the present.  A broad reading of ancient, medieval, and recent accounts of akrasia 
reveals that in all the basics, this is the case.  ‘The basics’ as I put it, are a set of features that 
would apply to any alleged instance of akrasia. The features are these: 
(i) Akrasia is action against a belief about what is better or best to do. 
(ii) Akrasia is irrational. 
(iii) Akrasia is voluntary. 
(iv) Akrasia is blameworthy. 
(v) Akrasia is episodic. 
In the second half of the first chapter, I discuss common examples of akrasia, matching 
them up to said features, and demonstrate the long-standing philosophical interest that akrasia 
has generated. 
Though it is important to have a clear view of akrasia as a concept, my primary goal in 
this work is to bring together long and productive philosophical discussion of akrasia with 
modern empirical psychology. 
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In Chapter 2, I propose an answer to both of the most persistent questions concerning 
akrasia. Those questions are, recall, is it possible and if it is how do we explain it?  As my goal 
is to empirically inform the philosophical discussion (as well as to philosophically inform the 
empirical discussion) I address these two questions more or less at the same time.  If I can 
identify in empirical research a plausible psychological explanation for what philosophers have 
termed ‘akrasia’ then I have at once provided an explanation for akrasia and a very good reason 
to believe that akrasia is possible—that it is actual.  
Very little empirical literature deals with akrasia by that name, so I have had to piece 
together a variety of different research areas in order to provide a plausible explanation of 
akrasia, which I will briefly summarize here.   
My empirically informed account of akrasia (as far as I know, the first of its kind) relies 
on three avenues of empirical research: heuristic decision-making, cognitive bias, and Global 
Workspace Theory.  Aside from being an empirically informed account of akrasia, my approach 
deviates from tradition in that in some ways, I do not view akrasia as a defect or a failing, or at 
least not entirely such.  While people have good reason to avoid akrasia and should wish always 
to act in accord with their own best judgment, akrasia is a by-product of cognitive properties that 
we should not wish to be without.   
Briefly, we live in an information-rich external environment and it would be hopeless to 
expect a finite system like the human mind to deal with all of that information.  So it is useful to 
us to have mental systems that help us to focus on some things rather than others, to notice some 
things rather than others, and to react certain ways to certain parts of our environments while 
ignoring other parts. Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues have pioneered research into the “fast 
and frugal” heuristics (informational shortcuts) that the human mind uses to accomplish complex 
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tasks quickly with a minimum of mental resources necessary.  These heuristics are immensely 
beneficial to us, but they don’t always get it right.  In circumstances in which our heuristics tend 
to lead us to ignore what we ought to attend to or focus on the wrong aspect of a situation or 
misestimate a probability, we refer to the heuristic as a cognitive bias—an instance in which we 
have a tendency to be irrational.  Tversky and Kahneman are pioneers in the field of cognitive 
bias, and their work provides the second leg of an empirically informed account of akrasia.  
Not only is our external environment more information-rich than we can realistically 
handle, but our internal mental environments (all of our thoughts, feelings, and mental processes) 
are similarly information laden, and just as we must have mental systems that allow us to deal 
with the volume of information bombarding us from without, we must similarly have systems 
that perform the same tasks for our internal environments.  We are not always aware of all of our 
mental states at all times, and some things seem to happen automatically while others require 
attention and concentration.  The idea that we can only be aware of so much information, even 
about our own mental states, at any given time is the central insight of Bernard Baars’ Global 
Workspace Theory.   
In combination, these insights provide an explanation for acting intentionally on the basis 
of one normative criterion (utilizing a one-reason heuristic in Gigerenzer’s terminology) while a 
more careful analysis (one in which more normative criteria are present in the global workspace 
of the mind) would regard a different normative criterion as the more important criterion, 
allowing the bias in favor of attending to the first criterion to be overcome.   
For example, the sweetness of a candy might commend itself to a dieter much more 
quickly than the dieter could focus on the caloric content of the candy and his judgment that, 
though the candy is indeed sweet, it is better to refrain.  In such a case, the dieter breaks his diet 
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while judging that it is better to maintain the diet.  This is of course a different case from the 
dieter consciously rationalizing his decision.  Most often, one-reason heuristics do their work 
below the threshold of consciousness, or outside the global workspace.  As a result the dieter is 
in the position of breaking his diet without paying enough attention to what he is doing.  This 
does not mean the dieter does not know he is breaking his diet, rather he simply pays it too little 
mind as it is happening.  The fact that these judgments are often not subject to conscious scrutiny 
does not mean that they cannot be subjected to conscious evaluation.  Indeed, it is the person 
who is more often able to pay attention to what they are doing who is most resistant to akrasia.  
Adopting this empirically informed account of akrasia, what I term ‘cognitive akrasia’, 
requires abandoning positions that are incompatible with its existence. Earlier, I mentioned that 
the possibility of akrasia tends to fly in the face of the fact that we most often do what we think 
we ought to do, and when we do not, it doesn’t make sense.  This is the view that normative 
judgments are necessarily connected to motivation (a view called ‘normative judgment 
internalism’).  In Chapter 3, drawing on some works by Sarah Stroud and Ralph Wedgwood, I 
demonstrate that normative judgment internalism can be amended to allow akrasia, long thought 
to be a straightforward counterexample to normative judgment internalism, while preserving 
what is plausible about the view. In the process of reconciling the possibility of akrasia with the 
notion that when we judge that A is better than B, we pursue A if we can, I must describe 
precisely what kind of irrationality is involved in instances of akrasia.  
Of course, modifying normative judgment internalism is only one approach to 
accommodating akrasia.  One might just as well deny the truth of normative judgment 
internalism altogether.  An approach that denies the truth of normative judgment internalism is 
referred to as normative judgment externalism.  Externalist views generally have no problem 
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accommodating akrasia.  A common externalist position subscribes to the Humean Theory of 
Motivation, which draws a line between beliefs and desires, and holds that only desires can 
motivate.  Akrasia, on this externalist view, is not such a puzzle.  If normative judgments are 
beliefs, and beliefs do not motivate, then it is no great surprise when one acts against their 
normative judgments.  It is a matter of the akrates thinking that one action is better than another 
without desiring to do that better action. 
There are many subtle distinctions among varieties of normative judgment internalism 
and externalism.  Chapter 3 first discusses a variety of methods for preserving what is plausible 
about normative judgment internalism while still allowing for akrasia. This effort is followed by 
an examination of several plausible forms of normative judgment externalism, and the problems 
that attend to each.   
By the end of the third chapter, I have two competing theories of motivation that can each 
accommodate akrasia.  The internalist theory posits a defeasible connection between cognitive 
rationality and motivation, while the externalist theory posits a defeasible connection between 
desires (which are by definition motivational) and normative judgments.  These theories are in 
opposition to one another, because the internalist theory holds that the normative judgment is 
prior to the motivation while the externalist holds that the motivation is prior to the judgment.   
In the fourth chapter, I provide an argument for preferring the internalist, cognitive view 
over the externalist, non-cognitive view of normative motivation.  If the externalist position is 
correct, then the way to combat akrasia is to work at changing a person’s desires so that they 
want to act as they think they ought.  If the internalist position and the cognitive bias account of 
akrasia is correct, then cognitive bias modification ought to have the best outcome in combatting 
akrasia.  This is an empirical question. 
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The trouble is that akrasia is an episodic phenomenon, and so it is difficult to specify 
when akrasia has been overcome and when it has not.   This is why I appeal to research on 
addiction.  Addiction, aside from being very well-researched, provides an excellent test case for 
my argument because it involves recurrences of the same kind of akrasia in an individual over 
time.  The akratic addict is one who judges that they ought not to continue being an addict, but 
who relapses into the addictive behavior.  If the cognitive bias modification treatment model is 
more effective than desire modification in reforming the akratic addict, then we have reason to 
treat the internalist view as the correct view of normative motivation.   
The research does indicate that cognitive bias modification treatment is more effective 
than desire modification, and the reasons for this are very interesting.  As it turns out, cognitive 
bias plays a large role in addiction of any kind.  Specifically, addicts are less likely to recall the 
negative consequences of past addictive behavior and are also more likely to notice or fasten 
onto addiction-related stimuli in their environments.   These biases are known as recall bias and 
attention bias, respectively.  These biases play a prominent role in all addictions, whether they 
involve an addictive substance or not.   
Common thinking about addiction gives too much thought to chemicals involved in 
addiction, and too little thought to what a gambling addiction and a cigarette addiction have in 
common.  People who try to break addictions must all come to grips with the fact that it’s not 
about just a chemical. People who break a caffeine habit must make other behavioral changes, 
like switching to decaf coffee, because it is more difficult to give up coffee drinking than it is to 
give up caffeine.  Smokers who try to quit will tell you that nicotine patches or nicotine gum are 
helpful but not ultimately effective because it is the activity of smoking that they miss, not 
necessarily the chemical.   
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My grandfather’s case is typical of those who have successfully quit smoking.  He 
smoked for 40 years, and when the health concerns of smoking were becoming more public and 
accepted, he decided to quit.  Patches or gum were not then available.  He soon found that he had 
to replace smoking with other things to successfully resist relapse.  After meals, when he used to 
smoke, he chewed gum, to keep his mouth occupied (always Wrigley’s Doublemint, until the 
end of his life nearly 40 years later), and took up handicrafts to keep his hands and mind 
occupied until the craving passed.  The necessity for these measures persisted well after physical 
withdrawal symptoms had ceased.   
The cognitive bias account of akrasia provides an empirically informed explanation for 
the above anecdotal evidence. Once cognitive biases can be implicated in akratic addiction, the 
research shows not only that cognitive bias modification yields better results for akratic addicts 
than desire modification, but why cognitive bias modification yields better results for akratic 
addicts.  I believe that the cognitive bias account of akrasia provides good reason to prefer the 
internalist account of normative judgment to the externalist account.  
In this work as a whole I set out to address the major questions surrounding akrasia.  
First, I develop a common notion of akrasia, and then furnish an empirically informed 
explanation of akrasia that demonstrates that akrasia is indeed intelligible and actually a part of 
common human experience.  In addition to that, I develop an account of normative judgments 
that can accommodate akrasia in a way consistent with the empirically informed account of 
akrasia.  Akrasia is a long-standing philosophical puzzle, and to my knowledge, there has been 
no attempt to articulate an empirical explanation for akrasia.  In addition to providing such an 
account, I also demonstrate that the account is fully compatible with an acceptable philosophical 
notion of normative motivation.    
10 
 
CHAPTER 1: WHAT COUNTS AS AKRASIA? 
The above passage finds the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius struggling with himself to 
get up in the morning.  This sort of experience is not unique to emperors, and his words speak to 
us across the better part of two millennia to remind us that in many ways, the more things 
change, the more they stay the same.  The passage is a dialog with only one speaker, Aurelius, 
and we recognize this internal dialog as a familiar element of our inner lives.  As familiar and 
commonplace as is this description of dragging (persuading, even) oneself out of bed each 
morning, it subtly reveals much about human motivation.  The voice in favor of staying in bed 
utilizes multiple approaches.  The first, “But this is more pleasant” is a base appeal to visceral 
pleasure, while the second statement, “But a man needs rest as well” is a subtle rationalization 
designed to subvert the argument that it is part of the proper and natural function of humankind 
to get up each morning and work.  More than anything, this passage illustrates a tension between 
immediate inclinations and reflectively considered judgments in a context in which it is 
intelligible for either to prevail.   
 Aurelius here has a choice to make.  Aurelius’ beliefs about which choice to make seem 
clear; however it is far from certain that Aurelius will actually get out of bed rather than lying in 
bed longer.  Should Aurelius act against his judgment of what is best, his action is an example of 
what the Greeks called akrasia.  Discussion of akrasia first appears in Western philosophy as a 
disagreement between Aristotle, expressed in Book VII of his Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle 99-
113) and an opinion that Socrates was said by Plato to have held in the dialog with Protagoras 
(Plato 45-117). The disagreement, simply put, is whether anyone intentionally does that which 
they know to be wrong.  The disagreement put into those terms is in no way exclusive to 
philosophers.  Nearly everyone has at some point stopped to consider whether anyone, even 
history’s most notorious evildoers, willingly does what they believe to be wrong.  Any attempt to 
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provide accounts of how or why people make decisions and act as they do is incomplete without 
at least some consideration of akrasia.   
Discussion of akrasia in Western Philosophy extends back to nearly the beginning of it.  
In all that time, it has somehow resisted becoming a dead issue, or an issue of interest only in the 
history of philosophy.  There is a remarkable degree of historical agreement on what akrasia is.  
Most disagreements concern whether it happens, and how to explain it.  In this chapter I will first 
describe the central features of akrasia that run throughout the philosophical tradition, and 
second, discuss a host of examples that have been historically prominent in discussions of 
akrasia.  When these examples occur in philosophical writing, those who cite them generally do 
so in order to set up specific disagreements.  It will be useful to separate these examples from 
their contentious contexts so that we may develop the clearest picture of what akrasia is, apart 
from questions of whether they accurately describe a genuine part of human experience, or 
whether they properly fit with theories of motivation and action. 
Traits of Akratic Action 
 The following traits are not intended to be an entirely strict set of necessary conditions 
(though I think that in combination, they are sufficient) for akrasia.  However, the following 
traits have traditionally formed the most notable talking points.  Much writing has concerned the 
extent of one or more of the below traits.  Those who have questioned the necessity of one of the 
below traits have typically acknowledged that they responded to a traditional view that regarded 
the trait as necessary.  For my own part, I think there are at least some interesting cases of 
akrasia that arguably do not possess one or more of the below traits.  In any case, the most 
common and interesting cases of akrasia, those cases that are so often used as a starting point, 
tend to share the following traits:  
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(i) Akrasia is action contrary to one’s own normative judgment (i.e. judgment of 
what is best).   
This is the overwhelmingly common phrase that most philosophers use to define akrasia, 
though examples and discussions of akrasia reveal other traits paired with the mere fact of action 
against one’s own normative judgment.
 2
  This is the place to start when looking for a case of 
akrasia. Other features, discussed below, are key in distinguishing akrasia from other actions 
contrary to one’s own normative judgment.   
There are several key components to this characteristic of akrasia.  First of all, an 
instance of akrasia is an action.  Traditionally, having thoughts that one thinks one ought not 
have does not count as akrasia, though I can imagine an account of having thoughts that one 
judges that one ought not have being very similar to an account of akrasia.  For the purposes of 
this analysis, we will restrict our inquiry to the things that people do.
3
  This is quite diverse 
enough, as it includes violation of both positive and negative normative judgments, that is, doing 
things that one judges one ought not do, and failing to do things that one judges one ought to do, 
respectively.   
Further, actions do not include mere physical movements, but can include the making of 
noises, speech acts, and other feats of more and less ambiguous non-verbal communications.  
Additionally, we ought to be generous in a sense and count attempts to contravene normative 
judgment as instances of akrasia.  For example, consider a man who judges that it would be best 
not to open the door on the right.  If he tries to open the door on the right and finds it locked, I 
                                                        
2
 For examples: “Akrasia is exhibited in behavior which is contrary to one’s better judgment.” (Mele, 
Self-Control, Action, and Belief 169), “There is a long tradition which views the problem of weakness of 
will as the problem of how agents can intentionally do what they consider wrong.” (Jackson 1), 
“Weakness of will is possible…because it is possible to act freely against one’s own best judgment…” 
(Buss 13) 
3
 In (Incoherence and Irrationality 193)Davidson supplies an example of akrasia as an example of 
irrational action, as opposed to irrational belief or irrational emotion. 
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think it is still fair to say that his action counts as an instance of akrasia.  He intentionally tries to 
open the door, and the impediment to his action is external to him.  He initiated an action that, if 
successful, would have contravened normative judgment.  He gets no credit for having been 
thwarted by the locked door.   
In general, a good criterion for the kinds of actions with which we shall concern 
ourselves are those actions that are in principle observable to others.  This criterion generally 
limits the discussion to actions as distinct from thoughts and to attempted actions as distinct from 
intentions.   
That leaves the phrase ‘contrary to a normative judgment’ next in line for some 
clarification.  ‘Contrary’ is reasonably straightforward, indicating that one logically cannot 
perform the action while following the normative judgment. For example, if Frieda judges that it 
would be better to give money to Oxfam than to buy a piece of luxury consumer electronics, but 
then buys the piece of luxury consumer electronics, this would count uncontroversially as an 
example of akrasia.  Frieda could not have followed her judgment and bought the piece of 
consumer electronics at the same time.   
The sort of judgment to which Frieda acts contrary is also important.  Frieda might judge 
that some painting is larger than another.  This is a judgment, but not a normative judgment. If 
she judges that the painting is a good painting, then she has made a normative judgment, but not 
the sort of judgment to which an action (or attempted action) could be contrary. So to be an 
instance of akrasia, some action must be contrary to a judgment about what one ought or ought 
not to do. There are of course many ways of phrasing action contrary to a normative judgment. 
The akrates could fail to act as she judges that she ought, she could act as she judges she ought 
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not, she could choose the inferior of two or more options, or she could fail to choose the better or 
best of a number of options.  All of these count as action against normative judgment.  
Finally, throughout this work I shall take normative judgments to be beliefs. I will not 
take this stance without some argument, but I will not argue extensively for this stance at this 
time.   At this point, suffice it to say that I regard normative judgments as primarily cognitive.  It 
may or may not be the case that a person cannot form a judgment that x is better than y without 
having some feeling, desire, or other non-cognitive state toward x and y.  I think that this is not 
the case, but my account of akrasia does not turn on that issue.    
(ii) Akrasia is irrational.   
This trait is an evaluation that is nearly universally applied to cases of akrasia.  This is 
because accounts of akrasia don’t sound altogether sensible to any party (the akrates or anyone 
else) when recounted.  Something like, “I knew I shouldn’t have done that, but I did it anyway” 
cry out for explanation.   
‘Irrational’ here is ambiguous.  For the moment, it is sufficient to say that any action 
against one’s judgment of what is better or best constitutes action against one’s own 
understanding of the reasons that one has for acting in a particular way, and is hence irrational 
action in that sense, though there are other senses.  In Chapter 3, I specify the particular 
dimensions of irrationality involved in instances of akrasia.  For now, it is enough to recognize 
that there is something odd about a case like Frieda’s above, and any other case of akrasia.  It is 
not that she acts for no reason whatsoever; in some sense she has a pro-attitude toward both 
available actions (and presumably many others).  So the act of buying the piece of consumer 
electronics is not in itself unintelligible, but when coupled with a genuine judgment that it is the 
inferior option, Frieda should acknowledge something irrational in her behavior.  Certainly, she 
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often acts in accord with her normative judgments and thinks nothing of it.  After all one is 
supposed to do what one judges is best.
4
 
(iii) Akrasia is voluntary.
5
   
This trait separates instances of compulsion from instances of akrasia.  There is little that 
is philosophically interesting about defying our normative judgments in cases in which we are 
physically, psychologically, or otherwise unable to follow our normative judgments.  In such 
cases the normative judgment is irrelevant to the action.  It is only when one can but does not act 
in accord with normative judgment that one is akratic.  
Suppose that Aurelius is called in the morning, feels like staying in bed, but judges that it 
is best to get up and take up his work, and as he begins to get up, realizes that he has been tied 
firmly to the bed and so fails to get up when called.  This is not an example of akrasia, as the act 
of staying in bed was involuntary.  Only when Aurelius is able to get up but does not is his 
decision an example of akrasia.   
There are, of course, many gradations of meaning inherent in ‘voluntary’.  I shall be 
unable to avoid committing myself to the view that at least some actions are voluntary in some 
sense of the word, but I hope to largely avoid narrow disputes about voluntary versus involuntary 
actions.  I may avoid such disputes because I contend that the preponderance of cases of akrasia 
                                                        
4
 Nomy Arpaly supplies an excellent examination of the requirement that akrasia be irrational.  I address 
this work more fully in Chapter 3, but consider: “A rational agent’s manual cannot instruct the agent to 
act against her best judgment… A rational agent’s manual is a deliberator’s manual, and acting against 
one’s best judgment is not the sort of thing one settles on doing as a result of good deliberation.” (490) 
5
 For some, this is a point of emphasis in the characterization of akrasia.  See for examples: “An agent, 
succumbing to last ditch akrasia, freely, knowingly, and intentionally performs an action A against his 
better judgment that an incompatible action B is the better thing to do” (Walker 653), “In a case of weak-
willed action the agent acts—freely, deliberately, and for a reason—in a way contrary to his best 
judgment, even though he thinks he could act in accord with his best judgment.” (Bratman 153), 
“Weakness of will occurs only if one knowingly does something contrary to one’s better judgment. We 
will see that this condition does not distinguish between weakness and compulsion.” (Watson, Skepticism 
About Weakness of Will 316) See also (Mele, Is Akratic Action Unfree?). 
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are uncontroversially voluntary for most viewpoints that hold that there are voluntary actions at 
all.   
The cases of akrasia can of course be stretched further and further until we are faced with 
an action that is not clearly voluntary, or even that is clearly involuntary. Consider Aurelius’ case 
again.  It may be that he is fatigued from a particularly strenuous day as Rome’s 
philosopher/king.  In common experience, bodily and mental fatigue can be overcome, to a point.  
Given the way I initially describe the case of Aurelius, I take it for granted that Aurelius is not so 
fatigued that it is not physically possible for him to accede to his better judgment and arise.  I 
think such a stipulation is reasonably uncontroversial, and in such a case, if Aurelius remains in 
bed, it is a clear example of akrasia.   
I can, however, imagine a kind of sorites paradox in which the details of the case are 
stipulated differently.  One could make Aurelius just a bit more fatigued and yet still hold that his 
staying in bed contrary to better judgment was voluntary.  One could increase the increments of 
tiredness (however such increments are conceptualized) until one reaches a point at which it is 
not physically possible for Aurelius to arise, so great is his fatigue.  At this point we have a set of 
minutely different cases of akrasia culminating in a case that is involuntary.   
Such a line of cases does not show either that there is no robust concept of voluntary 
action, or that cases of akrasia cannot be clearly demarcated from cases of “I judge that it is 
better to do A than not to do A, but I cannot do A.” A sufficient number of minute changes can 
lead to a significant difference.   I contend that there are sufficiently numerous cases of akrasia 
that are examples of voluntary actions if anything is voluntary.  
(iv) Akrasia is blameworthy.   
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This is another common evaluation of akratic action, and the trait falls out of akrasia 
being voluntary, against normative judgment, and irrational.  There is a difference between 
acting against a normative judgment that others hold and acting against one’s own normative 
judgments.  While others may blame one who acts against their view of what ought to be done, 
both the akrates and some other party can justifiably disapprove of one who does not even live 
up to their own standards.  If Aurelius decides to stay in bed despite his judgment that it is best to 
rise when called and see to his natural purpose, Aurelius himself regrets such a decision.  Not 
only does Aurelius express regret, but anyone informed of his situation would reasonably express 
disapprobation of such a case of one who “knew better, but did it anyway”. 
The blameworthiness of akrasia is in proportion to the extent to which akrasia is 
intentional.  We do not generally condemn people for acting in ways that they cannot control, 
though we sometimes blame those people for forming bad enough and strong enough habits that 
they cannot any longer act as they judge best.   
 (v) Akrasia is episodic.   
Nowhere in the history of philosophy is there widespread discussion of persons who 
always act against their better judgment (Stroud, Weakness of Will and Practical Judgment 143-
144).  Rather, akrasia is a behavior that may beset us all at some point, and may be a more 
frequent problem for some than for others.   
It is true that Aristotle discussed akrasia as a kind of character trait, a “weakness of will” 
with which some are more strongly afflicted than others.  If this is the case, then akrasia is a 
more or less permanent condition for at least some.  The contemporary writer uses the term 
akrasia to refer to a type of action, while the ancient writer used the term to denote a character 
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trait.  However, I think this is not a particularly important distinction because many virtues or 
vices are dispositional.   
Consider, for example, the virtue of generosity.  A person can be generous without giving 
at every single opportunity, so to talk of generosity as a dispositional character trait (those who 
are generous give in many circumstances, and always give in the best of circumstances) comes to 
much the same as discussing any given action as either being an instance of generosity or not 
being an instance of generosity.  The instances in which the generous person gives, and the 
actions that we consider tokens of the type ‘generous’ substantially (perhaps completely) 
overlap.  
Mutatis mutandis, we can consider akrasia as a dispositional character trait or as an 
action type without losing anything critically important about akrasia itself.  In any case, 
discussions of universal akrasia are not in the traditional or contemporary discussions of akrasia, 
leaving actual cases of akrasia to be discrete puzzles which share the criteria of being episodic as 
well as the criteria previously mentioned.
6
 
 Considerations of actions that fit the above criteria would be considerations of a robust 
and interesting concept of akrasia.  However, there is a long philosophical tradition concerning 
discussion of akrasia, and if my treatment of akrasia is to be most useful, then it must interact 
with this tradition. The claim that at least the major treatments of akrasia in the philosophical 
tradition are employing the same kind of concept as one another when they discuss akrasia is not 
a trivial claim.  Philosophical careers are made tracing the differences between contemporary and 
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 The kinds of everyday examples of akrasia are generally episodic things, for examples: “The motivation 
of weak behavior is generally familiar and intelligible enough: the desire to remain in bed, or the desire 
for another drink.” (Watson, Skepticism About Weakness of Will 316), “…yielding to temptation, 
procrastinating, eating beyond healthy limits, avoiding pain, and even abandoning the greater good for the 
sake of pleasure.  This phenomenon is the phenomenon of weakness of the will or akrasia.” (Tenenbaum, 
The Judgment of a Weak Will 876) 
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historical ideas about many concepts. What follows should establish that akrasia as a concept 
has changed little, even if the reasons for being interested in akrasia have been variable.  
Additionally, it is instructive to encounter the difficulties faced by historical philosophers in 
fitting akrasia into larger theories about motives and actions. 
 Before beginning this historical exegesis, a brief word on terminology is in order.  The 
beginning researcher should not expect to get very far past the Greek philosophical discussions 
of akrasia if ‘akrasia’ is the primary search term.  The Greek term akrasia is most often 
translated into English in one of two ways.  One way in which akrasia is translated is as 
‘incontinence’.  This term in English suggests a lack of self-control, but (to the contemporary 
ear) too specifically refers to a lack of control of the bowels, and as a result, this translation has 
become the less common one in philosophical writing.  The more common translation of the 
term akrasia is ‘weakness of will’.  Certainly the akrates (the person who acts intentionally 
against better judgment) is criticized for it, but whether or not akrasia necessarily involves some 
kind of weakness is a matter of dispute, and a matter of dispute that users of the term ‘weakness 
of will’ do not always enter into; often they use it as a term of art that means something different 
than the meanings of the individual words in the phrase would suggest.  Additionally, the term 
‘weakness of will’ is quite often used by philosophers who do not otherwise speak of The Will
7
 
as a human faculty, and who do not even mean to suggest anything of the kind in the use of the 
term.  In philosophy, then, the terms ‘weakness of will’ and ‘incontinence’ have become terms of 
art that simply stand in the place that the word akrasia would stand.  Because of this, I will 
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 Donald Davidson, for example titled his very influential paper about akrasia “How is Weakness of the 
Will Possible?” but in the paper “Intending” explicitly stated a desire to avoid talk of The Will (87-88). 
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simply use the Greek term.
8
  ‘Akrasia’ is the name for the concept of acting intentionally against 
one’s better judgment; an akrates is one who acts akratically. 
Examples of Akratic Action 
 The episode from Aurelius’ Meditations that begins this chapter is a look at just one 
person’s experience of akratic action.  As mentioned previously, there has been a more or less 
continuous discussion of akrasia and closely related issues for the last two and a half thousand 
years of Western philosophy.  As evidence for the claims I make above concerning the 
commonly held features of akrasia, I submit a brief description of the examples of akratic action 
that philosophers have commonly discussed.  This section is primarily expository.  Following 
presentation of these examples, I shall advance some arguments concerning what we are to learn 
about investigating akrasia from these historical approaches. 
 The Dieter: 
Aristotle may surprise any who believe that obsession with body image, health, and 
“eating right” are issues unique to the recent world.  One of our earliest examples of akratic 
action is related to dieting. Aristotle famously describes an akratic state as similar to madness, 
sleep, or drunkenness, but when he requires a concrete example of akrasia to discuss, he 
considers a man on a diet.  The dieter makes his first appearance as Aristotle distinguishes the 
vice of intemperance from akrasia.  “[The intemperate person] thinks it is right to pursue the 
pleasant thing at hand; the incontinent person, however, thinks it is wrong to pursue this pleasant 
thing, and yet pursues it.”
9
 Aristotle also asserts that intemperate persons feel no regret about 
their actions because they simply do what they want without considering things further.  In 
contrast, the akrates is always prone to regret.  So the intemperate one will probably not diet at 
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 William Charlton does this in his book, and says that it is becoming standard for philosophers to do so, 
but still he entitles his book on akrasia “Weakness of Will”. 
9
 Nicomachean Ethics: Book 7, Chapter 3, Section 2 (102) 
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all, while it is the dieter’s commitment that sets him up as a potential akrates.  We modern 
readers imagine the dieter breaking his diet and becoming upset with himself, and we imagine 
something very familiar to us.   
By way of further distinguishing akrasia from intemperance, Aristotle asserts that the 
akrates is better than the intemperate person because “the best thing, in principle, is preserved in 
him.”
10
  This again is in accord with considered moral judgment.  We tend to praise people who 
attempt self-betterment (like dieting) even when they occasionally slip up.  We praise those who 
slip up less often more than we praise those who slip up more often, but even those who slip up 
often are at the very least trying, and so they are better than those who make no attempt to better 
themselves (the intemperate).   
Aristotle supplies us with a metaphor and its interpretation to further emphasize the point 
of the previous paragraph.  Aristotle quotes a man named Demodocus as saying “The Milesians 
are not stupid, but they do what stupid people would do.”
11
 Likewise, we are to read, the akrates 
is not simply intemperate, but sometimes does as the intemperate would do.  The difference is 
that the akrates may be persuaded out of it.  The metaphor is fairly clear.  A person who is not 
stupid should be able to be persuaded out of doing stupid things while someone who is just 
stupid is not amenable to this persuasion.  Now imagine an interloper into our dieting example 
above.  They bring up what the dieter has previously said, and perhaps discuss reasons in favor 
of avoiding the sweets.  Now, given this interloper, if the dieter still chooses to eat the sweets, 
then we might not believe that he ever had a hindering belief, and this looks like a case of mere 
intemperance.  If the dieter avoids the sweets as a result of further reflection and rational 
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 NE, Book 7, Chapter 3, Section 5 (103) 
11
 NE, Book 7, Chapter 3, Sections 3-4 (102-103) 
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persuasion, then the interloper has saved the dieter from an akratic episode.  The potential to act 
in accord with reason is with the akrates the whole time.
12
 
The alert reader will already have noticed that Aristotle’s account of the difference 
between the akrates and the intemperate preserves each of the features of akrasia previously 
listed.  The alert reader will, then, hopefully excuse me for being explicit on this point. If (i) 
Akrasia is action against a belief about what is better or best to do, then Aristotle’s gesturing at 
the lapsing dieter fits nicely.  Committing to a diet in the first place implies a belief that it would 
be a good thing to diet, and failing to follow the diet (ii) is irrational in the relevant sense.  The 
dieter could have been persuaded into action consistent with his commitments, and was 
presumably not irresistibly compelled (iii) to eat the sweet which broke his diet.  While the dieter 
is to be praised for his commitment, he can be justifiably chastised (iv) for those occasions (v) on 
which he breaks his diet. 
 The Apostle: 
Thomas Aquinas wrote about akrasia for two ostensible reasons.  The first of these is that 
Aristotle wrote about akrasia.  Aquinas wrote a comprehensive commentary on the 
Nicomachean Ethics, and in this effort performed some considerable interpretive work. 
Secondly, akrasia was of interest to Aquinas because of a passage in the Apostle Paul’s letter to 
the Romans:  
“For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am of the flesh, sold into slavery 
under sin.  I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I 
do the very thing I hate.  Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is 
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 The phrase ‘akratic episode’ may serve to make sense of a strange statement that Aristotle makes in 
Book 7, Chapter 8, Section 1: “[I]ncontinence is more like epilepsy” (110).  Certainly it is not like 
epilepsy in the sense that it is a disease and people get it whenever they get it, regardless of their behavior 
or mental states, but rather, akrasia is like epilepsy in that is not a constantly apparent condition, but that 
it is episodic in nature.   
23 
 
good.  But in fact it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me.  For I 
know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is 
right, but I cannot do it.  For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not 
want is what I do.  Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but 
sin that dwells within me.  So I find it to be a law that when I want to do what is 
good, evil lies close at hand.” (New Revised Standard Version, Romans 7.14-25)  
Though Aquinas appeals to a different set of theoretical commitments in accounting for 
akrasia, it is noteworthy that akrasia itself is the same sort of thing as it is in Aristotle. Consider 
again the elements of akrasia identified above.   
(i) Akrasia is action against a belief about what is better or best to do. 
(ii) Akrasia is irrational. 
(iii) Akrasia is voluntary. 
(iv) Akrasia is blameworthy. 
(v) Akrasia is episodic. 
 The blameworthy aspect (iv) of akrasia has not departed the discussion.  For Augustine, 
Aquinas and philosophers for quite a long time afterward, blameworthiness is expressed in terms 
of sin.  To sin when one knows better is to do something irrational (which is property ii of 
akrasia), as indicated by St. Paul’s exasperated “I do not understand my own actions…”
13
.  If the 
whole of moral law is divinely commanded, and if one is aware of a part of divine law and yet 
acts contrary to it, we have sinned (thus property i of akrasia, that it is an action against better 
judgment). The charge of weakness involved in akrasia is only intelligible in those who are 
committed to certain normative standards, in this case a commitment to following divine 
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 This kind of introspective realization of irrationality is akin to “Recognizing in himself something 
essentially surd” (Davidson, How is Weakness of the Will Possible? 42). 
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commandment.  So akrasia’s blameworthiness (property iv) takes the form of persons failing to 
act according to their own normative commitments.  Anyone with an understanding of sin and 
sinfulness understands that sins are unworthy and undesirable behaviors (this is built into the 
definition of ‘sin’).  For example, when one lusts for another while understanding that such 
behavior is sinful, one has a choice as to what they end up doing (which fits property iii of 
akrasia, that akrasia is voluntary). If they had no such choice, then they are not culpable for their 
sin, but instead God (who made them the way they are) is. Despite having these passions, people 
do not always succumb to them or allow them to lead to sin.  In that sense, akrasia is episodic 
(property v), and is not some kind of compulsive pathology.   
As an historical note, it seems that the perception that akrasia is and has been 
traditionally a moral problem is due to Aquinas representing akrasia in the particular way that he 
does.  For example, Donald Davidson’s landmark paper “How is Weakness of the Will 
Possible?” begins with a discussion of the “traditional” representation of akrasia that is in the 
vein of Aquinas, depicting it as a struggle between the sinful passions of the body and the 
wisdom of divine command.  While it is true that akrasia for Aquinas, especially as represented 
by the apostle Paul’s account, invariably involved transgression of divine command, Aristotle 
was unencumbered by any such theology.  Aristotle’s account of akrasia, while it occurs as part 
of a book on ethics, treats akrasia as a moral problem only in the sense that it is an undesirable 
part of character with typically undesirable consequences for the akrates’ quality of life.  Nor 
does Aristotle typically consider akrasia as an intrinsically “body versus soul” phenomenon.   
I must here point out a very important distinction between ways of explaining akrasia 
and ways of identifying akrasia.  Explanations for akrasia abound, from Aristotle’s notion of 
having but not attending to knowledge, to the Judeo-Christian notion of our fallen natures, to 
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Davidson’s distinction between all-out and prima facie judgments (all subjects to be dealt with in 
later chapters).  The identifying features of akrasia, however, remain startlingly consistent over 
time and school of thought.  When someone acts contrary to their better judgment, and could 
have acted in concert with their best judgment, they are akratic, and subject to disapprobation.  It 
is to identification of akrasia that I now return. 
The Lover: 
Few things spark discussion of irrational and/or self-destructive behavior more than 
mention of people in love and in circumstances hostile to the flourishing of said love.  One of 
many potential examples of akrasia which springs from this fertile ground is identified by R. M. 
Hare.  Hare states early in “Backsliding”, Chapter 5 of Freedom and Reason, that he “approaches 
these questions in a way that goes back to Aristotle and beyond, but has been associated 
especially (how justly, I do not know) with the name of Aquinas.” (Hare 69) The examples of 
akrasia or weakness of will that Hare points to a page later (and describes as “extremely well-
worn”) are first, a passage from Ovid’s Metamorphosis describing Medea trying to resist falling 
in love with Jason.  The last two lines of this passage read: “Urged this way—that way—on Love 
or Reason’s course, I see and praise the better but do the worse.”  The second example Hare 
points to is the same passage reproduced above from chapter 7 of the Apostle Paul’s letter to the 
Romans that motivated Augustine and Aquinas to consider akrasia.   
For Hare, following Aquinas, akrasia is a problem specifically for moral philosophy (he 
most often calls it “moral weakness” rather than akrasia, incontinence, or weakness of the will).  
It is clear, however, that Hare is addressing the same bundle of properties outlined above when 
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he addresses moral weakness, but means to argue that a proper understanding of what a moral 
judgment is makes it unintelligible for all of those properties to apply to a single action.
14
 
It should be no surprise that many examples of akrasia involve sex, because sex is at the 
same time an activity much sought after, and also an activity fraught with strong normative 
convictions concerning its practice.  At the risk of being redundant, consider the case of someone 
involved in what they themselves take to be a case of sexual misconduct.  That it is blameworthy 
is implied in the term ‘misconduct’.   
That it is episodic (i.e. that the person in question does not succumb to each and every 
opportunity to transgress her sexual mores) is assumed given an average person with no 
clinically recognized mental or behavioral disorders.  Of course, compulsions can be episodic as 
well, but generally speaking, we view our previous adherence to our own normative judgments 
as evidence that we are able to continue to do so in similar circumstances.  We may be wrong 
about this on occasion and misidentify a compulsion as case of akrasia, but I think it reasonable 
to suppose on the basis of previously followed normative judgments that episodic failures to do 
so are candidates for akrasia pending further evidence of compulsion. 
The regret that follows such misconduct is typically accompanied by consternation at a 
violation of commitments to a standard of behavior that one was committed to before the act, 
during the act, and to which one is committed still (else, what cause for regret?).  This is 
recognition of the irrationality of failing to follow one’s normative judgments.  Also, at no point 
do those in such circumstances believe themselves to have been compelled to act as they did 
(again, what cause for regret exists otherwise, and what justification for disapprobation of the 
akrates?).  Also, the fact that akrasia of this kind is episodic and not universal indicates that it is 
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 Again, more is said about Hare’s specific arguments for the unintelligibility of akrasia in Chapter 2.  
For an excellent discussion of Hare’s views of weakness, see (Frankena). 
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indeed within the general capacities of the agent in question to act in accord with their relevant 
normative judgments.   
Identifying akrasia 
 
How to tell what cases are cases of akrasia has not changed in two and a half thousand 
years.  There is a set of symptoms that correspond with the presence of the above criteria.  If a 
person chooses an action that he himself believes to be worse than another option available to 
him (it is the ultimate sensibility of such sentences that gives many pause), he is akratic.  The 
evidence for distinguishing the akratic from the intemperate is as it always was.  From the first-
person perspective, there can be little doubt as to whether one is intemperate or akratic.  I know 
my own better judgment.   
It is much more difficult for a third party to distinguish the akrates from the intemperate.  
Consider an example.  Austin
15
 is a scholar who does research and writes on issues of 
distributive justice, and as such a scholar Austin has firm commitments about issues in 
distributive justice, even in the smallest circumstances.  Austin is at a formal dinner with a group 
of scholars.  An appetizer plate of various bite-sized pieces passes him, and as it does, he takes 
two pieces.  As it happens, there is one appetizer per person at the table on the serving plate, and 
in taking two, Austin has necessarily deprived another of an appetizer.  This conflicts with 
Austin’s normative judgments concerning distributive justice.  His action is voluntary; he could 
have taken all, none, or some of the appetizers.  His action is contrary to his normative 
commitments, is something he would not necessarily have done every time, and opens him up to 
one or another kind of disapprobation from himself and from those around him.  One kind of 
disapprobation would be the kind reserved for the intemperate person.  Another kind is the 
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 The name of the scholar in this example is a nod to J. L. Austin, who provides a similar example. 
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disapprobation that akrasia begets.  According to Aristotle (and I think most would agree), the 
latter ought to be less severe than the former, but still present.  The difference between first and 
third-person identification of akrasia is exemplified in this way:  Austin knows immediately that 
he is akratic rather than intemperate, for when he comes to realize that in taking two pieces he 
deprived someone of a piece, he feels regret, and perhaps even apologizes aloud.  The observer 
does not have the same kind of access to the relevant information as does Austin.  The observer 
may note visible signs of regret, might hear an apology from Austin, or might know Austin’s 
views on distributive justice from prior acquaintance.  These sorts of evidence, taken together or 
separately, indicate to the observer that Austin has done something that he himself would take to 
be the worse of several options open to him.  Consider also the following exchange between 
Austin and his neighbor at table: 
Neighbor: Why did you take that second piece of appetizer, thus depriving Bob of his 
share? 
Austin: Oh! I apologize; I neglected to count the number of pieces and match them up to 
people, though I could easily have done so, and ought to have. 
Neighbor: So you don’t think it’s important to be fair even in these relatively 
insignificant situations? 
Austin: But of course I do!  You know my commitments to fairness in all things as well 
as anyone! 
Neighbor:  I’ve always heard that actions speak louder than words 
Austin: But the great majority of the time I believe that I do act fairly. This episode is but 
a momentary lapse.   
29 
 
 An exchange of this kind should be sufficient to convince the interrogator of one of two 
things.  Either Austin has just revealed himself as an akrates, or Austin is intemperate and is 
lying about it, perhaps to lessen the disapprobation that accompanies the action.  There are not 
available to the third party any foolproof methods of distinguishing truth from lies in such a 
context.  Typically, we trust that others are telling the truth, especially about their own internal 
states, unless there are compelling reasons to expect falsehood.  In any case, people themselves 
know if they act intemperately or akratically and their reports provide the most ready means of 
distinguishing the one from the other, though this method is not without its unavoidable 
disadvantages.  A study of akrasia, then, requires that to a large extent we must take seriously 
what people say about their own reasons for action, and the normative judgments that they hold 
or do not hold.   
 I should mention that I do not here mean to defend a general position that people are 
incorrigible with respect to all of their internal states, nor even to all of their normative 
judgments.  I grant that it may be that someone might be mistaken concerning what is their own 
best judgment, but as long as people are sometimes or (as I think is the case) most often correct 
concerning their own normative judgments, we must be prepared to take peoples’ reports of their 
own normative judgments seriously. 
The Passions: 
 Traditionally, akrasia is thought to be associated with strong emotions or strong desires, 
or in other words, “The Passions”.  I must here make use of the distinction I mentioned earlier 
between identifying and explaining akrasia.  I mean to argue in this section that looking for 
evidence of the passions at work is not a necessary part of identifying akrasia.   
 Consider how Davidson introduces akrasia in his landmark essay “How is 
Weakness of the Will Possible?”:  
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“An agent’s will is weak if he acts, and acts intentionally, counter to his own best 
judgment; in such cases we sometimes say he lacks the willpower to do what he 
knows, or at any rate believes, would, everything considered, be better.  In using 
this terminology I depart from tradition, at least in making the class of incontinent 
actions larger than usual.” (21) 
 Again, what I hope that the reader will note is that Davidson’s idea of akrasia looks very 
much like everybody else’s, including the account in this chapter.  In what sense then does 
Davidson think he is departing from tradition?   
I read Davidson as separating himself from what he perceives to be two traditions in 
discussing akrasia.  One of these is that he wishes to separate himself from those who represent 
akrasia as a conflict between reason and the passions.  The other of these is that he wishes to 
separate his discussion of akrasia from discussions of specifically moral weakness as discussed 
by Hare and others.  The second is one that I shall not discuss except to say that his success in 
that venture depends entirely upon the degree of overlap between the normative and the moral—
a controversy that I shall not address here.  As to the first separation between Davidson and the 
“tradition”, I disagree that the philosophical tradition dealing with akrasia has been as generally 
concerned with strong emotions or strong desires (that is, passions) as has been commonly 
supposed. 
Davidson summarizes the views of Aquinas, Aristotle, and Hare as being like “a battle or 
struggle between two contestants”, each with a single argument, and one of them, “reason or 
passion” wins (in the case of akrasia, the wrong one, i.e. passion) (How is Weakness of the Will 
Possible? 35).  Davidson is, to my mind, guilty of some oversimplification in this 
characterization.  Aristotle, for example, never portrays an internal battle or struggle in 
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discussing akrasia, neither does he identify passions, nor strong emotional nor desiderative states 
as the sole culprits in cases of akrasia.
16
  Davidson’s characterization of Aquinas is closer to the 
mark, but still overemphasizes the role of strong emotional or intrapersonal conflict.  The 
common and abbreviated understanding of Aquinas’s position is as a straightforward account of 
physical passions (lust is the typical example) overcoming an understanding of what is moral 
(say, for example, the commandment not to commit adultery).
17
  While it is true that this is one 
way that Aquinas would describe akrasia, his account includes more than this.  At issue is 
partially that the word ‘passions’ has a connotation to the modern ear that does not match the 
way that we apply the term to what Aquinas wrote.  A passion is an emotional state, and the 
modern hearer of the word likely associates it with an intense emotional state as in ‘passionately 
angry’.  This is not necessarily the case in Aquinas’s context.  Aquinas follows Aristotle closely, 
particularly in Aristotle’s assertion that the akrates acts as if mad or drunk or asleep.  Aquinas 
concurs with Aristotle that intense emotional states, or intense passions, can render a person 
temporarily mad. But if those passions are less intense, a person may only be acting as if drunk 
or asleep, or if even less intense, might be acting as someone who has memorized something by 
rote, and so is speaking it, but is not attending to the meaning of what she is saying.
18
  
To be mad is certainly to be in an altered cognitive state, but there are many ways to 
interpret what kind of alteration is madness.  Contemporary folk psychology (as well as 
contemporary law) has a concept of “temporary insanity” usually used as a plea in a court of law.  
The idea of temporary insanity is taken more seriously by some than by others, but might it 
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 Aristotle does speak in a number of places of strong feelings contributing to some instances of Akrasia, 
but regards this as only a part of the phenomenon. 
17
 Socrates, in “Protagoras” discusses the idea of someone being overcome by pleasure to do what they 
know to be evil and dismisses it (106-112). 
18
 This is Aquinas’s understanding of Aristotle’s Book 7, Chapter 3.  Aristotle’s repeated example is of 
the drunk reciting Empedocles without attending to the meaning of his utterances. 
32 
 
provide a parallel for what Aristotle describes as the state that the akrates finds herself in?  I 
think not.  Temporary insanity in the modern sense is too strong to preserve the core features of 
akrasia.  Most notably, a temporary insanity plea in court is first and foremost an attempt to 
mitigate responsibility for and thus blameworthiness of a given action.  The akrates finds herself 
in the position of acting contrary to her better judgment, but is acting intentionally, and may not 
be attending to her judgment, but still possesses it.  One who is mad is certainly irrational, and 
this is one of the core features of akrasia.  Mere irrationality is enough to behave “as if mad” 
although again, Aristotle is silent as to the cause of this state of something-like-madness.  
Clearly, the passions may be very intense or very mild, and may cause anything ranging from 
near insanity to mere distraction, all of which can contribute to akrasia, but none of which is the 
whole story for either Aquinas or Aristotle. 
Davidson is by no means the only perpetuator of this understanding of akrasia.  Justin 
Gosling, in his book “Weakness of the Will” makes a great deal of a distinction between 
passionate akrasia and passionless akrasia.  Gosling considers Aristotle’s account as well as 
Augustine’s account to be passionate akrasia, and considers that what Aquinas qua Aristotle 
interpreter wrote is exemplary of an account of passionate akrasia.  According to Gosling, what 
puts passionless akrasia on the map is Aquinas’s discussion of the fall of Lucifer.  Aquinas was 
very concerned with how Lucifer, an archangel, could passionlessly choose the evil course 
(Gosling).  His full account is interesting, but not germane to this analysis.
19
  In any case, 
Gosling overstates Aquinas’s description of human akrasia as passionate, where ‘passionate’ 
indicates an intense emotional or desiderative state, and not just some emotional or desiderative 
state.  I must point out here that though such accounts are most common, akrasia need not 
necessarily involve any emotional or desiderative state whatsoever.  In any event, most who 
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 See Especially Gosling’s Chapter 10 
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focus on the role of emotion in akrasia tend to draw the reader’s attention to a distinction 
between akrasia involving strong emotional states and akrasia involving mild (or no) emotional 
states.  Gosling finds passionless akrasia to be the more interesting sort.     
As one good example, an often cited passage from J. L. Austin serves to point out that 
akrasia can be quite calm, emotionally.  Austin writes of a fondness for ice cream, and a 
situation in which dishes of ice cream are set at high table, one for each person present.  Austin is 
tempted to take two portions, against his principles, and does so.  He writes: “But do I lose 
control of myself? Do I raven, do I snatch the morsels from the dish and wolf them down, 
impervious to the consternation of my colleagues? Not a bit of it.  We often succumb to 
temptation with calm and even with finesse.” (Austin 24) 
Christine Tappolet, contra Gosling, finds akrasia that involves intense emotional states to 
be the more interesting sort.  In “Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action” Tappolet 
favors an interpretation of akrasia that involves emotional states, but only for what she calls 
“hot” as opposed to “cool” akrasia.  Hot akrasia tends to involve intense emotional states, while 
cool akrasia is much like the account from Aurelius that begins this chapter.  Implicit in the 
distinction between hot and cool akrasia is a recognition of the position that akrasia does not 
necessarily involve passions in the sense of strong emotions or desires.  There may sometimes be 
a great deal of dispute between adherents to one explanation of akrasia or the other, but the point 
I wish again to emphasize is that akrasia is still akrasia, independent of how it is explained and 
either made consistent with or inconsistent with a broader theory of decision and action. 
Perhaps I have overly belabored this point, but it is important to recognize that in looking 
for examples of akrasia in our lives and in the lives of others, we need not look for people in the 
grasp of strong (or any) emotional or desiderative states.  We need not look for ravening lunatics, 
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or even for people who look conflicted.  Instances of akrasia can range from the mundane to the 
life-changingly significant, but in neither case is passion a necessary symptom, nor, on 
reflection, has it ever been widely considered such. 
Akrasia Zoo 
 Despite the startling agreement on a general conception of akrasia through a vast span of 
philosophical history, there have been and continue to be a variety of distinctions within akrasia 
which usually take the form of phrases prefixed to ‘akrasia’, ‘incontinence’, or ‘weakness’.  I 
will address a few of these distinctions, but first I will make a general remark.  It can certainly be 
said that there are strong desires and weak desires, good desires and bad desires (relative to some 
purpose), general desires and specific desires, etc.  Philosophers do work on specific aspects of 
various theories and views that have to do only with some specific kind of desire versus another.  
These distinctions are useful for philosophical work, but do not generally imply that it is under 
dispute what, in general, desires are.  Though desires have different uses in different views on 
psychology, the general concept ‘desire’ is reasonably coherent from one context to another.   
 I submit that it is the same with akrasia.  There are many phrases prefixed to a word for 
akrasia, but this does not call into question that the word ‘akrasia’ has a general and reasonably 
consistent use.  For example, one of these distinctions is drawn by a multitude of Aristotle 
commentators.  This distinction is between the weak akrates and the impetuous akrates.  This is 
at heart a dispute only about what Aristotle really says about the way that akrasia affects 
practical reason.  I will not strenuously take a side on this technical issue, as every position on it 
has already been contested.  The weak akrates is the one who acts intentionally against her better 
judgment in that she knows full well that the sweet thing is both pleasant and is unhealthful, but 
sides with the pleasant in spite of a belief (the belief that hinders) in the superiority of the choice 
not to eat the sweet.  Pears calls this account of akrasia “last-ditch” akrasia, because at this 
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stage, the agent understands everything they need to understand in order to make the choice that 
accords with better judgment.  This has also been called “open-eyed” or “clear-eyed” akrasia for 
the same reason.  The impetuous akrates, on the other hand, does not fully take the time to 
consider whether the sweet is also unhealthful, though he judges that it would be better not to eat 
that which is unhealthful.  The weak akrates seems to be personified in the example with the 
sweets, while the impetuous akrates seems more like the person in Aristotle’s example about the 
beans.
20
  It may be that Aristotle really had in mind two different ways that someone might be 
akratic, or it might be that one of these sides represents the “correct” interpretation of Aristotle.  
Such disputes are of philosophical value, but they are not crucial to an overall account of 
akrasia.  No single version of akrasia is any more likely to be THE proper description of akrasia 
any more than any particular chair is THE proper example of a chair.   
My account of the nature of akrasia contains enough substance to cover a significant 
family of cases.  I submit that all of the prefixed versions of akrasia share at least the features 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter.  Most exhibits in the akrasia zoo are specifically 
constructed to explore other disputes about decisions, actions, and motivations, some of which  I 
address in future chapters. 
At the close of this chapter it is important to see akrasia as a generally stable concept 
over time in the philosophical discourse.  Examples of akrasia all share a set of criteria, namely 
that they are examples of episodic rather than habitual action against a better judgment.  Also, 
instances of akrasia are intentional, in some sense irrational, and are blameworthy.  In 
identifying cases of akrasia, we must take seriously what people report about their own 
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 Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7 Chapter 3 Section 6 “Perhaps…someone knows that dry things benefit 
every human being, and that he himself is a human being, or that this sort of thing is dry; but he either 
does not have or does not activate the knowledge that this particular thing is of this sort.” (103) In this 
example, beans are often the discussed example of a dry food such that a man might know the general 
principles but not identify beans as dry or might not identify some particular food as beans. 
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normative judgments, and there need not be any role for intense emotional or desiderative states.  
Subsets of, or specific kinds of akrasia have historically been of interest, and this fact may have 
obscured the extent to which ‘akrasia’ refers to a coherent and stable concept.  The examples 
and analysis provided heretofore should be useful in identifying akrasia. 
In the next chapter, I shall turn to the goal of explaining akrasia.  If akrasia is genuinely 
a part of human experience, it should be amenable to explanation consistent with and informed 
by our best empirical data concerning human psychology.  The next chapter constitutes such an 
empirically informed explanation of akrasia. 
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CHAPTER 2: AN EMPIRICALLY INFORMED ACCOUNT OF AKRASIA 
 
 In Plato’s “Protagoras”, Socrates is the first recorded philosopher in a long line of 
philosophers who deny the possibility of akrasia, claiming  “For no wise man, as I believe, will 
allow that any human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil…but they are very well 
aware that all who do evil and dishonorable things do them against their will” (94) and “No man 
voluntarily pursues evil or that which he thinks to be evil.”
 
(112)  In this chapter, I intend to join 
an equally long line of philosophers claiming that akrasia is indeed possible. My account of 
akrasia will differ from those preceding mine
21
 chiefly in that mine is an empirically informed 
account.   
The first thing I must point out is that, strictly speaking, discussions of the possibility or 
impossibility of akrasia are really discussions about the intelligibility or unintelligibility of 
akrasia.  For example, we say that faster-than-light travel is impossible because it is not 
compatible with other commitments of physics.  To a physicist, or anyone sufficiently well-
versed in physics, talk of getting to light speed and then just turning on a few more rocket 
engines to exceed light speed is unintelligible babble the proper response to which is “Look, you 
don’t understand the way things work.  That might sound plausible to you, but we have empirical 
evidence to the contrary.” 
Science fiction authors have long proposed various means of faster-than-light travel that 
have been variously scientifically intelligible, and so in a sense one might claim that these 
writers have demonstrated that FTL is possible.  What I have in mind is a stronger sense of 
‘possible’ than this.  There may be modes of transport that rely on hitherto undiscovered 
principles or technologies or that, while not specifically prohibited by our current understanding 
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 Most prominent are: (Bratman), (Buss), (Davidson, How is Weakness of the Will Possible?), (Hare, 
Freedom and Reason), (Jackson), (Mele, Is Akratic Action Unfree?), (Pears), (Smith, Rational Capacities, 
or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion) 
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of physics, are also not witnessed in nature nor are created in our laboratories.   Since the 
philosophical discussion of akrasia is current and has been an issue for about two and a half 
millennia, a claim that akrasia is empirically intelligible should come with some indication that 
akrasia is actual, and not merely possible.   
Given the general prevalence and successes of empirical methods of inquiry, I think it is 
an important feature of at least some philosophical discussions that empirical data be consulted, 
and that philosophical concepts should be intelligible by the lights of reasonably well-established 
empirical work.  For the akrasia debate, merely imagining and describing a plausible-sounding 
situation in which a person acts contrary to their own acknowledged better judgment is to my 
mind insufficient for claiming that akrasia is possible.  
 A truly rigorous defense of the possibility of akrasia requires some demonstration that 
akrasia comports with theories derived from empirical study of human behavior and decision-
making.  
I understand that not everyone shares the above requirement for a defense of the 
possibility of akrasia, and in discussing akrasia’s possibility, various philosophers have had 
various goals.  I would like to answer some common charges of the unintelligibility of akrasia.  
Following that discussion, and before presenting an empirically informed account of akrasia, I 
would like to explain the ways in which I find existing accounts of akrasia to be insufficient in 
establishing the kind of empirical intelligibility in which I am interested.   
One way of claiming that akrasia is unintelligible is claiming that it is logically 
unintelligible.  That is the assertion that something about the meanings of the words in the phrase 
‘acting intentionally against one’s better judgment’ are mutually incompatible and therefore, 
contradictory and thus logically impossible.  If this is the objection, then it is an objection that 
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accuses of unintelligibility any possible explanation for intentional action against better 
judgment.  If someone presents an explanation of an event that is genuinely logically 
contradictory, or a set of events that is genuinely logically inconsistent, then they are speaking 
unintelligibly in the logical sense of the word.   
 Some have seemed to favor just that analysis of akrasia.  However, some others have 
opted for a narrower sense of unintelligibility.  This might be termed psychological 
unintelligibility.  For these objectors, the claim is that there is nothing outright contradictory in 
holding that a person could willingly defy their better judgment, but rather, the claim is that those 
in the psychological state of judging one action better than another are psychologically incapable 
of acting contrary to that judgment.  A being whose psychology functioned differently from our 
own (or perhaps a person with a significantly damaged or abnormal psychology) would perhaps 
be able to be an akrates, but not a psychologically ordinary adult human being. 
 Any legitimate category of human behavior, if actual, should be amenable to empirical 
identification and analysis. Moreover, it would be odd for empirical science to have entirely 
missed any common human experience.  I contend that a proper and empirically informed 
account of akrasia ought to settle the longstanding philosophical question of whether akrasia is 
indeed possible.   
Two Prominent Challenges to the Intelligibility of Akrasia 
I would here like to address two of the most prominent (of which most other objections 
are a sub-type) challenges to the intelligibility of akrasia.  First, I will address the objection 
(owed chiefly to R.M. Hare) that descriptions of akrasia are logically unintelligibile.  Second, I 
will address the objection (originally forwarded by Socrates) that akrasia is psychologically 
unintelligible.  Both of these famous and well-trod positions have elicited answers at least as 
famous and well-trod.  Davidson responds to Hare’s position, and Aristotle to Socrates’.  These 
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responses are, to my mind, sufficient as far as they go, but both stop short of providing an 
adequately comprehensive account of the intelligibility of akrasia.   
The Logical Unintelligibility of Akrasia 
Hare argues that descriptions of akratic episodes like those in the previous chapter are 
unintelligible if presented as cases of akrasia rather than some other phenomenon.  More 
specifically, Hare considers descriptions of akrasia to be semantically inconsistent, and therefore 
logically impossible, as talk of square circles would be logically impossible. Hare makes three 
claims that, taken together, serve to represent his position on this issue.  The first is “The test, 
whether someone is using the judgment “I ought to do X” as a value-judgment or not is “Does he 
or does he not recognize that if he assents to the judgment, he must also assent to the command 
“Let me do X”?”.
 
(Hare, The Language of Morals 168)  The second claim concludes the fifth 
chapter of Freedom and Reason.  “If a man is faced with a difficult moral choice, and asks a 
friend or advisor ‘What do you think I ought to do?’, is it not sometimes the case that if he says 
‘You ought to do A’, and if the man then proceeds not to do A, he will be said to have rejected 
the advice?” (85) Thirdly, Hare makes even more explicit his notion of akrasia as logically 
impossible, saying, “It is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely assent to a command 
addressed to ourselves, and at the same time not perform it, if now is the occasion for performing 
it and it is in our (physical and psychological) power to do so.” (Freedom and Reason 79) In the 
face of examples of akrasia proposed by other philosophers, (Hare cites some examples 
described in the previous chapter) Hare makes a second claim, that the better way of explaining 
the cases that other philosophers have historically identified as cases of akrasia
22
 is to describe 
them as either cases of “want to but can’t” or “Don’t want to but can’t resist” where ‘can’t’ is a 
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 In Hare’s case, he focuses on Medea, in Ovid’s Metamorphosis and Chapter 7 of the apostle Paul’s 
letter to the Romans. 
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form of psychological (or even physical) impossibility.
23
  I will deal with issues of psychological 
impossibility in responding to the Socratic account below. 
Here, I wish to respond to Hare’s claims about the logical impossibility of akrasia in two 
ways.  My first response is that Hare’s account, taken on its own merits, ignores an important 
fact about identifying akrasia and distinguishing it from intemperance.  My second response is 
that what Hare claims is tautologous is not so.  Davidson provides what is to my mind a decisive 
blow to Hare’s account of the logical impossibility of akrasia, but Davidson’s account leaves out 
an explanation for what he claims about judgments.  My account preserves Davidson’s view that 
akrasia is logically intelligible and furthermore provides a model of psychology that Davidson’s 
account could fit into.   
Distinguishing akrasia from intemperance 
My first response to Hare and to those who hold relevantly similar positions is that such 
positions fail to distinguish akrasia from intemperance.  It should be no surprise that a particular 
description of a case should not fit the description of akrasia if the case as described is not an 
example of akrasia.  Consider what Hare says above about the man who seeks moral advice.  
Hare regards it as clear from the fact that the man does not follow the advice, he has rejected the 
advice.  Assuming that the advice is actually good advice, the man who rejects it is intemperate, 
but the man who accepts it and yet acts against it is akratic.
24
  Hare apparently appreciates no 
such distinction, inferring immediately from action alone a person’s normative commitments. 
A person’s actions alone are not sufficient evidence to make a determination of akrasia 
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 I will here reiterate that this kind of account does not distinguish cases in which, to follow the example, 
Paul sins and cases in which he does not.  If some psychological impossibility to follow divine command 
is at play, the account is silent as to why Paul sometimes does and sometimes does not follow divine 
command, while regarding it the whole time as divine command. 
24
 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between akrasia and advice, see (Wiland) 
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or intemperance.
25
  Some report from the alleged akrates or intemperate is required to make any 
determination at all.  It is a defect of Hare’s account, and accounts like it, that they do not allow 
any such first-person report to bear on the distinction between the akrates and the intemperate.  
Any account that, like Hare’s, does not allow for the reports of the alleged akrates or intemperate 
is, by the above reasoning (mutatis mutandis), an insufficiently fine-grained account. 
Positively demonstrating the logical intelligibility of akrasia 
Davidson presents the following triad to set up what he construes to be Hare’s reasoning 
concerning the logical unintelligibility of akrasia. 
“(P1) If some agent a wants to do x more that she wants to do y and she believes 
herself free to do either x or y, then she will intentionally do x if she does either x 
or y intentionally.  
(P2) If a judges that it would be better to do x than to do y, then she wants to do x 
more than she wants to do y.  
(P3) There are incontinent actions.” (How is Weakness of the Will Possible? 23) 
 It is clear that, given the previous citations of Hare, that Hare would agree with P1 and P2 
and would reject P3 on the ground that P1 and P2 are true and that an “incontinent action” is an 
action in which agent a judges that x is better than y, can do either one, and intentionally does y.   
 Because I consider Davidson’s account of the possibility of akrasia to be reasonably 
clear in its own right, and because there are a number of quality summaries of his account
26
, I 
shall be brief with regard to exposition of Davidson’s reply to Hare.  In presenting a précis of 
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 The degree of plausibility of a distinction between intemperance and akrasia rests on the degree of 
plausibility of cases like those described in the first chapter, most notable Austin’s case, in which it is 
necessary to consider his own view of his internal states in order to properly judge, by considering a 
distinction between intemperance and akrasia, the blameworthiness of his action. 
26
 The introduction to Stroud and Tappolet, Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (1-9) contains a 
very good summary. 
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Davidson’s reply, I want to point out that I take two things to be important about Davidson’s 
account.  The first is that as a pure demonstration that the triad above is not logically 
inconsistent, I regard Davidson’s account to be entirely successful.  Second, Davidson’s account 
must be supplemented with additional empirical data in order to provide some positive 
explanation of how akrasia can come to be.  To be fair to Davidson, he did not intend to prove 
more than that the apparently inconsistent triad above is not, contra Hare, actually inconsistent.   
 To explain: Davidson renders the above triad consistent by appealing to a distinction 
between unconditional judgments and prima facie (or pro tanto) judgments.  Unconditional 
judgments are of the form ‘action a is better than action b’.  Prima facie judgments are of the 
form ‘pf(a is better than b, r)’ Which is to be read, “Prima facie: a is better than b, given r”, 
where r is a reason or set of reasons for the judgment. (How is Weakness of the Will Possible? 
37-39)  Davidson explains:  
“But now there is no (logical) difficulty in the fact of incontinence [akrasia], for 
the akrates is characterized as holding that, all things considered, it would be 
better to do b than to do a, even though he does a rather than b and with a reason.  
The logical difficulty has vanished because a judgment that a is better than b, all 
things considered, is a relational, or pf, judgment and so cannot conflict logically 
with any unconditional judgment.” (How is Weakness of the Will Possible? 39) 
An action against one sort of judgment but in accord with another is an example in which 
each of the propositions in the above triad can be true at the same time.  The question becomes, 
is this what is really going on when someone is akratic?  I must say that I cannot be a very harsh 
critic of Davidson on this point, simply because Davidson acknowledges that these points are 
beyond the scope of his limited purpose, which was to demonstrate the logical consistency of the 
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above triad.  There remains the task of explaining akrasia while acknowledging its irrationality.  
The sense in which Davison views akrasia as irrational is as follows: 
“But if the question is read what is the agent’s reason for doing a when he 
believes it would be better, all things considered, to do another thing, then the 
answer must be: for this, the agent has no reason [Of course he has a reason for 
doing a; what he lacks is a reason for not letting his better reason for not doing a 
prevail.]” (How is Weakness of the Will Possible? 42)
27
  
Davidson concludes:  “What is special in incontinence is that the actor cannot understand 
himself: he recognizes, in his own intentional behavior, something essentially surd.” (42) 
  In “Paradoxes of Irrationality”, Davidson proposes that the appropriate way to explain 
akrasia while preserving its irrationality is to identify a cause of action that is not a reason for 
action. (176-178) For example, consider someone who buys themselves some new clothes with 
money that she had previously decided to give to charity, and still, on reflection thought it best to 
give the money to charity.  Whatever desire or other pro-attitude that caused her to buy the 
clothes was not a reason to buy the clothes; she really judged that it would be best to give the 
money to charity, meaning that she had every reason to give the money to charity.  This action is 
explainable in the sense that a cause can be identified but irrational in the sense that the cause is 
not a reason. 
 Davidson continues to outline a framework for the sort of explanation that can account 
for akrasia.  We generally have no trouble acknowledging that some mental events may cause 
others without the first being a reason for the second.  To paraphrase Davidson’s example, Bob 
wants Amelia to visit his garden, so he plants in it a beautiful flower.  Amelia desires to see the 
flower, so visits Bob’s garden.  Bob’s want is the ultimate (though not proximate) cause of 
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 I have here placed Davidson’s footnote in brackets. 
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Amelia’s desire and action, but is not the reason for it.  (180-181)  
 Note that the example is in an interpersonal rather than intrapersonal context.  Davidson’s 
purpose in appealing to the interpersonal context is to propose that one must see some sort of 
functional divisions, or “quasi-independent structures” in the mind to adequately explain some 
kinds of irrationality (like akrasia) so that his interpersonal context example above can translate 
into the intrapersonal context. (181) 
 Davidson’s proposal for explaining irrational action is a good one, and reconciles two 
projects that are, at first glance, incompatible.  It seems like explaining something renders it no 
longer irrational while something irrational is by definition inexplicable.   If there can be causes 
that are not reasons, then actions can be irrational but still explainable, whenever one’s own 
mental state is the cause of one’s action, but not a reason for it.  This is a nice conceptual outline 
that is missing only a description of which quasi-independent structures of the mind are 
responsible for akrasia.  My full account is found below.  Note that my account will rely on 
heuristics, cognition, metacognition, and Global Workspace as functionally quasi-independent 
features of the mind.  I will describe how it comes to be that one mental state can be a cause of 
an action without being a reason for that action.  
My empirically informed account of akrasia fills in Davidson’s framework.  Davidson is 
correct that to the average person, their failing to act in accord with what they themselves take to 
be preferable can be subjectively inexplicable.  However, to the philosopher or the psychologist, 
an appropriate account of akrasia can provide such answers.  Hare’s account does not allow for a 
sufficiently complex picture of human psychology and decision-making, and should be displaced 
by an account that includes knowledge that scholars and researchers have gained by careful 
observation.  Davidson’s account anticipates, but stops short of fully describing, such an account 
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as I shall develop.   
 Concerns like Hare’s with respect to the intelligibility of akrasia are one motivation for 
denying that akrasia happens.  I think that Davidson’s response has successfully made room for 
the possibility of akrasia, but I am more interested in the actuality of akrasia.  Before presenting 
the empirically informed account of akrasia, it is necessary to present the other major challenge 
to the intelligibility of akrasia so that it is clear what kind of opposition the empirically informed 
account is intended to overcome. 
Psychological Unintelligibility of Akrasia 
 Certainly, there is some connection between what a person thinks they ought to do and 
what they actually end up doing.  The Socratic position with respect to akrasia takes this 
connection as inviolable.  The Socratic position, and views like it, take the stance that it is a 
feature of human psychology that no other motivational force can overpower knowledge of the 
good (since all actions are aimed at the good).  In this section, I shall summarize the Socratic 
position and then I shall present an historical response to it that is in need of some completion 
and modification. 
The Socratic Position 
 In his dialog with Protagoras, in order to clarify the position that he will be critiquing, 
Socrates states (and Protagoras assents to) the following: 
“Now the rest of the world are of the opinion that knowledge is a principle not of 
strength, or rule, or of command:  Their notion is that a man may have 
knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by 
anger, or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear,--just as if knowledge were 
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a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow… [M]en are commonly supposed to 
know the things which are best, and not to do them when they might.” (103-104)  
 It is clear that what the people who hold the general opinion about knowledge are talking 
about is (at least in part) akrasia.  Knowledge is (at least) belief, and in the above quotation, a 
belief about what is best in some cases.  Yet in some of these cases, people are “overcome” by 
something else, and act against their belief about what is best.   
I have profound doubts about any explanation of akrasia that relies simply on the 
strength of one motivational force overpowering some other motivational force
28
, for the reason 
that such explanations strain the requirement that akrasia be intentional. I shall resume 
discussion of this issue in Chapter 4. 
 What is clear from Socrates’ statement above is that he accuses his opponents of 
misunderstanding the role that knowledge plays in decision and action.  He reacts with 
incredulity at the suggestion that knowledge could be dragged around by the passions.  He 
accepts, but does not argue at length for (because Protagoras also accepts), a view of human 
psychology that prevents anyone from knowing that one thing is better than another and yet 
choosing the acknowledged inferior choice.  Socrates and Protagoras both accept this as an 
intuitively obvious truth (in spite of the opinions of the general population).  No doubt Socrates 
is correct about something here; it is indeed plausible that knowledge has something to do with 
why we act, but it is not so plausible to hold that such a straightforward relationship exists 
between knowledge and action. 
 Pre-theoretically, something akin to what Socrates suggests has great explanatory force.  
In fact, assuming that knowledge of the good necessarily motivates actions or intentions can 
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 Davidson also was skeptical of such a formulation, writing, “…it is not clear how we can ever blame 
the agent for what he does: his action merely reflects the outcome of a struggle within him.  What could 
he do about it?” (How is Weakness of the Will Possible? 35) 
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provide a kind of sufficiency in terms of explanation of why some actions are taken or intentions 
formed.  Imagine asking someone why she decided to stay home sick from work rather than go 
in on some particular occasion.  If her response is that she judged that it would be better for her 
to stay in, we could view this as a sufficient, non-enthymematic explanation of her action in that 
case. 
 These concerns seem to effectively motivate the Socratic position of a strong and 
immediate psychological connection between a person’s knowledge of the good and their 
decision to pursue it.  If this connection holds, then it follows that akrasia, a straightforward 
counterexample to this connection, is unintelligible in any normal psychology.  Akrasia has 
never been entertained as a form of aberrant, deviant, or abnormal psychology, but instead 
always as a part, undesirable though it is, of a more or less ordinary psychology.  If akrasia were 
simply a form of mental illness, then it would not be a philosophical puzzle, but a psychiatric 
one.  Philosophers have not spent any time arguing about why one’s nose runs when one has a 
cold.  The force of the Socratic objection is that if akrasia cannot be part of a normal 
psychology, then the claim that akrasia is possible or even actual is a claim without much impact 
on our understanding of the general human condition.  I, of course, wish to dispute the 
understanding of psychology that excludes akrasia from the ordinary range of human 
experience, behavior, and mental function. 
One might go along with Socrates’ position for a long distance, holding the connection 
between knowledge of the good and action pursuing it to be very strong, yet not indefeasible.  
However, anyone who would claim that knowing what is good (or better or best) does not always 
cause us to pursue it must deal with the apparent explanatory power of Socrates’ account.  In 
other words, Socrates’ opponent owes a story of how having knowledge of the good does indeed 
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sometimes provide us with sufficient reason to pursue it and how yet we sometimes fail to pursue 
it.  Such an opposing account requires a more complex psychology than Socrates provides.   
Just as a plausible response to positions like Hare’s require a more fine-grained approach, 
I offer a more sophisticated psychological explanation for what is going on when a person judges 
that A is better than B and does B.  The Socratic position treats all reasons for action as pursuing 
a single, overarching normative criterion—the good.  This does not fit well with a more careful 
inspection of reasons for action. (Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes)   
Interestingly, Aristotle’s response to the Socratic position concerning akrasia contains a 
kernel of the empirically informed account of akrasia that I shall soon develop.  What is worth 
noting is that Aristotle’s approach satisfies the requirement for a more complex moral 
psychology than that found in the Socratic position, but still contains some gaps, some 
deficiencies, and can be improved considerably by the application of concepts in contemporary 
psychology.  I shall discuss briefly some of the salient features of Aristotle’s reply to the Socratic 
position because I regard my account as a refinement of rather than a radical departure from the 
traditional philosophical discussion of akrasia.   
Aristotle’s Reply to the Socratic Position: 
Aristotle begins with a distinction between attending to knowledge and having 
knowledge (without attending to it).  He notes that it would be extraordinary for someone to have 
and attend to their knowledge and still act contrary to it (and in this way adheres to the Socratic 
position), but that it would not be so implausible for someone to have knowledge and act against 
it because he is not “attending to” that knowledge.  The Socratic position makes no such 
distinction.   
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The relevant passage in Aristotle’s account is important enough (and awkward enough to 
summarize) to quote in full: 
“Suppose, then that someone has the universal belief hindering him from tasting; 
he has the second belief, that everything sweet is pleasant and this is sweet, and 
this belief is active; but it turns out that appetite is present in him.  The belief 
then, [that is formed from the previous two beliefs]
29
 tells him to avoid this, but 
appetite leads him on, since it is capable of moving each of the bodily parts.  The 
result, then, is that in a way reason and belief make him act incontinently. The 
[second] belief is contrary to the correct reason, but only coincidentally, not in its 
own right.  For the appetite, not the belief, is contrary [in its own right to correct 
reason].” (104)
30
 
 One of the most difficult things about dieting is sticking to a diet in the face of previous 
dietary habits and assumptions which are usually correct, but can sometimes contribute to 
leading one astray.  In Aristotle’s above example, the very same object (the sweet) is an object 
judged to be valuable based on the criterion of its pleasant taste, and judged to be of negative 
value on the criterion of its healthfulness (to supply a plausible reason for the admonition to 
avoid sweets).  A dieter (by virtue of being a dieter, and not merely intemperate) regards the 
healthfulness of the food as the more important criterion of value.  Aristotle contends that in the 
cases that the agent chooses to eat the sweet, they are doing so for a reason, and in accord with a 
judgment of theirs, and are not under any compulsion.  They are not, however, acting from their 
                                                        
29
 This is a difficult passage.  I take the meaning of the bracketed phrase as indicating that the “universal 
belief hindering him from tasting” and the belief “everything sweet is pleasant and this is sweet”, may 
operate together in an agent’s mind and favor whatever normative concern implied in the first belief over 
the pursuit of pleasantness identified in the second belief to yield an overall belief telling the agent to 
“avoid this” in spite of its pleasantness. 
30
 Book 7, Chapter 3, Sections 10 and 11 (Irwin 1999). 
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better judgment.  The more patiently the decision is made, the more likely that both criteria get 
compared, but we have all experienced moments of weakness that are quickly resolved, and that 
we quickly regret.   
Many sweets present themselves to us in a colorful and appealing way, which draws 
attention to their desirability more than to their healthfulness, so it should be of little surprise that 
information concerning the sweet’s desirability on a taste criterion should be brought to our 
attention first.  It is important to consider that many of our mental operations are features that 
were/are of critical importance to our survival as a species, so a quick decision-making tool that 
identifies pleasantly tasting things as highly desirable is a heuristic that separates potential food 
sources into more and less highly caloric categories, with a strong preference for the more 
caloric.  This one-reason heuristic is quite beneficial when food sources are scarce, but 
detrimental in the circumstances of extreme plenty and even profligacy that are increasingly 
common in the developed world.  It is a common experience to act on this one-reason heuristic 
while believing that it is better to keep one’s diet.  It is classically known as akrasia.  
In supplementing Aristotle’s reply to the Socratic position with some of the language and 
conceptual framework of modern evolutionary psychology, I am foreshadowing the content of 
my empirically informed account, and demonstrating Aristotle’s essential compatibility with 
such an account.  Just as Davidson demonstrated that a more finely grained understanding of 
what a judgment is allowed for the logical intelligibility of akrasia, Aristotle similarly argues 
that a more finely grained understanding of the psychology of judgment and motivation makes 
room for akrasia that is not present under the Socratic position.  Both Davidson’s position and 
Aristotle’s are plausible, but the question remains whether either is in any way supported by any 
substantial observations of modern empirical science.  It is to this question that I now turn. 
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An Empirically Informed Account of Akrasia 
 The effort of providing an empirically informed account of akrasia is complicated by the 
fact that the terms familiar to philosophy (akrasia, incontinence, weakness of will) are not terms 
of currency in the various empirical fields of study that are relevant to this analysis.  Akrasia 
necessarily involves peoples’ judgments of what is better or best, i.e. normative judgments.  
Since psychologists are scientists, they speak descriptively, and their habits of language 
generally assist them in maintaining both objectivity and the appearance of objectivity, both of 
which are important to scientific credibility.  So instead of studying a resoluteness or 
irresoluteness, described in terms of personal virtue or vice, a psychologist might avoid the 
appearance of morally criticizing his or her study subjects and examine ‘ego-depletion’. 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky and Muraven)  Since akrasia, or its translated cousins ‘incontinence’ or 
‘weakness of will’ all describe a personal vice, this all means that empirical accounts of what 
philosophers would term akrasia are likely to be termed something else (or will be mixed among 
several terms) even if psychologists were in general familiar with the traditional philosophical 
discussion of akrasia, which they probably are not. 
 However, this should not stop a determined philosopher (or anyone else) from crossing 
disciplinary borders and looking for commonality in the concepts studied, however they are 
termed.  If my position is correct and akrasia is not merely possible but actual and reasonably 
common, then it should have some manifestation in empirical observation of human psychology.  
The understood mechanisms and features of observed human psychology should also suggest an 
intelligible explanation for akrasia.  What would result is an empirically informed account of 
akrasia that ought to settle the question of whether akrasia is indeed possible by arguing that it is 
actual (hence possible) and intelligible on our best theories. 
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 My presentation of an empirically informed account of akrasia contains three parts.  The 
first is a review of other literature specifically intending to provide an empirically informed 
account of akrasia.  The second part is my proposal that research in cognitive bias forms the 
most compelling way to empirically study akrasia.  The third part presents a model of cognition 
(the Global Workspace Theory) that fits and explains cognitive bias as well as akrasia. 
A comprehensive survey of empirically informed accounts of akrasia: 
I know of only one work of empirical science focused on akrasia as traditionally 
discussed by philosophers.  It is called “Weakness of will, akrasia, and the neuropsychiatry of 
decision making: An interdisciplinary perspective”. (Kalis, Mojzisch and Schweizer)  It is not a 
formal study, but rather, as the title indicates, is an article intended to bridge empirical research 
about defects in decision making and philosophical analysis of the same issue.  This is at heart 
my project in this chapter.  I propose to examine some of the conclusions of Kalis et al., but 
ultimately, I shall argue that there is too much that their account of akrasia leaves out.   
To begin, Kalis et al. identify a “sequential model of decision making and action” and put 
forth three proposals for where to locate akrasia in the model: 1) option generation, 2) option 
selection, or 3) option initiation.  They term Akrasia in option generation, “Akrasia as accidie”
31
.  
This is an explanation of akrasia such that the akrates fails to recognize the option that she 
would have regarded as the best option among her perceived options.  To incorporate the full 
characterization of akrasia, including, notably, the stricture that akrasia be intentional action, the 
putative akrates must have been able to identify/consider the missing option.   
Akrasia in option selection is called “decisional akrasia”.  In decisional akrasia, the 
putative akrates recognizes several options and selects an action other than one that they have 
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 ‘Accidie’ is an alternate spelling of ‘acedia’, an archaic English word that suggests spiritual sloth or 
indifference. 
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some reason to prefer more than the one they actually selected.  Kalis et al. leave open an 
explanation for decisional akrasia, invoking many studies that suggest that different kinds of 
risk/reward evaluations are carried out by different cognitive apparati in the brain.  I think it is 
fair to assimilate this variety of possible explanations for decisional akrasia into the broader 
claim that the decisional akrates selects one option (including inaction) above the option that is 
judged to be best (leaving the sense of ‘best’ to encompass a variety of normative concerns).   
The third proposal for the location of akrasia in an appropriate model is in option 
initiation. They term this “last-ditch akrasia”.  What Kalis et al. refer to as “last-ditch akrasia” is 
quite different from what Pears, who uses the same term, deals with at length (Pears).  For Kalis 
et al. last-ditch akrasia is taken to involve neurophysical disorders like apathetic motor inertia, in 
which the afflicted wishes to exert motor control to no effect, or motor impulsivity (e.g. alien 
hand syndrome), in which the afflicted experience bodily movements over which they have no 
volition.  There are good reasons to regard behavior resultant from most psychiatric disorders as 
something the agent “cannot help,” i.e. as unfree action.  Both in society and in courts of law, we 
regard those acting under some form of psychiatric disorder as of diminished culpability.  The 
pathologies that Kalis et al. identify as candidates for akrasia generate action that seems to me 
sufficiently unintentional to qualify as “acting intentionally against one’s better judgment”.  That 
Kalis et al. primarily try to identify akrasia in terms of one sort or another of psychiatric disorder 
is a pervasive concern of mine throughout the article, and this difficulty is at one point 
anticipated by the authors: 
“…[I]n the philosophical literature, akrasia is often contrasted with symptoms 
such as addiction and compulsion.  Addiction and compulsion are then presented 
as…unfree actions or actions caused by irresistible desires.  The philosophical 
understanding of compulsion and addiction differs greatly from the way these 
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phenomena are understood in psychiatry and clinical psychology.  An important 
difference is that in psychiatry, the concept of freedom does not play a dominant 
role in demarcating diagnostic categories; psychiatrists do not generally assume 
that psychopathological behavior is unfree.” (47) 
 It occurs to me that it may be more appropriate to rephrase the last clause as ‘psychiatrists 
generally take no explicit position at all with regard to philosophical theories of freedom.’  There 
is a great deal of room for dispute about what kinds of actions (if any) are free, and I shall not at 
this point offer a comprehensive analysis.  In any event, historical and contemporary discussion 
of akrasia has considered akrasia a problem, but not some kind of psychiatric disorder.
32
 For 
example, consider a person, call him Durst, who is arrested for shoplifting.  Assume further that 
it were found out that he had some kind of psychopathology that either prevented the option of 
not shoplifting from even occurring to him, or that caused involuntary motor impulses that had 
the effect of causing Durst to grab an item on his way out of a shop in which he decided not to 
make a purchase.  In both of these cases, Durst would not be held responsible owing to his lack 
of ability to act otherwise.  In neither of these cases would Durst be reasonably accused of 
akrasia, in the first place because if he is incapable of entertaining a non-shoplifting option, he 
cannot have been said to have judged that shoplifting was the inferior course, and yet chose it.  In 
the second place, he cannot be said to have acted intentionally against his better judgment if he 
did not act intentionally at all.   
I think these concerns constitute an adequate reason to reject the first and the third of the 
possibilities that Kalis et al. propose for the appropriate place of akrasia in a psychological 
model.  Akrasia in the option selection phase, the second proposal, is much more promising as a 
starting point for identifying philosophical akrasia in psychological study and terminology.  
Kalis et al. do not identify any specific mechanism for explaining akrasia, but instead propose 
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 Even Aristotle describes the akrates as being as if mad. 
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that one of a variety of situations that involve different brain structures being active for one 
decision could be the culprit in akrasia.  One example is the psychological propensity of humans 
to value smaller, immediate rewards over larger but delayed rewards. Kalis et al. cite a study 
(McClure, Laibson and Loewenstein) that indicates that fundamentally different brain structures 
are employed for each evaluation. 
I think that Kalis et al. are on the right track with this proposal, and the account of 
akrasia that I will present is not incompatible with their suggestion that akrasia is an artifact of 
multiple evaluative processes running concurrently and independently in different parts of the 
brain.  Of course, Kalis et al. are proposing only a sketch of a possible approach to explaining 
akrasia.  I wish to offer a more complete account. 
 In the interest of brevity, I want to conclude discussion of the Kalis et al. paper with the 
following remark.  I think that their general approach is useful to the collaboration between 
psychologists and philosophers and ought to be emulated.  There is room for a fruitful dialog 
between philosophers and psychologists concerning the proper model for akrasia.  It strikes me 
(and Kalis, et al.) that the sequential model of decision making and action that they propose is 
not the only and may not be the best way to outline a research project to study akrasia, though it 
is certainly a good start.  At minimum, Kalis et al. have demonstrated that the conceptual 
analysis that philosophy is known for and the empirical method of testing precise hypotheses that 
characterizes all of the sciences including psychology and psychiatry work better when working 
together.  The implicit suggestion of Kalis et al. is that some mutual translation of vocabulary 
and jargon is all that may be required to facilitate such cooperation.  This is a good suggestion.  I 
depart from the Kalis et al. analysis in that I think there is a broad category of research in 
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psychology that maps onto the characteristics of akrasia as a concept, namely research in 
cognitive bias.  It is to cognitive bias that I now turn. 
Cognitive Bias 
In the past several decades, empirical studies of human behavior and decision making 
have revealed many interesting and surprising results.  This research is not limited to psychology 
or neuroscience; nearly every area of the social sciences is making use of research in cognitive 
bias for various purposes.
33
  By and large, a model of human beings as consistently rational 
decision makers has had to be substantially discarded.  When people face decisions, they often 
do not pause to subject their perceived options to a comprehensive analysis; they tend to act by 
habit or employ heuristics to make their decisions.  Various heuristics even affect which options 
are perceived as options at all.  I think we can supplant the Kalis et al. sequential model for 
describing akrasia by pointing out that cognitive bias affects both option generation and option 
selection rather than only one or the other, and thus is a part of vocabulary in psychology that 
more neatly maps onto philosophical conceptual analysis of akrasia.   
The Concept of Cognitive Bias 
The conclusion often drawn by a superficial understanding of research in cognitive bias is 
that human beings are hopelessly irrational and unsystematic decision makers who stubbornly 
resist any rational, scientific understanding of their decision making.  To begin to argue against 
this unwarranted conclusion, consider how difficult all decisions would be if every time one 
were faced with a decision, even a trivial one, that one would have to sift through all of the 
information available, actively separate relevant from irrelevant information, and then perform a 
rational calculation based on all and only the remaining information, actively arranged and 
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 Advertisers often exploit cognitive biases like the availability bias.  Economists rely on research in 
cognitive bias to understand how people perceive value and act on those perceptions.  Public safety 
officials design warning signs to capture attention (i.e. to initiate a certain sort of explicit cognition).  
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evaluated…all in real time.  Given a deeper and more reflective look at heuristic decision 
making, it becomes clear that, by and large, our decision heuristics are more beneficial to us than 
detrimental, though they are unquestionably detrimental at times.
34
  Put in the terms of 
commercial products, heuristic decision-making is both a feature and a bug. 
It is in those circumstances in which our heuristics tend to lead to error, that the term 
“cognitive bias” is applied.  Here is one famous example.  Tversky and Kahneman, credited as 
pioneers in investigating cognitive bias, studied what they termed the “representativeness bias” 
(Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases). In one study, (Extensional versus intuitive 
reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment) these two researchers noticed that 
their subjects evaluated coin flip results (H for ‘Heads’, T for ‘Tails’) like TTTHHH, HHHHTH, 
and TTTTTT as less probable than results like HTTHTH.  Of course, any specific result of six 
tosses is just as probable as any other specific result of six tosses of any fair coin.  It seems that 
the subjects confused a number of other concerns with the actual task of evaluating probability.  
The HHHHTH and TTTTTT results do violate the expected balance of H and T results, but the 
task is not to evaluate how well the results conform to expected balance of H and T results.  So 
the representativeness bias selected responses that represented deviation from an expected 
outcome rather than selecting mathematical fact. 
Though Tversky and Kahneman focus on coin toss results, it is easier to explain why 
what they observe is an example of the representativeness bias using poker hands as an example.  
Hand A is (A, K, Q, J, 10). Hand B is (3, J, 2, 7, 9).  Hand A and hand B are 
equally probable, though most people would rate hand A as more improbable.  Why is that?  The 
answer seems to be that Hand B is more representative of an average hand in poker, that is, a 
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 See especially (Haselton, Nettle and Andrews) for an account of the benefits of most of our decision 
heuristics, despite their role in occasional instances of harmful cognitive bias. 
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hand that would not be likely to be a winning hand, while Hand A, the royal flush, is the 
strongest possible hand, and thus is strongly representative of an unusual hand in terms of its 
expected result (an automatic win, barring the astoundingly improbable outcome of another royal 
flush).  Most poker players will play for years without ever seeing a royal flush occur (at least 
without manipulation of the deck).   
Another example of the representativeness bias from Tversky and Kahneman serves to 
fill out an explanation of representativeness bias.  Subjects of the study read a personality 
description of Linda: “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social 
justice and participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.” Subjects are then asked to compare the 
probability of two statements about Linda.  Statement A is “Linda is a bank teller” and statement 
B is “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement”.  Despite the fact that a 
conjunction cannot be any more likely than either of its conjuncts, 80% to 90% of subjects rated 
statement B as more likely to be true.  The explanation for this mistake seems to be that the 
second conjunct in statement B is more representative of a reasonable conclusion given the 
evidence than the first conjunct, which is also the entirety of statement A.   
It seems that the representativeness bias has its roots in a human ability to quickly 
separate signal from noise and focus on information relevant to the accomplishment of goals.  So 
when shown poker hands or coin tosses, the information is prioritized and evaluated in terms of 
what is representative of success or failure at poker games or coin tosses, rather than what is 
probabilistically expected or unexpected.  When people read a personality description, facts more 
relevant or closely connected to the provided description are likely to stand out as signal as 
opposed to noise.  In carefully crafted situations, this particular cognitive bias can be 
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systematically exploited to entice subjects to commit formal fallacies like the conjunction 
fallacy, or versions of the gambler’s fallacy.   
What seems to be happening in these cases is that a one-reason heuristic selects the 
option that fits a commonly valued normative criterion, but fails with respect to another more 
highly valued normative criterion in special circumstances.  For example, in the case of 
representativeness bias, a carefully constructed experimental setup exposes a one-reason 
heuristic that allows rapid identification of common goal-relevant concerns at the expense of 
ignoring much more cognition-intensive logical or mathematical truths.  A generally useful one-
reason heuristic, then, can be a factor in getting the “wrong answer”.
35
  
In a significant sense, cognitive bias research is research into systematic distraction. A 
case of cognitive bias usefully correlates to a case of akrasia when a normally useful heuristic (if 
we even have any other kind) is a factor in actions that are contrary to the agent’s own beliefs 
about what is better or best.  Introducing the notion of cognitive bias has several important 
contributions to make toward our understanding of akrasia.  First, cognitive bias is a reasonably 
well-explored area of empirical research, and so if cognitive bias as explored by empirical 
psychology is a significant feature of what philosophers call akrasia, then those who study 
akrasia can make productive use of this wealth of research and insight.  Second, if the account of 
cognitive bias as a key factor in akrasia is successful, then any story about the psychological 
unintelligibility of akrasia must be swept aside, along with any story of the logical impossibility 
of akrasia (if something is actual, then it’s possible). 
Akrasia and Attentional Bias  
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 Of course, this “wrong” answer is the right answer, but on a less valued normative criterion.  Still, we 
should not wish to be without such effective cognitive architecture.  “…[L]ogic, mathematics, probability 
theory…are computationally weak: incapable of solving the natural adaptive problems our ancestors had 
to solve reliably in order to reproduce.” (Cosmides and Tooby 329) 
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Some philosophical work concerning akrasia that is similar to what I suggest has been 
done by Christine Tappolet.  A subset of cognitive bias is attentional bias.  Attentional biases 
result from heuristics that have as their purpose to direct our attention to important things in our 
environments, both external and internal (mental).  Sometimes these heuristics are misapplied 
and instead direct our attentions to unimportant features of our environments.  For example, 
when we pay attention to what someone else is doing, we often look at what they are looking at.  
This is very often the proper place to look, but this is an attentional bias that magicians have long 
used to misdirect an audience’s attention. 
 Tappolet approaches analysis of akrasia as attentional bias in the limited case of akrasia 
that involves emotions. In her paper, “Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action”, 
Tappolet proposes a distinction between “hot” and “cool” akrasia.  Hot akrasia is characterized 
by the presence of strong emotional states that serve to focus the attention of the person who is 
deliberating onto certain courses of action and opinions.  Cool akrasia is absent any significant 
emotional influence.  Tappolet looks at emotions in a way highly informed by recent psychology.  
Rather than regarding emotions as blind forces at war with reason, which has been one 
traditional way of looking at emotion’s role in akrasia,
36
 Tappolet regards emotions in the way 
that has become accepted in recent years.  Many emotional states can be understood as 
perceptions of value.  For example, fear as an emotional state often serves to identify and direct 
one’s attention to danger in one’s surroundings.  One is sometimes afraid when one has no need 
to be afraid, and judging that the object of the fear is not really something to be afraid of does not 
always assuage the fear.  In the cases in which the fear is not assuaged, one may be less disposed 
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 Most notably in Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part II, Q. 77, Article 2.  See also (Davidson, How is 
Weakness of the Will Possible?) for discussion of this point. This might also be the general sort of thing 
that Hume has in mind in denying that there can be any real conflict between reason and the passions (See 
especially the Treatise of Human Nature 2.3.3) 
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to notice other features of one’s environment.  In this way, deliberating in the presence of strong 
emotions is described as an attentional bias.  Tappolet puts it this way:  
“[C]ases of akrasia caused by emotions involve a conflict between a value 
perception and an evaluative judgment that can be compared to perceptual 
illusions such as the Muller-Lyer illusion, in which one sees the lines as being of a 
different length even though one judges or knows that they are of the same length.  
This is particularly easy to see in cases in which one judges that one’s emotion is 
not appropriate, such as when I fear something while I judge that there is no 
danger and nonetheless act on my fear” (111) 
Tappolet is convinced that this approach makes hot akrasia intelligible, but leaves cool 
akrasia (deliberation not accompanied by strong emotion) with no such factor that makes it 
intelligible.  Since Tappolet is concerned only with the intelligibility of hot akrasia, her account 
ends there, claiming that the intelligibility of cool akrasia is the greater puzzle.  I agree that 
strong emotions (as attention-directing heuristics) account for a cognitive or attentional bias that 
could play a significant role in explanations for some akratic actions.   
 For cases of cool akrasia, I think a similar story can apply, though the bias involved is 
one that affects cognition without any appeal to strong emotions.  The cognitive bias account of 
akrasia would collapse Tappolet’s distinction between hot and cool akrasia from a distinction 
between a clearly intelligible form of akrasia and a puzzle to a distinction between akrasia 
involving one form of cognitive or attentional bias and another. As a result, I will at this point 
cease to apply the distinction.   
Consider as only one example of the kind of thing that makes akrasia intelligible a bias 
of temporal proximity.  In general, people have good reasons to prefer benefits to themselves that 
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are temporally nearby rather than far away (i.e. a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush).  As a 
result, people often pursue strategies based on this preference without reflecting on the 
preference (availability is the “one reason” for this one-reason heuristic).  However, this 
generally effective one-reason heuristic can sometimes lead us astray from what we know to be 
the best course of action.   
For example, consider Buck, who has some mild tooth problems.  Say that Buck judges 
that it would be best for him to see a dentist, though he knows the experience will be unpleasant.  
Many times the thought occurs to Buck that it would be best for him to make a dental 
appointment (say even that the telephone and the dentist’s phone number are near to hand) and 
still he does not.  When finally after many akratic episodes, Buck makes a dentist’s appointment, 
he fails to keep the appointment, though he remembers it and judges that it would be better for 
him to keep his appointment than to miss it.  Buck then follows this akratic action with akratic 
episodes similar to the first ones when judging that it would be best to reschedule his missed 
appointment.   
Buck is an example of one for whom akrasia is more frequent, and not an especially 
isolated incident.  His action is intelligible in the sense that we know why Buck should not want 
to go to the dentist, but certainly Buck could have made and kept an appointment promptly.  We 
have no reason to doubt that he sincerely judged a dental visit as better than no dental visit.  We 
also blame Buck for his failure, and look upon this defiance of his better judgment as irrational.  
At every turn we might imagine Buck believing that he will make and keep a dentist’s 
appointment before his dental problems escalate, and the reason that he believes this is because 
he judges that such an action would be best.  His desire to avoid pain is served both by avoiding 
the appointment and making the appointment, so this is not a case of some desire overwhelming 
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reason, as akrasia is often portrayed.  What is going on in Buck’s case is an example of cognitive 
bias.  A generally useful preference for immediate and certain value over longer term and less 
certain value (or in this case an aversion to the immediate and certain disvalue encountered in the 
dentist’s office) is a factor contributing to Buck’s actions against his own judgment of what is 
better.  Temporal proximity in this case is acting as a one-reason heuristic. 
Say that Buck (after perhaps someone’s urging him, or perhaps not) says to himself 
something to the effect of “I knew then, and I know now, that I need a dentist and that it will be 
unpleasant, but if I continue to wait, it will become far more unpleasant.  I don’t feel that bad yet, 
but I really must see the dentist.” In doing this, he is focusing his attention against the one-reason 
heuristic that prefers temporally near to temporally far benefits.  Perhaps he writes down a note 
or sets a reminder to the same effect.  Then Buck finally reschedules and keeps his appointment, 
because his better judgment (i.e. the criterion that is more important to Buck than temporal 
nearness) is finally substituted for the previous one-reason heuristic.  Should any aspect of this 
behavior baffle anyone?  Temporal bias may be something that some have more trouble 
countering on occasion than others, but it appears that all of the details of Buck’s case are 
intelligible and can be given an empirically informed explanation. 
Global Workspace 
To complete the work of giving akrasia a suitably empirical characterization without 
losing the concept that has been traditionally explored in philosophy, cognitive bias itself needs 
something of a deeper explanation.  Explaining akrasia in terms of cognitive bias leaves open the 
question, “Why do we have cognitive biases?”   A deeper explanation for cognitive bias makes 
akrasia less a thing that, just as a matter of fact, happens to people, but a thing that practically 
65 
 
must beset us at times.  Again, my goal here is to establish akrasia as an intelligible part of 
normally functioning human psychology—an undesirable part, to be sure, but normal. 
 It is obvious that human beings are incapable of taking explicit notice of everything in 
their surrounding environment.  We exist in such an information-rich setting that our greatest 
challenge is usually in separating the useful information from everything else.  Our abilities to do 
so are not perfect; we cannot notice everything of importance to us in the world around us.  
Failure to notice certain features of our environment can often have dire consequences for us, but 
even so, it is a necessary consequence of our ability to focus on some information to the 
exclusion of other information that sometimes the more important information is missed.  
Nobody disputes this. 
 Similarly, our internal environment, accessible via introspection, is more information-rich 
than our ability to manage it all.  We do many things intentionally without being fully aware of 
them at the time that we do them.  For example, we walk and talk and manipulate objects without 
being aware of moving each muscle and putting down each foot and transferring weight and we 
notice where we are going without noticing that we notice where we are going.  We often have 
feelings without knowing why we have them, or what they are even directed toward (ask any 
therapist).  It is obvious that our awareness is limited and that our ability to focus on certain 
internal states to the exclusion of others carries with it the necessary consequence that sometimes 
we will focus on something that is not as important to us as what is excluded.  
 When researchers in cognitive science and AI research need to model and simulate 
human cognition, they increasingly rely on one or another development of Global Workspace 
Theory.  Bernard Baars is credited as the pioneer of GWT, and summarizes it this way:  
“The idea that consciousness has an integrative function has a long history. The 
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late Francisco Varela and colleagues called it the "brainweb" (2002).
37
 Global 
Workspace theory suggests a fleeting memory capacity that enables access 
between brain functions that are otherwise separate.  This makes sense in a brain 
that is a brainweb, viewed as a massive parallel distributed system of highly 
specialized processors. In such a system coordination and control may take place 
by way of a central information exchange, allowing some specialized processors -
- such as sensory systems in the brain -- to distribute information to the system as 
a whole. This solution works in large-scale computer architectures, which show 
typical "limited capacity" behavior when information flows by way of a global 
workspace. A sizable body of evidence suggests that consciousness is the primary 
agent of such a global access function in humans and other mammals (Baars, 
1983, 1988, 1997, 1998)
38
.” (Baars) 
 GWT is generally well regarded not only in cognitive science research, but also in AI 
research.
39
  The central insight behind GWT is that attention (a workspace shared by a multitude 
of cognitive apparati) is limited, and necessarily so given the amount of information that we 
encounter and must deal with in some reasonably effective way.  Much of this information can 
be dealt with without ever entering the global workspace, and when the global workspace 
imports some new information, some old information is crowded out as a necessary consequence 
of the limited size of the global workspace.   
 Cognitive bias then, and akrasia by extension, has a deeper explanation in terms of the 
finite capacity that human beings have to pay attention to information both from the external 
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 Baars Cites: Varela, F., J.-P. Lachaux, E. Rodriguez, J. Martinerie, The brainweb: Phase 
synchronization and large-scale integration.  Nature Reviews - Neuroscience, 2, April 2001, p. 237. 
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 Baars Cites: (1983): Conscious contents provide the nervous system with coherent, global 
information."  In R.J. Davidson, G.E. Schwartz & D. Shapiro (Eds.),  Consciousness & Self- regulation. 
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 For an impressive though not exhaustive list of developments utilizing GWT, see (Wallach and Allen) 
Chapter 11. 
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world and to their own internal states.  Various cognitive abilities to triage information quickly 
will on occasion exclude information from our attention that we would prefer not to be excluded 
from our attention, but in general we would not wish to be without such cognitive abilities.
40
  I 
contend that akrasia is not simply a fluke of human psychology, but quite the opposite; 
vulnerability to akrasia is a necessary side-effect of the ability to quickly separate important 
information—even about our own internal states—from everything else.  The case of Aurelius 
arguing his way out of bed that begins the first chapter is an excellent example of someone 
attempting to force a dominant consideration into the global workspace, to the exclusion of 
competing considerations.  Methods of self control like the one Aurelius exemplifies are more 
extensively addressed in Chapter 4. 
Some philosophical treatments of akrasia are more compatible with the above insights 
than others, and that compatibility can be a criterion for whether those philosophical treatments 
of akrasia are good treatments of akrasia (insofar as my account is the right account, of course).  
I submit that the central tenets of Global Workspace Theory (GWT) provide an empirically 
informed account of having but not attending to knowledge that can serve to fill out a generally 
Aristotelian position with regard to an account of akrasia that also happens to be compatible 
with Davidson’s notion of prima facie judgments. 
The empirically informed account of akrasia   
Now that I have presented the requisite background conceptual apparatus, I can present 
an explanation for the general case of akrasia.  Akrasia occurs when a one-reason heuristic plays 
a prominent causal role in forming an action or intention, and when the one reason is judged by 
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 For demonstrations of formal simulations involving one-reason heuristics performing as well or better 
than more complex algorithms that make use of all available information see (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 
Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality). 
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the akrates to be inferior as a reason for action to some other reason for action that would 
counsel a different and incompatible action or intention.  
Consider as an example, Aristotle’s dieter.  In this example, the very same object (the 
sweet) is an object judged to be valuable based on the criterion of its pleasant taste, which is 
likely to be noticed by a one-reason heuristic commending caloric items to our notice.  The form 
of the judgment could be fairly stated as ‘pf I should eat this, sweetness’ where a one-reason 
heuristic supplies one and only one reason supporting the prima facie judgment.   
The same action (eating the sweet) is judged to be of negative value on the criterion of its 
healthfulness to a dieter already operating with a caloric surplus.  Note that this does not simply 
set up a competing prima facie judgment of the form ‘pf I should not eat this, unhealthfulness’.  
In that case, akrasia would be no more explicable than in any other account of akrasia in which 
some force simply overpowers another. Rather, the dieter (again by virtue of being a dieter, and 
not being merely intemperate) regards the healthfulness of the food as the more important 
criterion of value when the two values (and perhaps more) are consciously compared.  What 
makes one normative judgment qualify as better judgment is that the better judgment includes 
competing considerations and weighs them.  So a judgment of the form ‘pf I should not eat this; 
sweetness, healthfulness’ is a metajudgment in that it includes the considerations relevant to the 
one-reason heuristic, and in judging in favor of an action that is contrary to that commended by 
the one-reason heuristic the metajudgment holds the opposing criterion as a better basis for 
judgment, hence, ‘better judgment’.  When information is in the global workspace, it is attended 
to.  When it is running in a background process it is incorrect to say that the agent does not know 
the information—they do, but do not attend to their knowledge.
41
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 See (Smith) for an account of the modal claim made when someone could have but did not attend to 
knowledge that they had. 
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This account of akrasia fits both the criteria for identifying akrasia as well as the 
examples of akrasia that I presented in Chapter 1.  I have just described how a dieter might 
select a food for its tastefulness while the more reflective dieter who attends to his better 
judgment would consider the food’s healthfulness as the more important trait and follow his 
better judgment.  Likewise, the apostle Paul may often have found himself clinging to his 
worldly possessions, unmindful of his more important commitment to following Christ in a life 
of poverty and service.  Certainly, science has documented a systematic tendency to value small, 
temporally nearby benefits to even very large benefits if they are temporally distant (Kirby and 
Marakovic).  In many cases it makes sense not to delay enjoyment, but of course if the later 
rewards are sufficient enough, it is better to forego immediate enjoyment. So Paul may find 
himself unmindfully purchasing material comforts for the now when a more reflective Paul 
would eschew such immediate comforts in favor of an eternal reward in his future.  Likewise, the 
lover in the throes of passion is prone to an attentional bias of the kind described in Tappolet’s 
account and she does not attend to a more level-headed, but unquestionably better judgment to 
abstain.  In all of these cases, a one-reason decisional heuristic plays a prominent role in 
fulfilling the first criterion of akrasia.  That is, a one-reason decisional heuristic can, in some 
cases, select an action that better judgment would counsel against.   
Criterion ii of akrasia is that the action is irrational.  In none of these cases is the agent 
doing things for which they have no justifying reason at all, but all of them are betraying what 
they themselves hold to be of greater value in favor of something that they themselves hold to be 
of lesser value.  That their actions are intelligible and amenable to the explanatory machinery of 
empirical psychology does not remove the sense that each agent has that they have behaved, by 
their own lights, irrationally.  The cognitive and attentional heuristics to which I have appealed 
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in this account are generally useful, but are rightly classed as irrational when they get the wrong 
answer. 
Despite wishing that they had acted differently, none of our exemplars are out of control 
of themselves in the sense that would eliminate culpability.  The one thing that each would regret 
most about their behavior is that they could have (and by their lights should have) attended to 
their better judgment.  The dieter could have avoided eating the sweet but did not.  Paul could 
have given his money to the poor but did not.  The lover could have abstained but she did not.  In 
each of these cases, the agents are failing to attend to knowledge that they have, and would have 
acted in accord with their better judgment had they attended to that better judgment.  In this way, 
all three act intentionally, though against their better judgment, fulfilling the third criterion. 
Given that a failure to act in accord with better judgment is a form of lack of self-control, 
and given that a lack of self-control is generally blamed, akrasia is generally blameworthy 
(criterion iv).  If it is within someone’s ability to act more carefully, less hastily, or to consider 
some criterion that would change their behavior and they do not, they are deserving of at least 
some disapprobation.   
Finally, nobody has better judgments that they never follow (criterion v). It is not the case 
that the dieter always breaks the diet, while maintaining in all seriousness and sincerity that they 
are on a diet.  Paul does not sin at every opportunity while judging in favor of righteousness the 
whole time. The adulterer does not declare to him or herself, “I think adultery is wrong, and I 
plan to do it every chance I get!”  The fact that someone is unable to change their behavior no 
matter what they think of their behavior, and no matter the considerations they undergo prior to 
acting, is evidence that the person is acting under compulsion, i.e. not intentionally.  They may 
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be best advised to seek help, and a more extensive sort of help than that which causes the akrates 
to simply attend to their own better judgment.   
An Observed Case 
 To this point I have been operating with some canonical examples of akrasia as it has 
been discussed in the philosophical tradition.  To lend further support to the claim that akrasia is 
not only intelligible to contemporary empirical psychology, but in fact empirically observed, I 
shall now present an empirically documented case of akrasia. Of course, the term ‘akrasia’ is 
not used, but I will attempt to show that this empirically observed case is a case of akrasia.  As 
such I will describe the ways in which this case fits not only the traditional philosophical notion 
of akrasia, but the empirical explanation of akrasia contained so far in this chapter. 
 As it happens, the case to which I will appeal is a familiar one to many philosophers, and 
has most prominently been used to challenge the notion of character in ethics.  The position that 
character has been shown by empirical research to be a fundamentally unstable notion is known 
primarily as situationism.  I will not get into a full discussion of all of the various formulations of 
situationism in general, but instead shall appropriate one case used by one of situationism’s most 
prominent proponents, John Doris
42
.  Doris relays a number of often cited psychological 
experiments intended, when taken as a whole, to argue that character is an unstable notion that is 
not observed in fact.
43
   
The case that I shall primarily utilize is a psychology experiment in which a group of 
seminarians, assumed to be persons possessing the character trait ‘compassion’ due to self-report 
and due to vocation, were told that they were late to give a presentation on Jesus’s story of the 
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 Most prominent among these are: (Isen and Levin) concerning generosity differences between subjects 
who had and who had not recently found a dime; (Mathews and Cannon) concerning the willingness of 
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benevolence of people who are in a hurry. 
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Good Samaritan (Darley and Batson).
44
  The story of the good Samaritan being a notorious 
example of altruistic compassion reflects a wryly humorous streak to Darley and Batson, the 
framers of the experiment.  These provisionally compassionate seminary students who were in a 
hurry to give a talk were presented with a person suffering the symptoms of a heart attack (an 
actor hired by the psychologists) en route.  The seminarians generally failed to respond to the 
heart attack “victim” on their path to the “presentation”.
45
   
 Doris interprets this result as one among many that indicate that our notion of compassion 
as a character trait is an empty notion.  However, in order to construct this study at all, one 
requires a reasonably robust notion of compassion as a character trait, including what sorts of 
things count as compassionate behavior and which situations involve clearly identifiable 
compassionate or non-compassionate outcomes.  In this case, Darley and Batson (reasonably) 
assume that if anything is a compassionate action, it is stopping to assist the heart attack victim, 
speaking engagement or no speaking engagement.  If anything is a betrayal of compassion, it is 
proceeding blithely onward to give a speech (even a speech extolling compassion) while ignoring 
someone gravely in need of assistance.  
Additionally, the framers of the study even make assumptions concerning the sort of 
person likely to possess the trait of compassion (assumptions assumed to be shared by the reading 
audience) that belie a multifaceted, complex, and socially widespread idea of just what 
compassion is supposed to be.   
For my purposes, it will work equally well to focus not on character traits, but on 
normative judgments.  Surely, someone who is compassionate is one who judges that it is better 
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 About 60% of those who were not in a hurry responded to the distress, while about 10% of those in a 
hurry responded. 
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to assist the heart attack “victim” than to keep a speaking engagement. I should also think that 
any reasonably moral person, not only a seminarian, would sincerely assent to this normative 
judgment.    
 So, to the case of seminarians in a hurry failing to do what is recognized as the 
compassionate act.  The situationist’s analysis of this study is as follows: the situation that the 
subjects find themselves in (being in a hurry) actuates a major difference in their behavior while 
the character trait that they are assumed to have (compassion) remains constant despite very 
different patterns of behavior.  This is not taken to be an indication that character traits disappear 
when one is in a hurry, but rather that the situation of being in a hurry has a greater impact on 
what a person does than the character traits that they are supposed to have.  This analysis can be 
easily redescribed in terms of judgment.  While it is certainly the case that hurry has a substantial 
effect on the actions of the seminarians, we have no reason to assume that they abandon their 
better judgment.  But how do we explain why people who are legitimately committed to helping 
those in need above their own immediate interests (at least and especially when the needs of 
others are dire compared with one’s own needs) fail to do so?  
 As conceptual background to clarify my response to this question, it is useful to bring in 
some of Davidson’s insights concerning intentional action.  Since we are in part discussing the 
role of better judgment in causing (or failing to cause) action, Davidson’s framework concerning 
how best to attribute causation in intentional action is informative.  In “Actions, Reasons, and 
Causes” Davidson describes a simple event.   
“I flip the switch, turn on the light, and illuminate the room. Unbeknownst to me I 
also alert a prowler to the fact that I am home.  Here I need not have done four 
things, but only one, of which four descriptions have been given… [R]easons may 
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rationalize what someone does when it is described in one way and not when it is 
described in another.”  (4-5) 
 Combine this with the statement that “A reason rationalizes an action only if it leads us to 
see something that the agent saw, or thought he saw, in his action” (3)
46
 and we have a position 
stating that in the doing of an action, an indefinite number of descriptions may apply to the action.  
In this case we are concerned with the cause of the action.  And in explaining intentional action, it 
is by appealing to the agent’s reasons (in the Davidsonian sense of ‘reasons’ specified above) for 
doing x that we identify the cause of their doing x.
47
   
The difference between (intentionally) illuminating the room and (unintentionally) 
notifying a burglar of one’s presence depends on what information one has when flipping the 
light switch.  I wish to re-employ Davidson’s reasoning in cases in which a person may have, but 
not attend to, information that relevantly differentiates intentional from unintentional action.  My 
purpose in this is to respond to an assertion often made by those who are skeptical of the 
possibility of akrasia.  The assertion is that, in the terms of the Darley and Batson seminarians, if 
they were truly compassionate, they would have stopped to help.  So the fact that they did not is 
ipso facto evidence for a lack of compassion.  This is reasonable as far as it goes.  Anyone who 
intentionally ignored someone in dire need in order to make a speech on time would be acting 
uncompassionately.  However, we must separate intentionally hurrying to a speech from 
intentionally ignoring someone in need, even though they are the same action. 
I argue that the best interpretation of the results of the Darley and Batson study is that the 
case of the seminarians reveals an instance of akrasia more clearly than it reveals the instability 
of compassion.  Moreover, I think that treating the data in the study as revealing an instance of 
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 I realize that this is a contentious point, but will adopt it here without argument, simply referring the 
reader to the previously cited papers by Davidson, which I regard as persuasive.  
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akrasia is quite natural given the account of akrasia I have presented above. 
Now that I have laid out the conceptual tools that I require to interpret this case as an 
example of akrasia, let us look in more detail at what happens in Darley and Batson’s 
experiment. The seminarians do a number of things in the full course of participating in the 
experiment. They report that they are compassionate, they agree to speak about the Good 
Samaritan, they hurry to their presentation, they (some of them) miss an apparent heart attack 
victim, they speak about the Good Samaritan.  The events in question that are simultaneous, as in 
Davidson’s example of flipping the light switch, are 1) hurrying to the presentation and 2) 
missing an apparent heart attack victim.  Notice that the description is as yet devoid of intentional 
explanation (rationalization).  One of the features of Davidson’s example that is important to note 
is that in acting intentionally with respect to one of these two descriptions of an action is not 
necessary to act intentionally with regard to the other.  That is, in intentionally hurrying to the 
presentation, one need not intentionally miss the apparent heart attack victim.  In deciding to walk 
quickly by someone who you think may be having a heart attack out of hope that someone else 
will notice and take action instead, you do not intentionally hurry to wherever else you are going, 
though you act intentionally and you do hurry to wherever else you’re going.   
 When inserting intentional explanation from a third-person perspective one must take into 
account that descriptions of actions are ambiguous with respect to intentional explanation.  It is 
equally plausible given an observer’s evidence that: 1) the seminarians are intentionally ignoring 
the apparent heart attack victim, and 2) that the seminarians are incidentally ignoring the heart 
attack victim while intentionally doing something else (hurrying to their appointment).  The facts 
that the seminarians do hurry to their presentation and that they do miss the apparent heart attack 
victim is silent as to the contents of their better judgments.  The third person interpreter of this 
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experiment, in lacking certain knowledge of the intentions of the subjects of the study, can only 
say that the subjects in a hurry more commonly missed the heart attack “victim”.  We must appeal 
to the concept of akrasia to tell us the difference between those in a hurry who did and those in a 
hurry who did not stop to assist the “victim”.   
 Causal reasoning is subject to the criteria of adequacy for explanations.  Any explanation 
that is consistent with the data, and can explain not only why subjects who were not in a hurry 
assisted the “victim” more often than those who were in a hurry, but that can also specify the 
difference between those in a hurry who helped and those who did not, is a more powerful 
explanation than any explanation that can account for only some of those differences.   
 Among those in a hurry who did not assist the “victim”, there are two plausible intentional 
explanations.  At this time it is instructive to consider the merits of each.  The first explanation is 
that those subjects noticed the victim and intentionally decided to ignore the victim and proceed 
to their presentation.  This outcome shows the subject to be uncompassionate.  To put it in terms 
of judgments, consider the following reasonable assumptions about the commitments of the 
compassionate person: a) the compassionate person judges that it is better to assist someone in a 
great need than to see to one’s own lesser needs and b) making a presentation on time is a lesser 
need than getting swift aid when having a heart attack.  In the case where this intentional 
explanation is at play, the difference between those who stop and those who do not is clearly the 
presence or absence of the judgment in favor of assisting the “victim”.    
How plausible is this explanation?  I do not think that common moral experience contains 
so many persons who so callously prefer their own minor needs to the major needs of others in 
emergencies.  There are undoubtedly some, but most persons would sincerely assent to assisting a 
heart attack victim even if late for an engagement.  We would expect a majority of person who 
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hold this judgment then to act on it, and so something else must be going on in order to explain 
the results in a way that squares with other aspects of common experience. 
 The second plausible intentional explanation is that the hurrying subjects who did not stop 
to assist the “victim” did not notice the victim, but still intentionally hurried to their presentations.  
Some of the seminarians in fact noticed the victim, and stopped to render aid.  The better 
explanation of the results of the experiment is that the experiment is crafted so as to induce 
akrasia.   
Let us match up the criteria for akrasia outlined in Chapter 1 to the case of the 
compassionate subject (who is compassionate because she makes the judgments stipulated a few 
paragraphs above as a) and b)).  The criteria for an akratic act are: (i) Akrasia is action against a 
belief about what is better or best to do, (ii) Akrasia is irrational, (iii) Akrasia is voluntary, (iv) 
Akrasia is blameworthy, (v) Akrasia is episodic.   
The compassionate person is reasonably stipulated to make certain normative judgments, 
and in acting against them, fulfills condition (i), though they would insist even after acting against 
those normative judgments that they held those judgments (ii).  Certainly they were not 
compelled to ignore the “victims” and intentionally hurried to their presentations (iii).  When the 
seminarians report themselves as compassionate, the case provided does not give us evidence to 
conclude that they are not.  Granted, the failure of the seminarians to respond to the apparent 
heart attack victim is blameworthy (iv), and also requires some explanation to preserve their 
claim that they are compassionate, and were compassionate the entire time.  Further, it certainly 
sounds implausible that someone who was compassionate would always miss a chance to act 
compassionately (v) in circumstances like this experiment (it is worth noting that some of these 
compassionate people did notice the “victim” and both behaved compassionately and displayed 
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enkrateia, the opposite of akrasia).   
I believe that I have provided such an explanation for the failure of these compassionate 
persons to act compassionately in my account of akrasia as involving cognitive or attentional 
bias.  To briefly apply the outline of my account earlier in this chapter, the ability to narrow one’s 
focus to accomplish a single, urgent task is an important cognitive ability, but can be misapplied.  
It is certainly not the case that the seminarians were unable to notice the apparent victim, as some 
experimental subjects in fact did notice the apparent victim.  In Chapter 4, I shall be contending 
that the cognitive bias account of akrasia implicates a specifically cognitive weakness, but a 
vincible weakness.   
What the case of the seminarians demonstrates is that when one is in a hurry, one’s 
cognitive focus is narrowed toward identifying features in our environments that assist us in the 
goal of haste at the expense of information that does not.  This means that one’s attention while in 
a hurry would be biased toward, say, a quick way through a crowd as opposed to any features of 
the crowd that are not going to be germane to the goal of getting to where one is going on time.  
Specific experimental situations, narrowly tailored to take advantage of the cognitive biases of 
persons, generally influence those persons’ behavior in a regular and predictable way.
48
  What the 
Darley and Batson experiment succeeds in demonstrating is not so much that compassion is 
inherently irregular and unpredictable, but that our own cognitive and attentional tendencies are 
regular and predictable.  It is far more unlikely for the better judgment favoring great benevolence 
over trivial prudence to be in the global workspace when in a hurry because in such situations the 
global workspace is narrowed to items selected by a one-reason heuristic that considers only what 
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 In fact, the original Darley and Batson study found that those told that they were late for something 
very important noticed the victim less often than those who were told that they were late for something 
not very important, indicating that strengthening the bias makes more frequent the actions associated with 
the bias. 
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will aid the subject in their haste. 
Part and parcel to the classic virtue ethics approach is the idea that people have differing 
character traits in differing degrees from individual to individual.  I submit that different 
individuals have differing cognitive abilities (to a point), but that the abilities to pay closer 
attention to more important things more often and to pay less attention to less important things are 
abilities that can be habituated and practiced, and can vary from individual to individual.  In this 
respect, enkrateia, defined as the capacity to avoid akrasia, is a character trait much like any 
other, and matches up well with existing accounts of virtues and also with a common-sense 
notion of an enkratic person as more virtuous than an akratic person, and akrasia as distinct from, 
and better than, intemperance.   
The subject who notices and decides not to help the “victim” is intemperate, but 
subjectively rational, preferring their own lesser good to the much greater good of another.  The 
subject who fails to attend to their environment sufficiently to act on behalf of the commitments 
of their own character is akratic, but at least has it in their character to judge what ought to have 
been done.  The akrates’ defense of “Of course I’m compassionate, but I was in a hurry, I didn’t 
notice the victim.” makes their action intelligible, yet still not excusable, even if better than the 
intemperate person’s action.  
Conclusion 
 I take myself in this chapter to have provided an empirically informed account of akrasia 
that succeeds in demonstrating that akrasia is both actual and intelligible.  I have responded to 
prominent claims to the contrary, and found that existing responses to those claims were 
desirable insofar as they were compatible with the more detailed, empirical account of akrasia. 
The empirically informed account usefully completes Davidson’s defense of the logical 
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possibility of akrasia, and likewise for Aristotle’s defense of its psychological intelligibility.  
Most importantly, the account of akrasia that I have provided answers these objections without 
changing anything about the traditional philosophical concept of akrasia. 
 If I have successfully argued that akrasia is actual (and thus possible) and intelligible, 
then I may now turn to examining the implications that akrasia generates with respect to some 
positions in meta-ethics and moral psychology.   
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CHAPTER 3: ACCOUNTING FOR AKRASIA IN VIEWS OF NORMATIVE 
MOTIVATION 
In Chapter 1, I provided a set of features common to traditional examples of akrasia.  
Among those features is irrationality.  Given that ‘rationality’ is an ambiguous term, it is my goal 
in this chapter to identify precisely what sense of rationality is impugned by akrasia in the 
description of akrasia as supplied in the previous chapter.  This discussion will occur within the 
context of specifying the nature of the connection between normative judgment and motivation.   
Central to akrasia is the role that normative judgments play in motivation.  There are two 
basic positions concerning the relationship between normative judgments and motivation.  One 
such view is the view that normative judgments have a necessary connection with motivation.  
This view is called, for whatever reason, normative judgment internalism.  Its traditional 
opponent is the position that normative judgments have a merely contingent connection with 
motivation (Bratman 159).  This view is called normative judgment externalism.  I shall argue in 
this chapter for a modified version of normative judgment internalism. 
Strong Normative Judgment Internalism 
When we ask ourselves a normative question about what it is best for us to do, we regard 
that as equivalent to asking ourselves a practical question about what to do.  Philosophical views 
defending this necessary connection between our judgments about what is best (our normative 
judgments) and our plans for action are known as normative judgment internalist views.  These 
views most straightforwardly explain why questions of what it is best to do seem like questions 
of what to do.  Akrasia provides a counterexample to a normative judgment internalist view.  If 
there is a necessary connection between judgment about what is better or best and motivation to 
do what is judged, then akrasia as described previously cannot happen.  Given this conflict, a 
defender of the possibility of akrasia and a proponent of normative judgment internalism must 
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either give one up entirely, or reformulate one or the other or both to accommodate what is 
plausible about each view. 
I believe that no reformulation of akrasia is necessary, as the description of akrasia in the 
philosophical discussions that I have advanced and operated with thus far is, I think, the right 
one.  I also believe that the evidence advanced previously in favor of the actuality of akrasia is 
sufficient to deny the desirability of doing away with akrasia on account of its conflict with 
normative judgment internalism.   
Normative judgment internalism, though, contains a set of very plausible and widely 
accepted intuitions concerning the relationship of our normative judgments to our motivations, 
and I would like to preserve these to whatever extent I can. A short list of statements in favor of 
normative judgment internalism begins with Richard Price, writing “When we are conscious that 
an action is fit to be done, or that it ought to be done, it is not conceivable that we can remain 
uninfluenced or want a motive to action.” (A Review Of The Principal Questions In Morals) 
Gilbert Harman states, “To think you ought to do something is to be motivated to do it.  To think 
that it would be wrong to do something is to be motivated not to do it.”
 
(The Nature of Morality 
33) C.L. Stevenson puts it “‘Goodness’ must have, so to speak, a magnetism.  A person who 
recognizes X to be ‘good’ must ipso facto acquire a stronger tendency to act in its favor that he 
otherwise would have had.” (The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms 13)
49
 Simon Blackburn 
adds, “It seems to be a conceptual truth that to regard something as good is to feel a pull towards 
promoting or choosing it, or towards wanting other people to feel the pull towards promoting or 
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 Notice that this is the most weakly presented of the cited claims, but one that still considers judgment 
about the good (normative judgment) to be necessarily connected to motivation.  This is still strong 
normative judgment internalism in the sense that a judgment about the good provides motivational force, 
but judgment about a greater good will provide greater motivational force.   
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choosing it.”
 
(Blackburn 23) 
50
 In Wittgenstein’s “Lecture on Ethics”, his only public lecture, he 
appears to be certain of only one thing in ethics, and that is the truth of something like normative 
judgment internalism, writing:  
“Now let us see what we could possibly mean by the expression, 'the absolutely 
right road.' I think it would be the road which everybody on seeing it would, with 
logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not going.  And similarly the 
absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which 
everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring 
about or feel guilty for not bringing about.” 
Each of these phrasings of the thesis indicates something that is plausible about 
normative judgment internalism.   
 Price and Harman focus on the intuitive function of a judgment.  If judgment were not 
sufficient to motivate action, one would wonder why we bothered making judgments at all.  R. 
M. Hare argued that assenting to a sentence like ‘It is moral for me to do x’ entails assenting to 
the imperative to myself, ‘do x’.  For Hare, this is just a matter of the meanings of the relevant 
terms.  He denied any possibility of akrasia on the strength of this kind of normative judgment 
internalism.  Hare argued instead that any purported case of akrasia is either an exercise of 
“judgment” (note the quotes, indicating that the judgment in question is not really judgment) as 
if one were to recognize some social norm, but not to treat it as if it applied to her, or else that the 
action was compelled, or un-free, in some way.
51
 
Blackburn, Stevenson, and Wittgenstein point to the magnetism of the good.  When 
someone admits something is good, it seems that they ipso facto have motivation to pursue it.  
Socrates (as relayed by Plato in the Protagoras dialog) famously denied the possibility of akrasia 
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 I thank David Brink for a very helpful footnote here, (Moral Motivation 8) 
51
 See (Hare, The Language of Morals Ch. 11) 
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on the ground that the good is so magnetic that anyone who knew what the good thing to do was 
could not act contrary to it.   
There are many ways in which someone who defended normative judgment internalism 
could explain their view.  One could have a view that a normative judgment by itself provides 
motivational force.
52
 The necessary connection between normative judgments and motivation is 
in that case is explained by maintaining that motivational force is an essential part of normative 
judgments.  One could also say that normative judgments express desires,
53
 or else that 
normative judgments just are desires.
54
  In the former of these two positions, the connection 
between normative judgments and motivational force is dependent on desires essentially having 
motivational force and there being a necessary causal relationship between having a particular 
desire and forming its corresponding normative judgment.  For example, one could not judge that 
it is best to be a vegetarian unless they possessed an appropriate desire to be a vegetarian. The 
latter of these positions explains the necessary connection between normative judgments and 
motivational force by positing an identity relation between desires as the bearers of motivational 
force and normative judgments.    
Strong normative judgment internalism provides a kind of sufficiency in terms of 
explanation of why some actions are taken or intentions formed.  Imagine asking someone why 
she decided to stay home sick from work rather than go in on some particular occasion.  If her 
response is that she judged that it would be better for her to stay in, we could view this as a 
sufficient explanation of her action in that the explanation is not enthymematic.  We may make 
inquiries concerning the sense in which she judged it best to stay home, but all the while we 
recognize that whatever sense of ‘best’ is intended, it is explanatorily sufficient to account for 
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 A position like this is advocated by (Davidson, Intending), (Nagel), and (McDowell) 
53
 This is the suggestion that many emotivists make. 
54
 This viewpoint is open, but not promising, see (Lewis, Desire as Belief) and (Lewis, Desire as Belief II) 
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her motivation to stay home.  If normative judgment internalism, or something very like it, were 
not true, then we would not be able to regard such explanations as complete explanations.  
Rather, we would have to supply the normative judgment and the connection between the 
normative judgment and motivation. 
Even some notable skeptics of moral judgment internalism like Bernard Williams and 
David Brink reject moral judgment internalism while accepting a form of normative judgment 
internalism.  In Williams’ case, he argues that morality is only one of a number of normative 
concerns that might motivate a person, but only if that person himself held morality to be more 
important than competing personal projects (Internal and External Reasons).  Brink’s “principled 
amoralist” regards morality as of secondary or no importance when held against other normative 
criteria (Moral Motivation).  What both of these positions have in common is the idea that ‘is 
best’ and ‘is moral’ are not necessarily synonymous.  Both positions deny that someone must be 
necessarily motivated by their own moral judgment on the strength that they may be instead 
motivated by a better but not distinctly moral judgment. 
I regard these considerations as sufficient motivation to preserve normative judgment 
internalism to the greatest extent compatible with the actuality of akrasia.  If I have properly 
described the options open to one who wishes to accept both a version of akrasia and also a 
version of normative judgment internalism, then I am left with only one choice: to modify 
normative judgment internalism to account for akrasia as described previously. 
Any modification of normative judgment internalism to allow for akrasia will be 
successful only in the case that it (1) is itself coherent and free from significant conceptual 
troubles, (2) allows akrasia, (3) preserves what is plausible about normative judgment 
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internalism, and (4) is defensible against a view that is not normative judgment internalism that 
already allows akrasia, a view called normative judgment externalism.   
There are many potential varieties of normative judgment externalism because the 
position is defined negatively.  It holds only that normative judgment internalism is false.  The 
most common version of normative judgment externalism, and the one that I have in mind when 
I mention the position, is known as Humean externalism (Stroud, Weakness of Will and Practical 
Judgment).  The “Humean” part of Humean externalism is due to adherence to some form of 
Humean psychology, which holds that beliefs (cognitive states) do not motivate action, but that 
only desires (conative states) motivate actions.  The Humean externalist’s take on akrasia is as 
follows.  A person may judge (where a judgment is a cognitive state) that x is better than y, but if 
they have no antecedent desire to do x, they will not be motivated to do x, whatever their 
(cognitive) judgment about the merits of x.  I shall return to this position after presenting my 
preferred version of weak normative judgment internalism. 
Modifying Normative Judgment Internalism 
 My proposal for modifying normative judgment internalism will be to add a qualifying 
phrase weakening the strong thesis of normative judgment internalism that I have so far been 
describing.  The strong normative judgment internalist thesis is:   
 
Necessarily, if an agent judges it is best to φ, then the agent is motivated to φ. 
 
The account of akrasia described in Chapter 1 provides a counterexample to the strong 
normative judgment internalist thesis.  If the strong normative judgment internalist thesis is that 
it is necessary that if an agent judges it is best to φ, then the agent is motivated to φ, then any 
possibility of judging y better than x and doing x rather than y would deny the strong normative 
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judgment internalist thesis.  To deny the strong normative judgment internalist thesis is to either 
opt for a weaker sense of ‘necessary’ in the thesis of normative judgment internalism or to adopt 
normative judgment externalism.  
In contemporary philosophical writing, the way that internalists tend to weaken their 
positions to accommodate akrasia is to add to the strong normative judgment internalist thesis a 
term that in some way or other qualifies ‘necessary’.  Below, three examples of weak normative 
judgment internalist theses are supplied as paradigm cases of weakening internalism due to 
akrasia, specific weakenings underlined.   
 Wedgwood: “Necessarily, if one is rational, then, if one judges ‘I ought to φ’, one also 
intends to φ.”
 
(The Nature of Normativity 25) 
Smith:  “If someone judges that it is right that she φs then, ceteris paribus, she φs.”
 
(The 
Moral Problem 12) 
Stroud:  “..an agent’s having reached a practical judgment in favour of φing is normally 
sufficient explanation of her intentionally φing, or intending to φ.” (Weakness of Will and 
Practical Judgment 122) 
 There are three different weakenings of internalism present here, but given the 
surrounding text in each original work, each is intended to have roughly the same purpose, and 
that is to make room for (at least) akrasia.   
 Wedgwood provides a great deal of specificity with regard to the rationality he has in 
mind, and so it is worthwhile to start with his account of a weakening of internalism.  Talk of 
reasons, reasonableness, rationality, and reason has historically been fraught with a myriad of 
distinctions.  It is vitally important when speaking of the rational or reasonable to disambiguate 
one sense of the word ‘rational’ from others that may well be intended. 
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First off, Wedgwood means something stronger than the trivial sense of rationality (a 
sense so trivial, no one may even bother defending it
55
) that states simply that an action is 
rational if it is done for a reason (where a reason can be anything that explains the action, i.e. a 
cause).  Even akratic action and compulsive action fit this description of rationality because the 
compulsive action is caused by the compulsion, and the akrates does act for a reason in the sense 
that their action is voluntary, though the reason for which they act is inferior to their better 
judgment.   
Rather, Wedgwood claims that there are synchronic and diachronic requirements to 
rationality.  Synchronic requirements state that to be rational, one must avoid combinations of 
beliefs and intentions that are intuitively in conflict with one another.  Diachronic requirements 
state that to be rational one must follow all of the proper procedures for forming and revising 
one’s beliefs and intentions.  Synchronic rationality is the kind Wedgwood intends to be in play 
in his weakening of internalism.
56
  In addition, Wedgwood tracks another distinction at play in 
this particular use of ‘rationality’.  He states that one could assess the rationality or irrationality 
of a thought or action in either its relation to the thinker’s other mental states (subjective 
rationality) or else on the basis of its relations to the external world (objective rationality).  
Synchronic and diachronic rationality are meant to be distinct ways that a person can be 
described as subjectively rational. (The Nature of Normativity 27)  For an agent to be completely 
subjectively rational would be for the agent to realize coherence among his mental states (be 
synchronically rational), and for the agent to follow all of the proper procedures for forming and 
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 It might even be that this sense of ‘rational’ is descriptive rather than normative.  This might be the 
sense of rational that people invoke when saying that ‘there’s got to be a rational explanation for this’ 
where what is rational is merely causal in some intelligible or non-supernatural way. 
56
 See the final pages of (Davidson, Incoherence and Irrationality) for a similar view of the kind of 
irrationality implicated in akrasia¸ and Davidson’s views concerning what makes synchronic 
inconsistency so much more puzzling than is diachronic inconsistency. 
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revising one’s beliefs and intentions (be diachronically rational).  For an agent to be objectively 
rational is to appear to choose correctly given an objective perspective.     
To make these distinctions clearer, and to better isolate the form of irrationality 
implicated in the akrates, consider a pair of examples.  The first is an example adapted from 
David Brink.  If Biff is a light-bulb eater, his belief that light-bulbs are nutritious and his 
intention to eat that which is nutritious motivate Biff and explain why Biff is eating light bulbs.
 
(Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics 39)  Biff is synchronically rational so long as he 
recognizes no beliefs or intentions that contradict the above belief or intention.  Biff is surely not 
diachronically rational, believing that light-bulbs are nutritious because of a failure to correctly 
interpret the ambiguity in the admonition to eat light meals.
57
  In addition to having some degree 
of failure in his subjective rationality, Biff fails to be objectively rational; he fails to have a 
justificatory reason for his actions from the perspective of the third person, owing to the obvious 
disadvantages of being a light-bulb eater.   
Compare this example to an example adapted from Bernard Williams (Internal and 
External Reasons 102).  Chuck intends to drink gin, and believes the stuff in the bottle is gin.  
Assuming no belief or intention contradicts the above, Chuck is synchronically rational.  Assume 
that the bottle is labeled ‘gin’ and looks much as a standard bottle of gin looks, and we would 
have no trouble saying that Chuck has followed the proper procedures for forming and revising 
his beliefs and intentions and that he is thus diachronically rational as well.  As it turns out, the 
stuff in the bottle is, contra Chuck’s belief, petrol.  Though Chuck is subjectively rational, he has 
no objective justificatory reason to drink the stuff in the bottle (petrol).  Wedgwood uses this 
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 Whatever Biff’s reason for belief, it would seem to be a failure of diachronic rationality given the 
obviousness of the fact that light bulbs are not nutritious. I shall not challenge the ingenuity of 
philosophers to come up with a situation in which a decision to eat light-bulbs involves no plausible 
failure of diachronic rationality. 
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very example to mark the distinction between “choosing rationally” (being subjectively rational) 
and “choosing correctly” (being objectively rational).
 
(Choosing Rationally and Choosing 
Correctly 201-202)  Notice that neither of these cases could properly be called akrasia.  Biff 
never judges against that which he intends to do and subsequently does.  Chuck may recognize 
after his first sip of fizzy, lime-flavoured petrol on ice that he has made a mistake, but would not 
say that he acted against his judgment, but just that one of his beliefs was false in such a way that 
he should not necessarily have been expected to realize before it was too late.  In both cases, 
even though Biff and Chuck are in some sense irrational, both are still motivated to act in accord 
with their own sincerely held normative judgments.  Neither provides an example of akrasia and 
neither provides a counterexample to the thesis of strong normative judgment internalism. 
 The irrationality involved in the case of akrasia then, for Wedgwood, consists in 
inconsistency between one’s beliefs (so long as judgments are beliefs or at least so long as one 
cannot make a judgment without believing that one has made a judgment, which are surely 
reasonable assumptions) and one’s intentions.  When considering the examples of akrasia given 
in the opening chapter of this work, we notice that the behaviors indicate a difference between 
what one judges in favor of and what one does.  Wedgwood’s qualification, ‘insofar as one is 
rational’ can have a number of readings, but since Wedgwood is explicitly interested in 
weakening strong internalism to make room for akrasia, we need only read ‘rational’ in his 
qualifications as subjective synchronic rationality.  Lack of these other forms of rationality do 
not provide any reason to doubt the strong normative judgment internalist thesis; Biff and Chuck 
are both irrational in some way, though neither provides a counterexample to normative 
judgment internalism.  As a consequence, there is no reason to include either subjective 
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diachronic rationality or objective rationality in the qualification of the normative judgment 
internalist thesis.   
I stated earlier that an appropriate weakening of internalism should (1) be itself coherent 
and free from significant conceptual troubles, (2) allow akrasia, (3) preserve what is plausible 
about normative judgment internalism, and (4) be defensible against normative judgment 
externalism.  Wedgwood’s account is to my mind acceptable on each of the first three concerns. 
It seems free from any obvious conceptual inconsistencies, it straightforwardly allows akrasia 
(one might even say it allows akrasia and little if anything else), and it allows the good to be 
magnetic, and judgments to have a necessary connection to motivation for anyone not suffering 
from a failure of synchronic rationality.  
I have addressed the first three concerns in what has preceded, but should say something 
briefly about the fourth here.  This version of weakened normative judgment internalism is 
distinct from externalism in the following ways.  First, Wedgwood’s position regards a failure of 
the strong thesis as a failure of synchronic rationality.  The externalist need not see any 
synchronic irrationality (or perhaps any irrationality at all) at play in one who simply does not 
desire to do that which she nonetheless judges to be the better thing to do.  One might 
normatively condemn her as a hypocrite, or level on her some other normatively phrased 
disapprobation (including some other form of irrationality), but that would not necessarily have 
to be synchronic irrationality.   
Additionally, Wedgwood’s version of weak normative judgment internalism preserves a 
strong (though narrowly defeasible) connection between normative judgment and motivation.  
The akrates, in intentionally acting contrary to her better judgment, experiences an inconsistency 
between her own beliefs and intentions.  This inconsistency, though, is not an unintelligible 
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inconsistency.  The cognitive bias account of akrasia detailed in Chapter 2 lays out the sort of 
causal factors that are responsible for a breakdown of subjective synchronic rationality.   
To begin to address the acceptability of Wedgwood’s version of weak normative 
judgment internalism versus the corresponding externalist view, it will be useful to consider a 
different form of weak normative judgment internalism so as to develop a useful contrast with 
Wedgwood’s view with respect to how well the view weathers an objection from normative 
judgment externalism. 
To provide this contrast, I will now turn to Smith’s account of weak normative judgment 
internalism.  Smith is, unlike Stroud or Wedgwood, committed to the generally Humean view 
that beliefs and desires are distinct entities and that beliefs are in and of themselves devoid of 
motivational force.  Note that this is also true of the most prominent form of normative judgment 
externalism.  The way that the Humean normative judgment externalist accounts for akrasia is 
by making note of the very fact of the separation between beliefs and desires and the 
motivational monopoly held by desires.   
When Smith invokes a ceteris paribus qualification of the strong normative judgment 
internalist thesis, what he means is that  irrational behavior sometimes happens, whether it be 
akrasia or else psychological compulsion of some kind.
58
  Compared with Wedgwood’s narrow 
appeal to subjective synchronic rationality, Smith’s is a very expansive weakening of the 
internalist thesis, open to the charge of being a weakening that makes the resulting thesis trivial.  
After all, what is the normative judgment internalist defending when he states “Normative 
judgments motivate actions (except when they don’t)”?  To Smith’s credit, he does refine his 
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 It strikes me that this is not a strictly correct use of the phrase ‘ceteris paribus’, although there may be a 
common usage of the phrase that takes it to mean simply ‘barring strangeness’ or ‘normally’.  Usually a 
ceteris paribus clause will be inserted into an empirical or scientific law in order to specify that normal 
conditions are assumed.  This is generally a non-objectionable move for inductive principles, it is more 
objectionable for formal conceptual definitions.   
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statement of normative judgment internalism, later substituting the phrase ‘insofar as one is 
rational’ for the ceteris paribus clause.  Eventually Smith’s statement of normative judgment 
internalism is: “Agents who believe that they have a normative reason to φ in certain 
circumstances C rationally should desire to φ in C.”
 
(The Moral Problem 148)  Unfortunately, 
Smith does not go on to explain just what kind of rationality he regards as necessary for his weak 
internalism to hold.  What Smith does is analyze judgments about one’s reasons for action into 
judgments about what one would desire if one were fully rational.  It is tempting to read this 
move as an advocacy of the kind of subjective synchronic rationality that Wedgwood advocates, 
though considering rationality to be coherence of and between beliefs and desires rather than 
beliefs and intentions.   
Reading Smith’s move in this way is problematic because incoherence between beliefs 
and desires cannot account for akrasia in the way that incoherence between beliefs and 
intentions can. Smith relies on a common concept of “direction of fit” to specify the distinction 
between beliefs and desires.  Beliefs are supposed to originate in the world, and changes in the 
world should lead to appropriate changes in an agent’s belief states, while desires originate in the 
mind, and changes in desiderative states should lead to appropriate changes in the world. This 
distinction prevents any belief from being equivalent to any desire and vice versa.  It is difficult 
to see how, on this view, any incoherence could arise between beliefs and desires.
59
   
A possibility I shall mention just to put aside is that someone could believe that they held 
a desire that they did not hold or desire to hold a belief that they did not hold, but that is no 
actual incoherence between a belief and a desire, but rather simple a false belief or an unfulfilled 
desire.  Alternatively, if normative judgments just are beliefs about what is better, then a person 
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 Indeed, throughout The Moral Problem Smith assumes, following Hume, that beliefs and desires are 
“distinct existences”. 
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could have a belief that it would be better to φ without ever having a desire to φ.  This person 
does not thereby have an inconsistency in their psychology.  To say that such a state amounts to 
a failure of subjective
60
 rationality would be to beg the question against the common externalist 
position because it just defines rationality as an agent having whatever desires they must have for 
their judgments to motivate them.  For many externalists, and Humeans in general, there is 
nothing necessarily subjectively
61
 irrational about having a belief about what is better and not 
having a desire to pursue that which is better.  Smith relies on some beliefs having rational force 
over some desires, but without accounting for the source of that rational force.  It is thus unclear 
how Smith’s understanding of rationality as consistency between beliefs and desires doesn’t 
simply beg the question against the externalist. 
Consider another way that Smith states weak internalism (my paraphrase): if beliefs 
about what we have normative reason to do are beliefs about what we would desire if we were 
fully rational then judgments of practical reason should affect one’s desires insofar as one is 
rational.
62
  It is not clear to me that this formulation is any less question-begging than the former, 
but it may be at least a general attempt on Smith’s part to state that our judgments have a sort of 
general rational force distinct from mere rationality as consistency between beliefs and desires.   
Laying aside concerns of a question-begging notion of rationality, I shall introduce here 
an objection against Smith’s rationality qualification that is due to Nomy Arpaly.  Arpaly seeks 
to deny the position, common at least since Davidson, that akrasia is necessarily irrational by 
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 This use of subjective rationality is different than the sense in which Wedgwood uses it (as a 
combination of synchronic and diachronic rationality).  This is meant to convey the sense of ‘rationality’ 
that is understood as ‘rationality as consistency’.  Wedgwood calls this synchronic rationality, and defines 
it as a consistency between one’s beliefs and intentions.  For Smith, it is not the consistency specifically 
of beliefs and intentions that he has in mind, but a consistency of belief states and desire states. 
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in the specific manner Wedgwood defines. 
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 For the extended statement, see (Smith, The Moral Problem 177) 
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denying that our judgments necessarily have any rational force of the kind suggested by Smith.  
Arpaly argues that if a person’s beliefs or desires were irrationally attained, then not having a 
desire that we believe we ought to have may be the more rational state of affairs, though it be 
akratic.  One of her several examples involves Sam, a college student who has left more work to 
do at the end of the term than he is comfortable with.  He believes it would be best for him to be 
a hermit while in college so that he could get the most study time in and get the most benefit out 
of the college education that he is paying for.  Imagine that while he is deliberating he leaves out 
facts about how his productivity would decrease due to loneliness.  Failing to have the desire to 
become a hermit, Sam, reading Smith, would say “How irrational of me not to desire that which I 
believe would be best for me” 
 
(Arpaly 496-497). The force of Arpaly’s objection is to deny that 
such a non-compliance with one’s better judgment need be irrational.  In fact, the more rational 
thing for Sam to do is to act contrary to that belief that it would be best to become a hermit 
during college.  Arpaly’s objection is well taken.  Smith claims that a fully rational person would 
desire that which they believed they ought to desire, but Sam seems a clear example of a rational 
person not desiring that which they believe they ought to desire.  Acting against his judgment is 
ultimately the more rational action.  
Arpaly’s example should be carefully considered.  If the claim is that akrasia is 
essentially irrational, then a putative example of rational akrasia demands notice.  To maintain 
that akrasia is irrational means to claim that Sam’s case is not an example of akrasia or that Sam 
really is irrational.  I think that the first response is reasonable because in not becoming a hermit 
though he judges that it would be best, Sam is failing to consider information that would 
certainly affect his views about the benefits of hermithood. In this sense it could be charged that 
Sam, instead of acting contrary to his better judgment is acting in concert with it, though without 
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realizing it at the time.  In any case, the example gives us reason to doubt that becoming a hermit 
is Sam’s sincere better judgment.  However, we could recast the example subtly to preserve it as 
a clearer case of apparently rational akrasia.   
Consider Samson, a university student who has to this point pursued social relationships 
for their ancillary benefits in terms of forming connections that may benefit him later.  He has 
never enjoyed social interaction, and has often regarded the conversation of his fellows to be the 
height of dullness.  While studying for exams, Samson is overcome with love of pure learning 
and resolves to swear off all social relationships in favor of living a life of entirely withdrawn 
scholarship.  Samson genuinely believes that he would be happier as a hermit without all of this 
unpleasant socializing.  He resolves to embark on hermithood immediately.  But here’s what 
happens next: Samson goes to sleep for the night and when his alarm wakes him in the morning 
he decides to go to his morning class, as he enjoys the learning, even if it means being around his 
classmates, and after class eats in the cafeteria as usual (without dwelling on the question of 
where to eat lunch and why), though it invites others to engage him in conversation while he is 
there.  He follows the rest of his daily routine, perhaps avoiding some socializing that he would 
have pursued prior to his epiphany about the benefits of hermithood.  Mostly by force of habit, 
Samson substantially continues his typical social routine, disliking it the whole while, and after 
some time realizes that he has failed to act in accord with his better judgment.   
 Recast in this manner, Samson’s case is more clearly an example of akrasia than Sam’s 
case, but now, one may wonder, if Samson would truly be happier as a hermit, then in what way 
is his failure to become a hermit rational?  This is a fair question, and I shall add some 
stipulations to the example.  Assume that though Samson genuinely dislikes social life, the 
burdens of recasting his lifestyle to avoid all social interactions would be more burdensome than 
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Samson could have reasonably supposed, given his ability to anticipate consequences.  So 
burdensome as to overshadow the benefits of avoiding the socializing that he dislikes. I think that 
this preserves the intent of Arpaly’s example.  Samson judges it best to do something that he 
really shouldn’t do, and then fails to do it.  This failure saves him a great deal of trouble, so 
where do we get off calling Samson irrational? 
 Since I am claiming that one of the essential traits of akrasia is that it is irrational, I must 
in some way respond to Samson’s case.  Since I recast Arpaly’s original example as more clearly 
a case of akrasia, I must now evaluate whether Samson is also acting rationally.  
The way that Smith’s position and Wedgwood’s position are affected by this example 
shows a notable difference between the two positions.  I shall begin with an answer compatible 
with Wedgwood’s view.  Making a sharp distinction between subjective and objective rationality 
allows us to grant an Arpaly-like intuition of Samson as rational (in one sense) and also to 
preserve the charge of irrationality (in another sense) given that Samson acted akratically.  
Wedgwood could say that Samson’s case is one that involves a failure of synchronic rationality 
in that Samson had a belief that it was better for him to become a hermit which was inconsistent 
with Samson’s intentions over the next several days.  Samson is irrational in the sense that he is 
synchronically irrational (a kind of subjective irrationality), but has done something that is in his 
best interest (i.e. objectively rational).   
I grant that Sam ends up avoiding something that is bad for him, but should we call a 
good outcome resultant from faulty processes rational?
63
  Bringing in Wedgwood’s distinction 
between choosing rationally and choosing correctly, we can see that Samson chose correctly in 
not becoming a hermit, that is, he acted in his objective interest, but Sam did not choose 
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rationally.  It is not clear what to say about the overall rationality (if such a phrase has any real 
meaning) of those who are subjectively irrational but are objectively rational given a certain 
case.  Samson’s case actually looks much like another example that I employed earlier to clarify 
Wedgwood’s distinctions concerning the different forms of irrationality.   
Consider again the man in Bernard Williams’ example, referred to as Chuck above, who 
intends to drink gin, believes that the stuff in the bottle is gin, and so intends to drink the stuff in 
the bottle.  There is no failure of subjective synchronic rationality in this man and no evidence of 
any violation of diachronic rationality (so long as the “gin” is in a bottle labeled ‘gin’ and is in a 
place gin might plausibly be found, and other reasonable assumptions).  If the stuff in the bottle 
turns out to be petrol rather than gin, the man has chosen rationally, but alas has not chosen 
correctly.  Samson, conversely, has chosen correctly but not chosen rationally.  This appears to 
plausibly track our intuitions with regard to Samson’s case.  So for Wedgwood, Samson is 
objectively rational, but recognizes inconsistency between his judgments and actions. 
Smith’s account cannot access this approach.  This is for two reasons.  First, a belief and 
a desire, having as Smith says, “distinct existences” cannot be inconsistent with one another.  
Does a desire to do a and a judgment not to do a contradict one another?  If so, what of their 
being “distinct existences”?
64
  The second reason Smith’s account cannot access Wedgwood’s 
treatment of Samson’s case is that Smith relies on this conditional notion of being fully rational 
(see note 64, above).  I interpret ‘fully rational’ (I think reasonably) as objectively and 
subjectively rational.  Smith’s claim seems to be that the nature of the connection between 
normative judgment and motivation depends on the truth of the conditional ‘If one is fully 
rational then if one judges that it is best to  then one desires to ’.  I do not know whether Smith 
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would strengthen the consequent to a biconditional, but Smith at least advocates the conditional 
relationship between judgments when fully rational and desires.  This means that Smith is 
precisely targeted by Arpaly’s objection.  Samson cannot act against his better judgment unless 
he is not fully rational, and if he is fully rational, then he never judges that it is best to become a 
hermit in the first place.  Arpaly’s objection can only be overcome by a view which allows 
subjective and objective rationality to come apart. 
Both Smith and Wedgwood rely heavily on some concept of rationality in their 
weakening of the internalist thesis (Wedgwood with more success than Smith), but the account I 
gave of Stroud’s does not explicitly do so, relying on the qualification ‘normally’ instead.  
Stroud (Weakness of Will and Practical Judgment) provides some reasoning which indicates that 
what she believes she does when she weakens internalism is really to strengthen it.  She begins 
by saying that the existence of akrasia denies internalism as an entailment from judgments to 
actions.  This is quite uncontroversial, as the necessary entailment in the strong internalist thesis 
is directly contradicted by an action that instantiates the possibility that an agent could judge it 
better to φ without φing or intending to φ, as pointed out above.   
Adding the qualification ‘normally’ isn’t specific enough by itself.  After all, what 
determines the normal conditions?  The ‘normally’ qualification, without further specificity, 
would not necessarily preserve the distinction between externalism and internalism.  The 
externalist’s route to explaining why people most often (i.e. normally) act as they judge is that 
people normally desire to do what is best, or desire to act as they judge, or have some such 
appropriate desire.
65
  In “Weakness of Will and Practical Judgment” Stroud means her use of 
‘normally’ to presage an argument against externalism that concludes that internalism is to be 
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as one judges> or to desire <what is best>.  In any case, elaboration of such skepticism is not necessary 
for the present contention. 
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properly regarded as the ‘normal’ case, while externalism’s claim to normality is improper (141-
142).
66
  It is an interesting argument, but not one that I shall address here.   
Thankfully, Stroud addresses this issue in other work, describing the normal conditions as 
conditions of rationality.  I believe that Stroud has at least a very similar idea to Wedgwood’s of 
the kind of rationality qualification that best weakens internalism specifically against akrasia.  In 
“Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory” Stroud writes, “…a charge of irrationality seems 
most at home when an agent acts against what she herself takes to be the balance of reasons. 
(Consider weakness of will.)”
 
(174)  This will be what I consider to be Stroud’s view of what 
kind of irrationality akrasia represents, and a kind of irrationality that people normally lack.  
This is an internalist view in the sense that normative judgments have a rationally necessary 
connection to motivation.  The explanatory sufficiency of normative judgment internalism is 
largely preserved because people are presumed to possess rationality (especially subjective 
synchronic rationality). Stroud describes akrasia above as a failure of subjective rationality, 
which can be read as a failure of synchronic rationality in that the agent’s beliefs (what she 
herself takes to be the balance of reasons) are inconsistent with her intentions (she acts against 
that balance and is thus charged to be irrational).  This general interpretation of Stroud indicates 
that she believes that akrasia represents a failure of subjective synchronic rationality, just like 
Wedgwood.  Given what has preceded, I think that Wedgwood and Stroud’s idea that akrasia 
represents a violation of subjective synchronic rationality is the correct idea.  This can be 
contrasted to Smith’s idea, which suffers from some conceptual difficulties, and doesn’t 
differentiate itself from the externalist in a non-question begging manner. 
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distinguishing weak normative judgment internalism from normative judgment externalism since 
externalism is just the denial of the strong normative judgment internalism thesis. 
101 
 
Strong Normative Judgment Externalism 
An externalist may plausibly explain the entire range of behavior that internalism 
explains, but on the externalist account, saying that the normative judgment provided 
motivational force is enthymematic, leaving out (on one common account of externalism) that 
the person also had certain relevant desires which combined with the judgment to provide 
motivational force.  Our general methodological preference for modesty in explanations would 
caution us not to claim more than necessary.  Explaining the motivational force of judgments 
using only the judgments themselves is a modest explanation.  The explanatory modesty of 
strong normative judgment internalism is a good reason to prefer it to normative judgment 
externalism. 
However, akrasia provides a straightforward counterexample to strong normative 
judgment internalism.  In adapting strong normative judgment internalism to allow for the 
possibility of akrasia (in light of evidence of the actuality of akrasia) the internalist must give up 
the superiority in terms of explanatory modesty that an unmodified normative judgment 
internalism possesses over normative judgment externalism.  Explaining action simply by means 
of identifying a normative judgment must now be enthymematic under either view of normative 
judgments. In addition to the presence of the relevant normative judgment, the advocate of 
modified internalism must also assert that the agent who acts in accord with their judgment was 
not akratic.  So explanations posit on the one hand a normative judgment along with an absence 
of akrasia, and on the other hand posit a normative judgment along with the presence of a 
requisite desire.  So in terms of explanatory modesty, modified internalist explanation is on par 
with externalist explanation.  In explaining why the woman stayed home from work, the 
explanation ‘she judged it best to do so’ must have ‘and she was not akratic,’ or the like, added 
to it by the normative judgment internalist, while ‘and she had a desire to do what was judged 
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best’ is added by the externalist.  Given that weak internalism isn’t explanatorily superior to 
externalism, that point becomes a draw, and the advocate of modified normative judgment 
internalism must turn to some other reason to prefer it over the externalist alternative.  
Losing explanatory modesty is a significant cost to modifying normative judgment 
internalism.  However, such modification does not force the internalist into accepting 
externalism.  The internalist may cling to views that are not based on the explanatory sufficiency 
of strong internalism; examples include the magnetism of the good, or the role of judgments in 
motivation.  
Since I will be defending a modification of normative judgment internalism, I will 
necessarily have to consider the alternative to normative judgment internalism, which is 
normative judgment externalism.  Since externalism is simply the denial of internalism, no single 
positive characterization of it is forthcoming, as one could deny internalism in any number of 
ways for any number of reasons.  Despite this, with regard to normative judgment internalism, 
there is one overwhelmingly prominent position that underlies normative judgment externalism.  
The position is often characterized as Humean because of its reliance on an understanding of 
belief/desire psychology as originally characterized by Hume.
67
  The key feature of the Humean 
view is the status of desires as having a monopoly on motivational force.  This Humean theory of 
motivation (HTM hereafter) is very common, and naturally suggests itself as a plausible reason 
for denying normative judgment internalism.  If desires motivate while normative judgments 
(which are not themselves desires) do not, then there is no necessary connection between 
normative judgments and motivation.  Of course, accepting HTM is not necessary for accepting 
normative judgment externalism because there may be any number of reasons to reject a 
necessary connection between normative judgments and motivation.  Despite this, I regard 
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acceptance of HTM as an important component of a theory of action that is intelligible, common, 
and not internalist with regard to normative judgments and motivation.   
Accepting HTM, however, is only half of what is required to supply an account of 
normative judgment externalism.  Recall above that one way of being a strong normative 
judgment internalist is to accept HTM and regard normative judgment as identical with desires.  
It follows that if desires hold a monopoly on motivational force, and normative judgments are 
desires, then there can be no instances of acting against better judgment, assuming that better 
judgment is stronger desire on this account.
68
 The normative judgment externalist committed to 
the HTM must also hold a view of the nature of normative judgments such that normative 
judgments are not identical with desires. 
 If we limit our consideration of the candidates for moral judgments to beliefs and 
desires,
69
 we have two possibilities concerning the identity of normative judgments.  A view that 
holds normative judgments to be identical with desires is a strong internalist view, so long as all 
desires carry some motivational force.  Since akrasia is a straightforward counterexample to 
strong normative judgment internalism, on the strength of the actual occurrence and observation 
of akrasia, I have been treating normative judgments as beliefs.   
Normative judgment externalism is no more than the negation of the thesis of normative 
judgment internalism, but that negation contains some ambiguity.  In maintaining the negation of 
‘necessarily, if an agent judges that it is better to φ, then the agent is motivated to φ’, one might 
mean a variety of things.  By contrast, the weak internalist does not negate the strong thesis, but 
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 I can imagine no other way of describing better judgment if normative judgments are identical with 
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 A view that proposed some third form of mental state for normative judgments would be, in my 
opinion, unnecessarily novel, as the belief/desire distinction is both versatile, common in philosophical 
discourse, consistent with the cognitive/affective distinction operant in empirical psychology, and entirely 
sufficient for an account of akrasia.  
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rather qualifies the sort of necessity involved in the internalist thesis.  I advocate the view 
inspired by Wedgwood that the connection between normative judgment and motivation is 
rationally necessary (where ‘rationally’ is understood in terms of subjective synchronic 
rationality) as opposed to logical or metaphysical necessity as in the strong internalist thesis.  
Smith appears to rely on a form of objective rationality to supply the necessary connection 
between judgment and motivation which opens his account up to Arpaly’s objections as 
discussed above. 
 Since identifying normative judgments with desires yields strong normative judgment 
internalism, I shall assume for the sake of specifying the corresponding externalist view that 
normative judgments are beliefs.  The HTM is committed to (at minimum) beliefs qua beliefs 
holding no motivational force, but there is a great deal of potential variety in the relationship 
between normative judgments and motivation (desires).  At one end of the spectrum is a maximal 
disconnection between normative judgments and desires, and at the other end of the spectrum is 
a set of views that posit one kind or another of strong (but not necessary) connection between 
normative judgments and desires.   
 It is beside the point of this analysis to detail Hume’s actual views concerning the 
relationship between normative judgments and desires, but it is in my opinion one of the most 
difficult interpretive challenges for those interested in Hume’s moral psychology.  I think that the 
textual evidence is ambiguous as to whether Hume thought that normative judgments were just 
desires, expressed desires, were caused by desires, or were beliefs not necessarily connected to 
any desires.  So any view that grants desires motivational monopoly is by my reckoning entitled 
to the label ‘Humean’.
70
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 The view that normative judgments are independent of desires has no trouble explaining 
why some actions can be actions against better judgment.  If the judgments themselves are 
motivationally inert, and the desires that actually carry motivational force are not necessarily 
connected to the presence or absence of any particular normative judgment, then it should be no 
surprise that some actions accord with our normative judgments and some do not.  On the most 
extreme version of this view, the connection between normative judgments and desires is the 
most contingent connection possible: coincidence.  I shall refer to this view as strong normative 
judgment externalism.
71
   
 Note that even strong normative judgment externalism does not imply that beliefs have 
no causal role at all in actions.  After all, the most fervent desire for a taco is inert without some 
beliefs about where and how tacos are to be obtained.  However, normative judgments have an 
element of evaluation that beliefs like “there is a taco shop down the street” lack.  The interesting 
questions for my account begin with asking what the motivational picture is like for cases in 
which I have a desire for a taco, and a belief that there is a good taco shop to my left, and a bad 
one to my right (this is an explicitly evaluative belief).  If this evaluation is accounted for as an 
expression of desires, as one form or another of normative non-cognitivism would have it, then 
intentional action contrary to such an evaluation is unintelligible.  If instead I express the 
normative judgment that I ought to have a salad rather than tacos (It would be better to have 
salad rather than tacos), and the source of normative approbation is just an expression of desires 
that I already have, then again, it is unintelligible to consider intentional action against this 
judgment (which expresses my greater desires).  This accords with what I have already pointed 
out: that akrasia is a counterexample to normative judgment internalism.   
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The strong externalist view (the view that treats even normative judgments as beliefs and 
that holds that these beliefs have only a coincidental connection to desires) has no trouble at all 
explaining action contrary to better judgment.  Such views do, however, have trouble explaining 
why so many of our actions do conform to our normative judgments, and also why appealing to 
normative judgments is explanatorily useful (even if not sufficient).
72
   
I believe that my account of the actuality of akrasia is damaging to strong normative 
judgment internalism, and I have made it my project to preserve what is plausible about 
internalism while accommodating akrasia.  While strong normative judgment externalism can 
accommodate akrasia, it doesn’t explain why akrasia is a problem.  Specifically it doesn’t 
account for akrasia’s being irrational in the relevant (subjective synchronic) way.  In addition to 
this difficulty, I will argue in the next chapter that strong normative judgment externalism does 
not adequately cohere with evidence concerning the effectiveness of behavior modification 
strategies that are actuated by means of cognitive states independently of conative/affective 
states.  
While I believe that my account of akrasia and its consequences are a very serious 
challenge to both strong externalism about normative judgments and also strong normative 
judgment internalism, I am at some level agnostic concerning the ultimate truth of the HTM 
taken on its own.   
Weak Normative Judgment Internalism and the HTM 
 The Humean theory of motivation is very well-entrenched in philosophy, but it does not 
have a monopoly concerning intuitions about the kinds of mental states that carry motivational 
force.  For my own part, I do not see that there can be no overlap whatsoever between cognitive 
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and conative states, or that desires should hold a monopoly over motivation.  My own intuition 
on this matter is that there seem to be both cognitively heavy and cognitively light motivational 
states.   
 Examples of cognitively light motivations are those that strike me as more immediate and 
bodily.  Hunger is a desire for food, thirst a desire for drink, and the cognitive states required to 
facilitate action are limited to perception and memory.  Cognitively heavy motivations, 
contrarily, have less propinquity and more abstract ends.  If I am motivated to write 
philosophical work that defends the family of views in the philosophy of mind known as 
functionalism, or if I am motivated to argue that human-made entities could potentially be moral 
subjects so that in some distant future that includes autonomous androids (if there even is such a 
future) humans don’t treat the androids as slaves, then these would strike me as cognitively 
heavy motivations.  Such stories of cognitively heavy motivation do not easily reduce to more 
basic kinds of urges that human beings have. 
 Most pedestrian examples also seem to me to admit of both cognitively heavy and light 
motivations.  Consider a shopper in a supermarket.  People are naturally attracted to (that is, they 
naturally desire) foods that are high in sugar and fat because those foods tend to taste most 
pleasant.  Our sense of taste tends to identify more caloric choices as more pleasant.  This makes 
sense as an evolutionary mechanism for assisting us in selecting the most caloric foods in an 
environment in which calories are hard to come by.  But at the same time, our supermarket 
shopper can recognize that they do not require the calories that our ancestors probably required, 
and that a more healthful diet is likely to be better for their health and happiness (but of course 
who knows which food expert to believe these days concerning what is and is not healthful).  
And of course the shopper might decide that they just don’t care about health or their Omega-
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6/Omega-3 ratio and end up with potato chips and cookies.  The shopper might also leave with 
salmon, sweet potatoes, and pomegranates, and depending on how much attention they are 
paying to what they are doing, a couple of candy bars, or none.   
 I hope that it is clear from the shopper example that appeals to cognitive evaluation as 
well as conative evaluation can fit variously well with any of what goes on in the above example.  
The anti-Humean can appeal to the role of explicitly evaluative beliefs in the motivational story 
that are distinct from, and that even oppose desires.  The Humean can just as easily reply that the 
presence of some desire is required in order to motivate the shopper to care about health in the 
first place.
73
   
 To further the dialectic between anti-Humean and Humean explanations of motivation, I 
shall introduce an example adapted from Shafer-Landau.  Betty believes that it would be good 
for her to become a lawyer, so she applies to various law schools, selects the one that fits most of 
the criteria she considers to be important in a law school, and enrolls in that law school.  She 
finds herself increasingly unhappy with her coursework, and while volunteering on a Habitat for 
Humanity worksite, discovers a love of carpentry and is convinced that she can do more good by 
serving Habitat than becoming a lawyer, so she pursues and lands a job as a Habitat site 
supervisor (Shafer-Landau 122-141).
74
 
 What makes this example work in the way that the anti-Humean wants is that it purports 
to resist the Humean position that all of our normative or evaluative judgments are at base 
desires that we currently hold.  Betty is acting on the basis of what she thinks is best, or perhaps 
even trying to fulfill desires that she thinks she will have (but importantly, that she does not and 
will not have).   
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 Shafer-Landau provides an excellent discussion of issues in the humean/anti-humean debate, and seems 
to regard presumption as favoring the anti-humean.   
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The adherent of the HTM of course has a plausible response to cases like these.  The 
Humean can point out that other desires (e.g. for prestige or high salary that she thought a career 
as a lawyer could bring, or a desire to please her parents, etc.) could well be implicated in 
adequately accounting for Betty’s motivation to become a lawyer.  
The call and response between the Humean and the anti-Humean in cases like Betty’s 
illustrates something troubling about the dialectic.  While the Humean explanation for Betty’s 
motivation to enroll in law school is entirely plausible, only someone already convinced of the 
truth of HTM would look for motivations beyond what Betty judged would be best.  On the other 
hand, only someone already committed to the truth of an anti-Humean position would regard 
Betty’s normative judgment to be of itself sufficient for explanation.  It is not clear that cases like 
Betty’s can adequately contribute to determining presumption in the Humean/anti-Humean 
dialectic.   
As a thought experiment, consider what would result if Betty simply had no desires.  It 
might seem plausible to convince her to enroll in law school on the basis of some moral duty to 
provide for her parents as her parents provided for her, combined with making a case for law 
being the path most likely to provide financial success.  This requires a sort of Kantian 
appreciation of moral duty as independent from desire (“inclination” in Kantian terms) but such a 
theory is at least on the table.  While I am sympathetic to the anti-Humean view that normative 
judgments as belief states are sufficient to explain motivation, I can imagine no considerations 
that would prevent the Humean from denying that Betty could be motivated to do anything at all 
lacking desires.  After all, why would duty be important to her?  What could motivate her even to 
listen to arguments?  Not only is the modified Betty case far from the actual world, I can imagine 
no way to conceptually or empirically test it.     
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The notion that normative judgments carry motivational force (an anti-Humean view) and 
the notion that normative judgments must generate, influence, stir-up, or access some desire in 
order to motivate (a Humean view) are both able to account for Betty’s actions.  The view that 
there is at least some law-like and regular (though defeasible) connection between normative 
judgments and desires could appropriately be termed ‘weak normative judgment externalism’.   I 
must admit here that it is not clear at what point a suitably weak version of normative judgment 
internalism is at all distinguishable from a suitably weak version of normative judgment 
externalism.  Both views posit a law-like and regular connection between normative judgment 
and motivation for all synchronically rational agents.  I regard adherence to the HTM as the main 
difference between the internalist and externalist views of normative judgment.  That is, an 
externalist view, adhering to the HTM, requires the presence of an appropriate desire for 
motivation (a desire that does not fail to be present in any synchronically rational agent).  An 
internalist view requires no desire, regarding normative judgment as itself motivationally 
sufficient for all synchronically rational agents.   
My account of the causal factors that serve to undermine synchronic rationality in cases 
of akrasia appeals to cognitive states and cognitive factors, but does not rule out a rationally 
necessary connection between desires and normative judgments such as would be invoked by an 
adherent to the HTM.  Because I do not subscribe fully to the HTM, I shall not supply an account 
of what kind of connection that this would be, and thus I supply no specific account of weak 
normative judgment externalism.  Instead I will refer to this family of views as Humean 
externalism, and will direct my reply to this whole family of views, rather than any specific 
version of Humean externalism.  I will argue in my next chapter that the weak internalist 
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understanding of the relationship between normative judgment and motivation is the correct one, 
given the account of akrasia that I have presented. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have specified the implications of the cognitive bias account of akrasia 
on several theories of moral motivation that are most significantly impacted by akrasia.   
Any version of strong normative judgment internalism is at odds with the very existence 
of akrasia.  On the strength of my account of akrasia’s actuality, then, I have supplied a good 
reason to doubt that strong normative judgment internalism is true.  I have, however, weakened 
the strong thesis to hold that there is a rationally necessary connection between normative 
judgment and motivation, and in the process have provided a detailed account of the irrationality 
that akrasia represents while preserving as much as possible what is plausible about normative 
judgment internalism.   
While my account is neither supportive of nor decisive against the Humean theory of 
motivation taken by itself, I do believe that a suitable analysis of akrasia demonstrates that 
strong normative judgment externalism must be false.  Strong normative judgment externalism 
results from HTM’s combination with the idea that normative judgments are beliefs and that 
there is nothing stronger than a coincidental connection between normative judgments and 
motivation (desires).  This is a significant result due to the fact that strong normative judgment 
externalism is commonly regarded as a good explanation for akrasia. To wit, when someone 
judges that A is better than B and chooses B, the assumption is that the person who judged that A 
is better than B must simply not have desired A.  A weaker normative judgment externalism that 
posits a more regular connection between judgment and motivation (desires) than coincidence is 
included as part of a family of views I term Humean externalism.  The next chapter contains an 
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account of the incompatibility of Humean externalism with a preponderance of empirical 
evidence and conceptual analysis.  
To summarize in preparation for the next chapter, a Humean may be an internalist or an 
externalist with respect to normative judgments.  The Humean internalist is committed to 
normative judgments being non-cognitive and motivational (i.e. desires). This is strong 
normative judgment internalism, to which akrasia is a counterexample.  The Humean externalist 
has no trouble allowing akrasia because she is committed to normative judgments being 
cognitive, but (per HTM) non-motivational.  This is strong normative judgment externalism, and 
it has some conceptual difficulties both with explaining why we regularly follow our normative 
judgments and in distinguishing akrasia from compulsion.  I have been advocating a weak 
normative judgment internalism that regards normative judgments as cognitive and motivational 
insofar as one is synchronically rational (the weakening clause).  This position allows akrasia 
and allows for preservation of what is plausible about normative judgment internalism.  This 
view specifies a strong but defeasible (causal) relation between normative judgment and 
motivation, which is the defeating of synchronic rationality by cognitive bias (the full account 
outlined in Chapter 2).  A Humean could, however, hold that desires (defeasibly) cause 
normative judgments, which are cognitive states and (per HTM) non-motivational.  This is weak 
(Humean) normative judgment externalism. The next chapter provides an argument against this 
view and in favor of weak normative judgment internalism. 
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CHAPTER 4: ON NOT BEING AKRATIC 
 The cognitive, weak internalist account of akrasia has, as I mentioned in the previous 
chapter, one chief rival in Humean externalism.  Both weak normative judgment internalism and 
Humean externalism are compatible with the existence of akrasia, and each view is compatible 
with a reasonable explanation of akrasia.  In this chapter I will contend that the cognitive, weak 
internalist account of akrasia is the better account because it is more compatible with an 
empirically informed means of not being akratic. 
 The chief difference between weak normative judgment internalism of the sort that I have 
been advocating and Humean (weak) normative judgment externalism is that the internalist view 
holds that normative judgments, regarded as cognitive states, cause motivation, while the 
Humean position regards motivation as essentially non-cognitive.  In the case of akrasia, the 
truth of weak normative judgment internalism would imply that once cognitive bias is modified, 
akratic behavior is reformed, while truth of the Humean position would imply that only 
modification of desires would reform the akrates. 
 Suitably interpreted, this is an empirical question.  In this chapter, I have assembled 
evidence and explanation that shows that modification of cognitive states as opposed to conative 
or affective states is more reliably indicative of behavioral change in the akrates.  Much of this 
evidence is taken from studies of addiction and clinical approaches to reforming addicts. So I 
shall begin this account by describing the relationship between addiction and akrasia.  
Akrasia and Addiction   
 I mentioned briefly in Chapter 2 that it would be improper to regard akrasia as a form of 
mental illness or psychopathology because it would mean that the traditional feature of 
blameworthiness would have to drop off of akrasia or be strongly mitigated.  I wish to return to 
the blameworthiness of akrasia to discuss what it is that a person is expected to do in order to 
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avoid the disapprobation justly due the akrates.  To this end, I would like to bring in a distinction 
between intemperance, akrasia, and compulsion as they are differentiated by blameworthiness. 
Intemperance: An agent pursues a course of action, c, that is objectively incorrect (i.e. 
that by some reasonable account he ought not to do), while making no normative judgment 
opposing his doing c.  Intemperance is a failure to be motivated to behave as one ought. The 
agent makes an objectively poor choice, and is generally blamed for choosing so. 
 Akrasia:  An agent pursues a course of action, c, that by her own judgment is not the best 
course of action open to her. The agent chooses irrationally and is generally blamed for choosing 
irrationally, but may be given some credit for knowing better and regretting c, unlike the 
unrepentant intemperate. 
 Compulsion:  An agent cannot help but pursue c, whether judging that c is the superior or 
inferior option.  The agent cannot alter his own compulsive behavior, and this is why it is called 
compulsion.  The agent doesn’t choose and is not generally blameworthy (except insofar as he 
allows the conditions for compulsion to obtain, and/or does/did not seek help in redressing his 
compulsive behavior). 
 This distinction is important chiefly because our approbative responses to each of these 
phenomena are different.  In the case of the intemperate, we blame the lack of motivation to do 
what one ought.  The way we go about reforming the intemperate is by convincing them of what 
they ought to do or not do, and if that fails, we generally try to motivate the intemperate through 
reward or punishment to assist them in ceasing to behave recklessly.  The akrates is culpable for 
behaving as they themselves would condemn, but the fact that they themselves condemn it often 
gets partial credit.  Instead of having to convince the akrates of the best way to act, we need only 
assist the akrates in attending to her better judgment.  The compulsive is a case in which 
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persuasion or another ordinary sort of motivational change is not effective.  Generally, we regard 
compulsive behaviors as psychiatric pathologies of one kind or another, and attempt clinical 
interventions if the compulsion interferes with the subject’s ability to live a normal life.  
 Normative judgment internalism characterizes the difference between the three cases in 
terms of the presence or absence of the relevant normative judgments.  What intemperate and 
akratic individuals are blamed for is plausibly actuated on the status of their normative 
judgments vis a vis their actions.  The intemperate simply has no normative judgment contrary to 
their action (but could have such a judgment and ought to). The akrates acts contrary to 
normative judgment (but could have and ought to have avoided such action).  Compulsives 
cannot do other than they in fact do, whatever they judge, and so given the reasonable and 
common view that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, they are not blamed. 
Humean normative judgment externalism explains akrasia in terms of the permanent 
irrelevance of normative judgment (understood as cognitive states) to motivation.  Action against 
normative judgment occurs when someone judges that x is better than y but desires y more than 
x, and so does y.  Under this view, the strongest desires supply motivational force, so people do 
whatever they most desire to do.  Many have found this explanation of akrasia plausible (Mele, 
Irrationality) (Stocker).  If this is the best explanation for akrasia, then reforming the akrates 
consists in some form of desire modification.   
If the Humean externalist explanation is really the best account of akrasia, then the 
approach that it suggests toward reforming the akrates should be the one that demonstrates the 
best success.  If, on the other hand, a primarily cognitive approach is most effective, it is 
reasonable to conclude that akrasia is a primarily cognitive problem.  In other circumstances, 
this kind of reasoning bears fruit.  If a mechanic replaces part A, and the problem is subtly 
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affected, while replacing part B largely or completely fixes the problem, then the mechanic can 
reasonably conclude that part B is the largest part of the problem.  What I intend to demonstrate 
in what follows is that success or failure in reforming frequent akrasia is actuated more by 
cognitive factors than desiderative factors.   
This task is faced with the same problem that I faced in developing an empirically 
informed account of akrasia in Chapter 2.  There has been, to my knowledge (and I have 
searched extensively) no study of reforming anything called ‘akrasia’, so I am faced with the 
task of finding something that has been studied that matches the criteria for akrasia, even though 
the terminology under which it is studied in psychology, psychiatry, and physiology is not the 
same as philosophical terminology. 
Akrasia per se has not been the subject of empirical study, but one sort of frequent 
akratic behavior that has received a great deal of empirical study is addiction.  Instances of 
addiction as examples of akrasia are nothing new in philosophy, but even so, I shall go to some 
length drawing parallels between the cognitive account of akrasia and addicts continuing to 
engage in the addictive behaviors despite judging that they ought not.   
The first step in this process is to recast the distinction between the intemperate, the 
akratic, and the compulsive (above) as a distinction between different sorts of addict.  To this 
end, I appeal to a set of cases supplied by Gary Watson that instantiate the above definitions of 
intemperance, akrasia, and compulsion (Skepticism About Weakness of Will 324):
75
 
(1) The reckless or self-indulgent (intemperate) case: the woman who knows that having 
another drink will likely result in her becoming drunk and unable to fulfill other obligations, but 
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 I do not know if Watson, if pushed, would accept Humean normative judgment externalism, but his 
account in this piece does seem to take seriously the main theoretical commitments of strong normative 
judgment externalism.  See (Smith) for commentary on Watson’s distinction.   
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who prefers the drink and accepts the consequences.  She acts in accordance with her best 
judgment.  
(2) The weak (akratic) case: the woman who judges that it would be better not to drink, 
who could have refrained, but did not.  She acts contrary to her judgment. 
(3) The compulsive case: the woman who judges that it would be better not to drink but 
who was unable to refrain.  She also acts contrary to her judgment. 
It squares with common experience that addicts are often, at various times, one of the 
three above.  Of course, for my purposes, I shall focus attention on the addict who judges that 
they ought not behave as they do, and who is capable of avoiding that behavior. 
 The example Watson brings in has to do with choosing to drink another drink of alcohol.  
This is appropriate, as many instances of failing to do as we judge that we ought are often bound 
up in (at the mild end of the spectrum) bad habits or (at the more severe end) very serious 
addictions.  Failures to change our habits, like when starting a new diet, are frequently cited as 
candidates for akrasia.  In the context of discussing addiction, I shall provide an account of 
cognitive bias modification along with evidence of its effectiveness in assisting persons in 
breaking addictions.  Again, this is an important part of the account because it demonstrates that 
the sort of weakness involved in akrasia is a cognitive weakness because it is most effectively 
remediated by addressing its cognitive aspects.  In identifying the correctable weakness 
implicated in at least these cases of akrasia, I shall be identifying the weakness that the akrates is 
blameable for failing to correct. 
 Before I begin with the main discussion, I would like to point out an issue that may arise 
that might make the following account more likely to be misunderstood.  I have made extensive 
use of empirical data from psychology in developing the cognitive bias account of akrasia, and I 
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shall make use of literature primarily from psychiatry in detailing cognitive bias modification as 
it pertains to reforming akratic behavior.  I do not thereby mean to give the impression that I 
regard akrasia to be a pathology requiring clinical intervention.  I hold what I believe is a 
common view of pathologies requiring clinical intervention.  That is, I view such pathologies as 
examples of compulsion rather than akrasia or (at least ordinary) intemperance.   
In fact, in denying the existence of akrasia, some have characterized reported cases of 
akrasia as instead being cases in which the dictates of a person’s best judgment are 
psychologically impossible for her to follow (Hare, Freedom and Reason).
76
  In any of these 
cases (some of which surely must exist) the action that takes place against better judgment is not 
intentional, and thus is not akrasia.  It is instead a version of psychological compulsion.  In 
adapting psychological literature to empirically inform the philosophical concept of akrasia, it 
would be tempting to identify akrasia with an existing mental disorder.
77
  I encourage the reader 
to resist such temptation, and regard clinical pathologies as more akin to instances of compulsion 
(in the sense that compulsion operates in Watson’s example) than to akrasia.  Even if 
psychologists and psychiatrists do not generally regard pathological behavior to be unfree, the 
more common view of praiseworthy or blameworthy action involves action that is suitably under 
the control of the individual in question.
78
  I shall avoid entry into any debates concerning 
metaphysical free will.  The common view may or not be ultimately mistaken about pathological 
behavior, but at the very least I shall be able to provide an account of cognitive bias modification 
that addresses akrasia but that is not a strategy that requires or is restricted to clinical 
intervention.    
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 See especially Hare’s Ch. 5.  See also (Hardcastle) for a critique of an attempt to reduce psychological 
explanation of akrasia to neuroscience. 
77
 This is largely what Kalis, et al. attempt.  See Ch. 2. 
78
 Aristotle, NE book III, agrees. 
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An addiction is a pattern that persists over time, while akrasia is episodic.  Of course 
some are akratic more often than others, and addictive behaviors will be correlated with more 
frequent occurrences of akrasia.  However, not all addictions are created equal.  There appear to 
be many different sorts of addictions, some involving chemical dependence, and the strongest of 
these may appear better examples of compulsion than akrasia.  Also, some addictions, like my 
own utter dependence on my morning coffee, are, if anything, examples of intemperance rather 
than of akrasia as most people do not care to break their mild to moderate caffeine addictions.    
 I shall like to leave aside both these most severe cases of addiction and the mild 
addictions that people generally don’t regard as particularly bad or worthy of effort in breaking. I 
contend that there are sufficiently many examples of addicts who are capable of controlling 
and/or breaking their addictions, judge that it would be best to do so, and still sometimes fail to 
perform the individual actions that eventually lead to the breaking of a bad habit.  These 
phenomena are rather well studied.
79
   
 Common experience tells us that at least some addictions that addicts wish to break 
involve instances of action against better judgment.  It is part of our common knowledge of 
alcoholism, for instance, that most alcoholics do not think it best that they continue to be 
alcoholics.
80
  As a necessary step in demonstrating that cognitive bias modification is an 
effective remedy for akrasia, I must demonstrate the role that cognitive bias plays in those 
addictions that include examples of akrasia.  What follows then is an account of the cognitive 
aspects of addiction that match up with the account of akrasia as given in Chapter 2.     
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 See (Campbell), which is one of a very few articles that specifically identifies addiction with “akrasia 
or weakness of will”.   
80
 For voluminous examples of this see: (Alcoholics Anonymous), or any other collection of testimonies 
of alcoholics or recovering alcoholics. See also Chapter 1, for my contention that in order to properly 
distinguish akrasia from intemperance we must take at least some of the things that people say about their 
own judgments at face value. 
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Cognitive Bias in Addiction  
 Two kinds of cognitive bias are at play in both substance and behavioral addictions that 
do not involve substances.  One sort of cognitive bias involved in addictive behavior is a bias 
that minimizes recall of the negative effects of the addictive behavior. Let us refer to this as 
recall bias.     
Typically, rewards for behaviors tend to reinforce those behaviors, while negative 
consequences for behaviors tend to discourage repetition of those behaviors.  Long experience 
with conditioning, incentives, and disincentives tells us that such a connection is as regular and 
reliable as any psychological law.  Objectively, addictive behaviors are often harmful.  A failure 
of the addict to reform his or her own behavior, or even to recognize the problem, is a cognitive 
failure—a form of subjective irrationality as well as a failure of objective rationality.   
My account of akrasia has specified that akrasia is a failure of synchronic rationality, 
and not a failure of diachronic rationality.  If addicts believed that their addictions were not 
harmful or if they misestimated the consequences of their addictive behaviors in a way that 
additional information or a different way of considering things would fix, then the addict would 
demonstrate a failure of diachronic rationality.  Surely this is what happens some of the time, but 
it does not capture the full range of mental processes often associated with the persistence of 
addictive behaviors.  Those who seek to give up their addictions often do so on the basis of the 
past negative consequences of addictive behaviors.  It is the failure of their own past negative 
experiences to sufficiently motivate addicts that is, in a way, paradoxical.  Being able but not 
disposed to remember negative consequences of addictive behaviors fits well with Aristotle’s 
talk of having but not attending to knowledge, as well as the more empirically respectable talk of 
information that is or is not present in the global workspace.   
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The phenomenon of recall bias makes a charge of subjective synchronic irrationality 
(akrasia) intelligible and empirically verifiable.  It is not that the addict believes things about 
their addiction that are false, or that they must revise.  Instead, the past negative consequences of 
the addictive behavior are often not recalled at all. 
  William Campbell, a fellow of the American Society of Addiction Medicine, is one of a 
few who explicitly link akrasia in the case of addiction to a specifically cognitive impairment 
(recall bias).  Campbell describes the causal relevance of cognition in addictive behavior as 
follows (the italics are my own):  
“Addicts appear to be acting at various times on 2 different belief systems. The 
first belief is that the addictive behavior is harmful and produces negative 
consequences…The addict appears to act on the basis of faulty reasoning, and the 
actions are such that cognition does not appear to consider the previous negative 
consequences of the addiction.” (671) 
 This is a clear description of akrasia and its classification as a failure of subjective 
synchronic rationality. At this point it is tempting to ask what feature of addiction causes this 
lack of recall.  This is a subtle confusion.  It is like asking what it is about forests that causes 
trees to clump closely together.  Campbell is arguing for cognitive bias as a causally necessary 
aspect of the etiology of addiction.  It is not just clinicians who appear to hold this view.  
Campbell cites some literature from Alcoholics Anonymous, an organization with a wealth of 
practical experience that should not be discounted. In particular, Campbell singles out the 
statement that “…we shall describe some of the mental states that precede a relapse into 
drinking, for obviously this is the crux of the problem.”  
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Recall bias is not the only kind of cognitive or attentional bias implicated in addictive 
behavior.  Another sort of cognitive/attentional bias implicated in addiction occurs in the 
increased attention to addiction-related stimuli in the addict.  We may refer to this as focus bias.  
Focus bias and recall bias serve together to make the addict more aware of the presence of 
temptation and less cognizant of its previous bad consequences.  In Chapter 2, I discussed the 
general usefulness of one-reason decision heuristics, and also their propensity to be misapplied in 
certain situations.  The heuristic gets labeled a ‘bias’ when it gets misused.  Consider the 
ordinarily useful traits of selective attention and memory.  Having our attention drawn to the 
fastest moving object in our surroundings can have survival value.  Often, fast-moving things are 
dangerous (charging predators) or else are opportunities for food (fleeing prey).  Caloric items 
present themselves readily to the attention because there has historically been value in knowing 
where the calories in our environment are.  Generally, the ability to see what we want more 
readily than what we don’t want is very useful.  In the context of addiction, such tendencies are 
positively and powerfully counterproductive.  It makes sense on these lights to regard addiction 
as a misapplication of the ordinarily useful cognitive tools that are selective attention and 
memory. 
 Medical and psychological researchers, in studying addicts and their characteristic 
behaviors, have noticed a number of ways in which addicts of various kinds share cognitive 
traits.  These traits have become an integral part of understanding the cognitive aspects of 
addiction.  Focus bias, as it is studied, consists in the following: a tendency of addicts to respond 
to certain cognitive cues more quickly than non-addicts, a reduced tendency of addicts to 
disengage attention from addiction-related cues and onto non addiction-related cues, and a 
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reduced tendency compared with non-addicts to distinguish target cues from distracters (Mazas, 
Finn and Steinmetz).   
 It is significant to recognize that these same sorts of cognitive biases contribute to a 
startlingly wide range of addictive behaviors, which includes both addictive behaviors that do 
and addictive behaviors that do not involve any psychoactive or mood-altering substances.
81
     
A wealth of evidence suggests that increased attentional bias toward addiction-related 
stimuli predicts relapse of addiction among a startling diversity of addictions.  As one example of 
attentional bias in addicts, a study by Liu et al. made use of what is known as a Stroop task to 
demonstrate focus bias in cocaine addicts
 
(Liu, Lane and Schmitz).  In a Stroop task, cocaine 
addicts and controls are contrasted in their abilities to identify the color of a word while ignoring 
the word’s meaning.  The word is presented, and subjects (both cocaine addicts and controls) are 
asked to press color coded buttons corresponding to one of the potential colors of the presented 
words as quickly as they can accurately do so.  Some of the words are cocaine-related (e.g. 
‘cocaine’, ‘dealer’, or ‘freebase’) while an equal number of words are neutral with regard to 
cocaine and length-matched with the cocaine-related words (e.g. ‘cabinet’, ‘window’, and 
‘armchair’).  A significant difference in cocaine addicts’ reaction times to neutral versus cocaine-
related words is evidence of attentional bias to cocaine-related stimuli.  Controls show no 
significant difference in reaction time to cocaine-related versus neutral stimuli.  The Liu et al. 
study confirmed the results of other studies
 
(Hester, Dixon and Garavan) (Vadhan, Carpenter and 
Copersino) that find an increase in what is above termed ‘focus bias’ among cocaine addicts.   
Further, Liu et al. write “[I]mproving impulse control and remediating attentional bias 
may prove to be helpful tools in the treatment of cocaine dependence.”
 
(121)  It stands to reason 
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 Though Seamus Decker and Jessica Gay claim that research into the role of cognitive bias in addiction 
is scarcer for “evidence about behaviors that do not involve drug use or other physiological factors”.  See 
their (Cognitive-bias toward gaming-related words and disinhibition in World of Warcraft gamers). 
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that if the remediation of cognitive bias would assist in the treatment of cocaine dependence, 
other sorts of chemical addictions should admit similar amenability to cognitive bias 
modification as effective treatment.  Some evidence confirms this suggestion, indicating that 
higher attentional bias negatively correlates with the success of treatment outcomes for 
alcoholics
 
(Cox, Hogan and Christian) and similar confirmation in the case of smokers (Janes, 
Pizzagalli and Richardt).  The Janes et. al study is particularly interesting.  The study measured 
brain reactivity to cues related to cigarettes and to smoking, and concluded that there was a 
strong negative relationship between brain reactivity to smoking-related cues and likelihood of 
continued tobacco abstinence among smokers who wish to quit smoking (our akratic addicts).  
They also found a correlation between brain reactivity (measured by fMRI data) and attentional 
bias (measured by a Stroop task).  In concluding “…that prequit brain reactivity to smoking-
related images is greater in smokers who eventually slip after attaining brief abstinence with 
NRT and that anterior insula and dACC fMRI cue reactivity correlate with an attentional bias to 
smoking-related words.” Janes et al. provide a biological/neurological confirmation of the role 
played by attentional bias in addictions.  
The empirical evidence for the important role that attentional bias plays in addictive 
behavior is not restricted to chemical addictions like alcoholism or addictions to cocaine or 
tobacco.  Other studies have uncovered similar attentional bias (characterized by focus bias and 
recall bias) among overeaters
 
(Nijs, Muris and Euser), pathological gamblers
 
(Boyer and 
Dickerson), and computer gaming addicts
 
(Decker and Gay).   
Decker and Gay, studying computer gaming addiction, used an Affective Shifting 
Go/No-go Task (ASGNG) to measure cognitive bias toward gaming-related cues among habitual 
players of a particular video game against a control group of non-players.  The ASGNG task is 
125 
 
similar to the Stroop task.  A set of positively valenced common English terms as well as 
positively valenced jargon specific to the video game are targets, while negatively valenced 
English and jargon counterparts are distractors for some trials, vice-versa for other trials.  
Subjects are asked to identify the targets by pressing a button when they are displayed, and are 
instructed not to press the button for the distractors.   
So each subject would be expected to press the button for a word like ‘friend’, a 
positively valenced English word, as well as for ‘purple’, a positively valenced word for World 
of Warcraft players.
82
  Subjects would likewise be expected to leave off the button for negatively 
valenced English or World of Warcraft phrases, like ‘betray’ or ‘nerf’
83
 respectively. 
The World of Warcraft players demonstrated cognitive bias toward game-related stimuli 
by more quickly and accurately distinguishing between game-related targets and distractors than 
English targets and distractors, and also distinguished game-related targets from game-related 
distractors more quickly and accurately than the control group of non-players distinguished 
English targets from English distractors.  Decker and Gay conclude: “Similar to past research 
showing that recovering alcoholics had cognitive-bias to alcohol-related words, [game players] 
with high rates of time spent playing computer games showed cognitive-bias toward gaming-
related words.” (807-808) 
 It has long been clear that cognitive performance can be habituated—practice enough 
memorization and you will become better at memorizing things, even without intentionally 
trying to do so.  The role of habit and cognitive bias in the case of the addict seems to be a kind 
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 The most powerful and desirable pieces of weaponry and armor in World of Warcraft are most easily 
distinguished by their names written in purple text (for rare or epic items) versus blue (for merely 
uncommon items) or green (for run-of-the-mill items).  Players refer to receiving such an item as, e.g., 
‘getting a purple’.  
83
 Blizzard, the company that maintains World of Warcraft, often makes changes in the abilities of certain 
classes of players’ characters. Such changes that serve to make a class of character relatively more 
powerful are known as ‘buffs’ while such changes that make a class less powerful are known as ‘nerfs’. 
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of feedback loop.  The addict trains herself to recognize and seek addiction-related stimuli, and 
this makes the attentional bias toward addiction related stimuli stronger.  If attentional bias really 
is as central to addiction as the evidence suggests, this feedback loop would explain why those 
who have been addicted for a greater period of time find it harder to break an addiction.  The 
attentional bias is more highly habituated in the long term addict.   
Because the same forms of cognitive bias are observed accompanying so many varieties 
of addiction, it is reasonable to postulate that these cognitive biases are central to what we mean 
by ‘addiction’.  Evidence that the degree of cognitive bias varies concomitant with the strength 
of the addiction (measured in rates of absinence from the addictive substance or behavior) is 
further reason to believe that cognitive bias is an essential element of addiction.  Since addictive 
behavior is often contrary to the better judgment of the addict, addiction provides a rich field of 
examples for the cognitive bias account of akrasia.   
It is worth noting that in the philosophical tradition, examples of people wanting to 
change their behavior but failing to do so often involve bad habits or addictions.  Unifying an 
empirically informed account of akrasia with empirical evidence concerning the role of 
cognition in sustaining addictions is a philosophically and scientifically significant development.  
It is philosophically significant because it is the first appearance of a thoroughly empirical 
account of a long-discussed phenomenon.  It is scientifically important because it serves to unify 
separate avenues of research under a broader aegis.  Given a clear empirically informed account 
of akrasia, the interested empirical researcher has a starting point in further studying akrasia as 
such, rather than inadvertently revealing elements of akrasia while studying addictions, 
cognitive biases, or decisional heuristics.   
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 As I am primarily interested in the philosophical importance of the empirically informed 
account of akrasia, I shall briefly point out how the empirically informed account contributes to, 
and in some sense completes prior philosophical perspectives on akrasia. 
In Aristotle’s diagnosis of akrasia, undertaken to refute the position that akrasia is 
psychologically impossible, Aristotle proposes that akrasia is the result of having but not 
attending to knowledge of the good.  Lacking the vocabulary of modern behavioral psychology, 
Aristotle appears to have anticipated, albeit in a very general way, the empirically informed 
explanation of akrasia.  Replacing vague notions of having but not attending to knowledge with 
detailed empirical accounts of cognitive/attentional bias preserves the spirit of Aristotle’s feeling 
concerning an appropriate explanation for akrasia and adds an empirically verifiable 
phenomenon on which to ground an explanation of akrasia.   
 Similarly, Davidson, in developing an account of the logical possibility of akrasia, relies 
on a distinction between all-out judgments (judgments that consider everything relevant to the 
evaluation) and judgments with a prima facie operator that take the form pf(x is better than y, r) 
where r is the evidence considered.  Davidson does not consider (as it is outside the scope of his 
paper’s limited purpose) whether the difference between all-out judgments and prima facie 
judgments is empirically verifiable.  The empirically informed account of akrasia that I have 
been advocating fills this gap in this overall story of akrasia as well as Aristotle’s.  Because 
human beings are incapable of simultaneously considering all relevant evidence at the same time, 
and frequently act upon judgments of the form outlined above, it is clear that we ought to see 
cases of action based on evidence that is more apparent or that is attended to first (prima facie 
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judgments) than judgments based on evidence that a more patient thought process would reveal 
as superior.
84
   
 The idea that a specific cognitive weakness explains the difference between the addict 
who sincerely judges that they ought to break their addiction and still relapses has both 
commonsense currency and also empirical verification.  If a computer gaming addict (for 
example) is more apt than the non-addict to take notice of gaming-related stimuli, and also apt to 
respond more quickly to gaming related stimuli than the non-addict, then it should not be 
surprising for their decisions concerning computer gaming are more frequently made on the basis 
of prima facie judgments with gaming-related stimuli crowding out non gaming related stimuli, 
accompanied by a failure to recall past negative consequences of excessive gaming.   
Treating Akratic Addiction 
 William Campbell, mentioned above, approaches the problem of addiction and akrasia 
from a treatment perspective.  Campbell is motivated by what he sees as a problematic lack of a 
unifying definition of addiction that explains why chemical addictions (like alcohol and cocaine) 
should have so much in common with behavioral addictions (like gambling).
85
  Campbell argues 
that the field of addiction treatment has been held back both by lack of a comprehensive etiology 
of addiction, and by an “accepted view” that treats addiction as primarily conative.  He puts it 
briefly: “The accepted view is that craving causes the addict to act.” (671) Campbell follows this 
claim with a brief refutation of the conative accepted view.  First, if the craving were causative, 
then every time the cravings became sufficiently strong, an abstinent addict would relapse.  In 
reality, sometimes they do, sometimes they don’t.  Further, sometimes addicts who experience 
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 See (Davidson, How is Weakness of the Will Possible? 40) for a formal description of better reasons 
supplanting inferior ones in judgment.  
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 “The present conceptualization of addiction inadequately explains addiction as an entity unto itself and 
does not provide any understanding of the relation between the substance and behavioral addictions” 
(Campbell 671) 
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severe craving stop their addictions.  These events tell against cravings as a sufficient condition 
for relapse or as a necessary obstacle to recovery. 
 This is not an extended argument, and it is a bit simplistic, but I think Campbell’s point 
has merit, particularly since the previously discussed evidence indicates a much more central role 
for cognitive states in addiction than conative states.  But because the conative view is so 
prevalent, it is worth more detailed examination. 
  One might preserve the conative view against Campbell’s argument and posit that 
whenever the desire to quit is strong enough, it can overpower even the strongest of cravings, 
and when it is weak enough, it can be overcome even by mild cravings.  However, this idea, 
though common, has its own conceptual problems.  The will (in this case, whatever accounts for 
the desire not to be an addict) is often taken to be the feature of psychology that resists or fails to 
resist desire, and the ‘will versus desire’ description of akrasia has been historically prominent 
enough to translate akrasia as “weakness of will”.
86
  Watson, who is skeptical of the view, puts 
the problem this way: 
“This talk of strength of desires is obscure enough, but insofar as it has meaning, 
there does not appear to be any way of judging the strength of desires except as 
they result in action…Isn’t the only relatively clear measure of strength of desires 
[versus strength of the will] the tendency of those desires to express themselves 
independently of the agent’s will?...If a sufficient condition of compulsive 
motivation is that the motivation be contrary to the agent’s practical judgment, 
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 See also Davidson, “How is Weakness of the Will Possible?” p.27.  Here, Davidson also characterizes a 
separation of “thinking we ought” and “wanting to” as the most common way of handling akrasia.  This 
can legitimately be called the “received view” of akrasia. In (Paradoxes of Irrationality 175) Davidson 
expresses a similar worry to mine that the “will versus desire” picture (he calls it the Medea Principle) 
does not adequately distinguish akrasia from compulsion. 
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then weakness of will is a species of compulsion.”
 
(Skepticism About Weakness 
of Will 327-328) 
 In other words, the “will versus desire” picture of akrasia has difficulty distinguishing 
akrasia from compulsion.  If some desire is so strong that nobody could overcome it, then it is a 
clear case of compulsion, but the evidence for this circumstance is identical to the evidence for 
someone with an extraordinarily weak will succumbing to a stronger, but still very weak (that is, 
resistable) desire.   
 Aside from this issue, the “will versus desire” theorist is constrained by their view to 
offer one of two remedies for the akratic addict.  That is, the “will versus desire” theorist must 
provide some account of what it means to intentionally strengthen one’s own will or else to 
intentionally weaken one’s desires (both of which sound like things traditionally described 
themselves as “acts of will”). I need not belabor the inherent circularity of using one’s will to 
strengthen one’s will.  Put into layman’s terms, the addict who judges that they ought to quit and 
is unsuccessful in quitting needs to find a way to either want the addiction stimulus less or else to 
want to quit more. Such a view is dependent upon some successful method of desire 
modification.   
 Despite the status of the “will versus desire” view as the received view of akrasia, it 
appears that few actually endorse the view in its entirety, while many argue against it.  I have no 
intention of building up the naïve “will versus desire” view
87
 because my primary opponent is 
the Humean externalist. I bring up the “will versus desire” view because it shares one particular 
problem with the Humean externalist, and that is how to best account for reform of the akrates.   
 If the akrates is to act in accord with their judgment that x is better than y, then the 
Humean externalist must come up with an account for desiring x more strongly or desiring y less 
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 See the latter half of (Watson, Skepticism About Weakness of Will) for an attempt at this. 
131 
 
strongly.  This is what Campbell has in mind in referring to a conative approach.  It is my intent 
to show through other additional evidence and analysis that it is much more productive to 
approach addiction from a cognitive angle than from a conative angle, and that the cognitive 
approach to reforming akrasia has been attended with greater success than the conative 
approach.  What I think that this demonstrates is that normative judgments, understood as 
cognitive states, have a much greater role in normative motivation than the Humean externalist 
can accept, and so my version of weak normative judgment internalism is the correct view.       
Changing behavior without changing desires 
Odysseus wished to hear the sirens sing, because their singing was said to be so beautiful 
that men would dash their ships upon the rocks pursuing the sirens who sang so.  Knowing that 
his desire to pursue the sirens would be irresistible, Odysseus ordered his sailors to tie him to the 
mast and then to seal their own ears with wax, and not to let him loose until they were well clear 
of the sirens.  As the story goes, Odysseus begged and pleaded and shouted for his men to untie 
him or to remove the wax from their ears, but they did not hear him, and followed his orders.  So 
Odysseus changed what would have been his behavior without changing the desire to pursue the 
sirens.  He did this by recognizing his interests, anticipating his future desiderative states, and 
then manipulating his environment to make the pursuit of an irresistible desire impossible so as 
to act in accord with his better judgment. 
Examples of this combination of foresight, careful judgment, and manipulation of our 
future selves can be termed ‘Odyssean self-control’ in his honor.
88
  People take similar, though 
less heroic measures every day.  Not keeping candy bars in the house so as to avoid 
overindulging, not shopping for food while hungry, or seeking out a less distracting environment 
in which to work are all examples of Odyssean self-control.   
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 I first encountered this phrase in (Pinker), Chapter 9 
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Consider a more contemporary example germane to the current discussion.  Ingrid is a 
recovering alcoholic. Let us stipulate that she is an addict who judges that it would be best not to 
be an addict, and so is an akratic rather than intemperate addict if she resumes drinking.  She 
very much desires to drink, but of course has no trouble refraining from drinking while at work, 
as there is no alcohol available.  Similarly, her husband helps her to ensure that she resists the 
temptation to keep any alcohol at home.  The most direct route home from her workplace takes 
Ingrid by a pub where she has spent many an after-work hour drinking and socializing with her 
friends, some of whom she has had to break contact with because they have been insensitive to 
her efforts to stop drinking.  She has even had her husband replace the phone numbers for these 
friends with the number of the local AA support line in her phone.  Because she finds the 
temptation to stop at the pub nearly irresistible, she has stopped driving herself home from work, 
going as far as to sell her car and allow her driver’s license to expire, replacing it with a mere 
government ID card.  She takes the bus home, and there is no bus stop near her old pub. 
The reason she goes to such heroic measures is to ensure that she would have to go to 
equally heroic measures to have a drink.  She would have to solicit someone’s cooperation which 
might not be forthcoming if they know she is a recovering alcoholic, and she tells everyone she 
knows that this is the case.  She would have to call and schedule a cab or walk a long distance to 
get to her old pub, and both of those are actions that give her much time to reconsider or not 
follow through with these plans in the course of her ordinary work day.  In other words, these 
obstacles to drinking and going to the pub allow Ingrid sufficient opportunity to attend to her 
meta-judgment as opposed to being in a situation in which recall bias and focus bias would have 
a significant causal role in her behavior.  This is a good example of Odyssean self-control, and 
what is most notable is that it is an attempt to modify behavior not by diminishing the desire to 
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drink, but by Ingrid’s reasoning out her likely response to environmental cues and then placing 
barriers in the way of encountering the cues likely to contribute to a relapse, while replacing 
some cues with cues likely to contribute to abstinence.  
It would beg the question to say that either of course there is some desire not to drink in 
operation the whole time or that of course her judgment that it is best not to drink is sufficient 
motivation for her to work out the strategy that she has worked out.  I do not deny that the 
Humean may be correct and that desires may hold a monopoly on motivation, but I think that 
Ingrid’s case is one which, if taken at face value, demonstrates a form of cognitive self-
manipulation.  Whether there is some desire at play that counters the desire to drink or not, 
Ingrid’s strategy is essentially one that is actuated on her ability to anticipate consequences and 
manipulate her surroundings to achieve results that she judges best.  These are cognitive abilities.  
Further, her efforts are all steps that are intuitively consistent with her judgment that it is better to 
quit drinking, while a failure to do something to keep herself away from bars and alcohol would 
be intuitively inconsistent with her better judgment, opening Ingrid to the charge of subjective 
synchronic irrationality. 
Consider only one more fabricated example.  Alex judges that it would be best to quit 
wasting so much time playing video games.  He decides to make use of the best behavior 
modification research available and visits the website www.stikk.com.
89
 The Stikk system was 
born out of credible research on incentives and behavior modification, and chiefly makes use of 
the insight that it is more effective to give someone a reward (say, money) and then threaten to 
take it away if the subject doesn’t complete a goal than to offer the same reward only once the 
goal is completed.  Alex, in order to make the stikk contract, must set his goal: no more than ten 
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 This is an actual website, founded by Ian Ayres, Dean Karlan, and Jordan Goldberg, two Yale 
economics professors and a former Yale student, respectively. 
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hours of video gaming per week (hey, it’s a start).  Alex must then supply stakes.  Most people 
choose to put money on the line, but the site allows a commitment contract without monetary 
stakes. Alex designates $10 for every hour exceeding 10 per week of video games that he plays.  
Of course, those at stikk do not wish to profit off of others’ akrasia, so the disincentive for 
failure has an interesting twist.  If Alex’s credit card must be charged, the money goes to the 
Westboro Baptist Church, whose views and practices Alex absolutely detests.  Alex then selects 
a referee, who keeps track of his progress.  Alex’s roommate, Beavo, who has been most vocal 
about the amount of time Alex has been wasting at video games, is the logical choice.  Finally, 
Alex enlists several friends and family members to act in the role of supporters, whom he keeps 
informed of his progress and from whom he receives encouraging feedback.   
If this method of behavior modification works, as the laboratory work on which the 
method is based would suggest,
90
 then it is also an example of a form of self-manipulation that 
relies on the ability of the individual to predict their responses (including what their desires will 
be) in counterfactual scenarios.  Would it be most accurate to say that Alex stopped playing so 
many video games because he hated the Westboro Baptist Church more than he loved video 
games? That makes some degree of sense, except that presumably Alex always hated the 
Westboro Baptist Church more than he loved video games, and that his hatred only mattered 
after he intentionally set up a system in which one was set directly opposed to the other.  The 
cognitive anticipation of his future states is doing a great deal of motivational work.  Even if the 
Humean is correct and desires hold a monopoly on motivation, there is at least room to pay much 
greater attention to cognitive states in a credible story of motivation, especially a person’s 
normative judgments.   
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 The site, as of March 20, 2013, lists just over 300,000 workouts completed and over 2.5 million 
cigarettes not smoked. 
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As far back as Aristotle, the difference between the akratic and the intemperate is 
couched in their actions relative to their best judgment.  The intemperate chooses in accord with 
their own best judgment (and thus are subjectively rational), but are disapproved of because their 
judgment runs afoul of some objective standard (and thus are called objectively irrational).  This 
distinction has some consequences that are relevant here.  The intemperate person might be 
persuaded to change their judgment, or might not, but the akratic is susceptible to correction of 
their behavior by simply having their best judgment more readily brought to their attention.
91
   
 Even in cases in which we do little or nothing to change desires that we have, we may 
change behavior.  In the psychological literature, cases like the above are termed ‘cognitive bias 
modification’.  The term sounds more clinical and impressive than it really is.  Actually, the 
kinds of strategies employed in the various forms of cognitive bias modification in the literature 
strongly resemble the above two examples. 
 Cognitive bias modification treatments have their genesis in research aimed at treating 
various sorts of anxiety and depression disorders.  A significant part of the etiology of anxiety 
and depression disorders involve certain cognitive biases, and indeed these biases are common 
across many emotional disorders.
 
 As Matthews and MacLeod put it in their literature review: 
“Evidence has continued to show that, relative to emotionally stable individuals, 
those prone to emotional disorders preferentially attend to emotionally congruent 
cues, recall more unpleasant memories, and interpret ambiguous events in a more 
negative manner. The findings we have reviewed suggest that these emotional 
processing biases occur across emotional disorders, as perhaps might be expected 
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 Aristotle puts it “Moreover, the incontinent person is the sort to pursue excessive bodily pleasures 
against correct reason, but not because he is persuaded [it is best]. The intemperate person, however, is 
persuaded, because he is the sort of person to pursue them.  Hence the incontinent person is easily 
persuaded out of it while the intemperate person is not.” (111) (NE Book 7, Chapter 8, section 4) 
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in view of their frequent comorbidity. The evidence also suggests that apparently 
different types of repeated negative ideation, including worry in GAD 
[generalized anxiety disorder] and rumination in depression, have more in 
common and are more similar across disorders than is sometimes supposed.”
 
(Mathews and MacLeod)   
It is important to note that the cognitive biases specifically identified are focus biases
92
 
and recall biases,
 93
 which are both identified above as important causal factors in addictive 
behavior.  Importantly, these biases disappear when emotional disorders are in remission
 
(MacLeod and Mathews).  This data has given researchers reason to wonder whether attempts to 
address these cognitive biases would improve clinical outcomes. 
In the case of akrasia, the kind of cognitive bias modification that should be effective 
given the cognitive account of akrasia that I have supplied, is as follows.  The key to avoiding 
akrasia is attending to one’s own better judgment.  The akrates needs some form of cognitive 
bias modification that has the effect of combating the focus and recall biases that crowd attention 
to better judgment out of the global workspace.  Such approaches have commonsense support.  I 
am not the first to propose that such cognitive approaches are effective remedies for akrasia.  
Alfred Mele, in discussing what enkrateia (the opposite of akrasia) consists of, writes: 
“An agent can, for example, keep clearly in mind, at the time of action, the 
reasons for doing the action which he judged best; he can refuse seriously to 
entertain “second thoughts” concerning matters about which he has just very 
carefully made up his mind; he can seek to add to his motivation for performing 
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 For more evidence concerning the causal role of focus bias in emotional disorders like anxiety and 
depression, see (Mineka and Sutton) and (Mathews and MacLeod, Selective processing of threat cues in 
anxiety states) 
93
 For more evidence concerning the causal role of recall bias in many emotional and other disorders, see 
(Blaney).  
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the action judged best by promising himself a reward (e.g. an expensive dinner) 
for successfully resisting tempation” (Mele, Self-Control, Action, and Belief)
94
 
The first part of the sentence refers to keeping better judgment in the global workspace, 
or as in Ingrid’s case, keeping unwanted stimuli out of it.  The second part of the sentence refers 
to strategies like Alex’s, though his reward is supporter approbation while failure carries a 
penalty.  Commonsense approaches to behavior analysis and modification are not always 
accurate, but where careful study confirms them, we have that much more reason to rely on such 
approaches.    
 In Chapter 2, I detailed the relationship between decisional heuritics and cognitive bias.  
What is worth noting is that a heuristic is a passive thing, while metajudgment is active, and 
requires attentional resources (i.e. space in the global workspace).  It is also slower and more 
deliberate.  Common remedies for attending to better judgment often feature a strategy of being 
more cognitively active than passive. Counting to ten before acting or speaking gives the agent 
opportunity to attend to metajudgment rather than acting out of anger or other impulse.  Posting 
reminders to oneself where they will be seen during critical moments helps people to attend to 
factors that they at once consider most important and at the same time know they may neglect.   
 The success of some of these long-used attempts at cognitive bias modification is also 
observed in a more controlled setting.  A recent study by Hoppitt, Matthews, Yiend, and 
Mackintosh examines the role of active training in cognitive bias modification
 
(Hoppitt, 
Mathews and Yiend). The study is designed to reveal the effect of active (as opposed to passive) 
training on modifying cognitive bias.   
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 Mele’s view is not a fully worked out view of the motivational role of normative judgments, but his 
focus on specifically cognitive “therapies” is apropos. He cites Alston, “Self-Intervention and the 
Structure of Motivation” The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues ed. Mischel, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1977, p.77 and Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right Oxford: Clarendon, 1979, pp. 111, 
126-27, 333ff. 
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The study takes two groups of volunteers who are not disposed to anxiety, as measured 
by a standardized assessment.  One group is given active cognitive bias modification, while the 
other group is given passive cognitive bias modification.  In the active training, the subjects are 
given a scenario that is emotionally ambiguous until the last word of the scenario.  For example:  
“You have decided to go caving even though you feel nervous about being in such 
an enclosed space.  You get to the caves before anyone else arrives.  Going deep 
inside the first cave you realize you have completely lost your w—.”
 
(Hoppitt, 
Mathews and Yiend 75)  
 The framers of the study point out that such a scenario is emotionally ambiguous in the 
sense that the last word could sensibly be ‘fear’, but supplying the first letter of the word ‘way’ 
resolves the ambiguity.  The subject is then asked if they envision themselves feeling afraid in 
the cave.   
 The passive training group is supplied with the entire passage above, complete with the 
final word, and the sentence ‘You are feeling afraid of being in the cave’ appended to the end of 
the original passage.  Both groups are then given a filler task and then are both presented with an 
emotionally ambiguous passage such as: 
“You are finding that your sight is worse than it was and despite the risks you 
decide to try an experimental laser surgery you've read about. Afterwards as the 
bandages are taken off your eyes, you realize that your life will be affected 
radically by the results.”
 
(Hoppitt, Mathews and Yiend 75) 
 The point is to see if there is a difference between how the actively trained group and the 
passively trained group interprets the ambiguous passage.  The study found a statistically 
significant difference in the tendency of the actively trained group versus the passively trained 
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group to interpret the ambiguous passage negatively.  Presumably if the active training were 
positively valenced instead of negatively as the study write-up indicates then the active training 
would have increased the tendency of the active training sample to interpret the ambiguous 
passage positively.   
Interpreting ambiguous evidence as valenced in a particular way is evidence of cognitive 
bias.  If there were no cognitive bias present, the subject would interpret the ambiguous evidence 
as ambiguous.  What the results of this study seem to indicate is that actively engaging the 
cognitive faculties to interpret data and envision one’s own emotional response has an 
observable causal effect on future responses.  Active cognitive engagement is at the heart of 
cognitive bias modification.  
The study is carefully crafted to isolate the effect of active cognitive training, but the 
study interestingly confirms a great many common platitudes about behavior modification.  For 
example, some form of “visualizing success” is a staple in self-help guides and guides to 
personal and professional success.  The idea is that when you actively visualize yourself acting, 
thinking, or deciding a certain way, you become more likely to act, think, and decide in that way.   
The treatment of a focus bias, especially in cases of addiction, would then have a strong 
effect on determining whether the addict would refrain or relapse.  Most of the work in 
modifying focus bias is in the context of treatments for anxiety disorders.  Part and parcel of the 
anxiety disorder is focusing unduly on negative or threatening stimuli to the exclusion of positive 
or non-threatening stimuli.  There are two ways of measuring anxiety: trait anxiety and state 
anxiety.  Measures of state anxiety are measures of the degree to which a person is in an anxious 
state.  Trait anxiety is a measure of the effect of anxiety-producing stimuli.  A recent review of 
the literature concerning attentional bias modification indicates that “Attention Bias Modification 
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Treatment produced a greater effect on trait than state anxiety measures. This suggests that 
ABMT might target the more enduring aspects of anxiety.”
 
(Hakamata, Lissek and Bar-Haim)   
The message is encouraging for the treatment of akrasia by means of treating the 
cognitive biases that are implicated in the akrates.  If the anxiety sufferer can come to diminish 
attentional biases that select threatening stimuli to the exclusion of positive and neutral stimuli, 
then it stands to reason that the addicted akrates like Ingrid or Alex may train him or herself to 
focus on more stimuli in their environments other than alcohol-related or gaming-related stimuli. 
A study by Lester and others,
 
similar to the Hoppit et al. study described above, but with 
a broader scope, details some strategies for cognitive bias modification designed to broadly treat 
anxiety and depression.  What should strike the reader about their descriptions is that they are 
much more pedestrian in nature than the clinically impressive sounding phrase ‘cognitive bias 
modification therapy’ would suggest.  It is a case in which at least some aspects of our common 
folk psychology have some empirical verification in a carefully controlled setting.   
  A sampling of the cognitive biases and their modification strategies are as follows 
(Lester, Mathews and Davison 300): 
Cognitive 
Error 
Definition Clinical Example Example Modification Item 
Selective 
Abstraction 
Focusing on a detail 
taken out of context, 
while ignoring other 
more salient features of 
the situation and 
conceptualizing the 
whole experience on 
the basis 
of this fragment 
A recent graduate 
begins a new position 
and is eager to make 
friends with their 
colleagues. They ask 
their new colleagues 
whether they would 
like to join them for a 
drink after work and 2 
people accept their 
offer. They focus on the 
fact that some people 
declined and think this 
means they aren’t liked 
You have started a new job 
and hope to be friends with 
your colleagues. At the end 
of your first day you ask 
whether people would like 
to go for a drink and 2 
people offer to come out 
with you. You think this 
means you have probably 
been rejected/accepted Have 
you failed to make friends? 
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rather than being 
pleased that some of 
their colleagues are 
keen to socialize. 
Dichotomous 
Thinking 
Tendency to place all 
experiences in one of 
two opposite 
categories, e.g. flawless 
or defective rather than 
viewing them as 
existing on a 
continuum. In 
describing oneself, the 
extreme negative 
categorization is 
selected 
You’ve been trying to 
diet but you’ve eaten a 
few sweets over the 
weekend. You tell 
yourself that you can 
never control yourself 
and that all your dieting 
and jogging over the 
whole week have gone 
down the drain. 
You have been on a really 
strict diet for a few weeks 
and have totally cut out 
sweet things. However you 
couldn’t resist a piece of 
cake on your friend’s 
birthday. You think your 
attempts at dieting have 
been. futile/disciplined 
Have you completely failed 
in your attempts to diet? 
  
 Notice the overlap between the cognitive errors described in this table and cognitive 
errors involved in classic examples of akrasia discussed in Chapter 1 and throughout this work.  
The examples in the Lester et al. study are tailored to anxiety and depression, but consider 
different ways of fitting the definitions supplied.   
 Ingrid is at a party, and there is alcohol present, and several people near her are having an 
alcoholic drink.  Ingrid focuses unduly on these examples and becomes anxious that everybody 
else is drinking, and she feels a great deal of social pressure that crowds out her resolve to stay 
on the wagon.  Now imagine that a close friend is next to her to apply cognitive bias 
modification treatment.  This interlocutor points out all of the people who are not drinking 
alcohol, and asks probing questions of Ingrid, asking whether she really believes that anyone 
notices or cares whether or not she has a drink.  This line of questioning and pointing out of 
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external stimuli actively engage Ingrid’s cognitive faculties and gives her a greater chance to 
attend to her better judgment of abstinence.
95
   
 Consider now Aristotle’s dieter, who can be accused of dichotomous thinking with rather 
little modification of the above example.  The dieter, though judging that it would be better to 
avoid the sweets than to indulge in them, recalls akrasia in his recent past, and considers his diet 
irrevocably lost.  He indulges in the sweets, contravening his better judgment while making it 
even easier to continue indulging in the sweets.  Again, an interlocutor could actively engage his 
cognitive faculties with probing questions about the real effectiveness of dieting and the 
comparative effectiveness of indulging less as opposed to more.  Again, this would have the 
effect of not only allowing better judgment to prevail in this case, but (in accord with the 
evidence from the Hoppitt study) makes it more likely to prevail in similar circumstances in the 
near future.   
 The success of these strategies for cognitive bias (and therefore behavior) modification is 
also confirmed by Lester et al.  In their words, “Cognitive Error Modification was capable of 
inducing systematic group differences in how hypothetical events were perceived in both a 
healthy and vulnerable sample.” (305)  
 Of course, strategies for anti-akratic cognitive bias modification need not necessarily 
involve an interlocutor.  Controlling one’s environment (as in Odyssean self-control), setting 
reminders for oneself in places that they will likely be seen (being one’s own interlocutor), 
habituating active engagement of cognition and metacognition (repetition of slogans, mottos, or 
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 Consider this from Aristotle: “For some people are like those who do not get tickled themselves if they 
tickle someone else first; if they see and notice something in advance, and rouse themselves and their 
rational calculation, they are not overcome by feelings, no matter whether something is pleasant or 
painful” (Nicomachean Ethics 110) (Book 7, Chapter 7, Section 8) 
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using the ‘count to ten’ strategy) are all examples of cognitive bias modification therapy that do 
not require a therapist.   
 I hope I have not belabored the point, but what I have been arguing is that the right way 
to reform the akrates is to focus on the cognitive aspects of the akrates rather than on their 
desires.  If akrasia involves cognitive bias, as I argued in Chapter 2, and if the difference 
between being akratic and not being akratic is actuated on the modification of cognitive states, 
then this is good reason to believe that the cognitive account of akrasia is the right account.  If 
the cognitive account is the right account, that indicates that normative judgments, understood as 
cognitive states, play a significant role in motivation and action.  The evidence I have gone to 
such lengths describing is at odds with the picture of akrasia painted by the Humean externalist.  
For the Humean externalist, you can judge and cogitate all you like, but unless you have the 
appropriate desires, your behavior doesn’t change.  The evidence indicates that cognitive states 
(which include normative judgments) have a much more significant role than the Humean 
perspective allows in motivation and action.     
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CONCLUSION 
Akrasia has been a significant puzzle for philosophers for a long time.  What I hope to 
have accomplished in this work is something new in the philosophy of akrasia.  I have shown 
that akrasia as a philosophical concept has had a remarkable degree of consistency in addition to 
its longevity.  In akrasia, we see a common part of human experience that baffles us.  How can it 
be that we should be able to think that one thing is truly better than another and yet sometimes 
voluntarily do the other?   
I have shown that recent discoveries concerning the way that people make decisions and 
evaluate options provide the groundwork for an explanation for why humans sometimes act 
intentionally against their better judgment.  This explanation ought to settle the question of 
whether akrasia is possible or intelligible.  Also, in providing an explanation for why we 
sometimes act contrary to our better judgment, I have shown why we may still hold the view that 
there is a necessary connection between normative judgment and motivation.  This avoids the 
trouble of accounting for akrasia without accounting for why we so often do follow our own best 
judgment.   
This account has implications that go beyond the immediate scope of akrasia in moral 
psychology and normative motivation.  Very briefly, this account of akrasia relies on a notion of 
motivation that places a far greater emphasis on the role of cognition in motivation and action 
than is common in philosophy post Hume.  In general, I think that philosophers ought to pay 
much closer attention to the role that cognition plays in motivation.  
Also, my account of akrasia should have implications for public policy. Just for one 
example, consider public service announcements designed to encourage people not to smoke or 
to quit smoking.  The vast majority of such advertisements concern the dangers of smoking, and 
often hyperbolize those dangers in a striking way.  This kind of PSA aims only at persuading 
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someone to judge that they ought not smoke.  A more effective public policy would consider 
akrasia.  Perhaps there are many instances in which people agree that it would be best not to start 
or continue to smoke, but because of the situation that they are in, do not attend to such 
judgment.  PSAs that rehearse situations in which peer pressure or impulsivity are common 
might be more likely to cause people to more frequently or easily attend to their best judgments  
and thus accomplish the goal of the public service advertisement more effectively.   
I hope that these and other questions of moral and normative motivation can be informed 
by treatment of akrasia in this work. 
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